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Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a diverse technology. It is 
already having significant effects on many jobs and 
sectors of the economy and over the next ten to twenty 
years it will drive profound changes in the way New 
Zealanders live and work. Within the workplace AI will 
have three dominant effects.
• AI will change how human work is administered in 
workplaces: particularly how employers hire, manage 
and monitor employees. AI is already being used to 
rank and interview job applicants, to monitor and 
assess the performance of workers, and to assign 
tasks in gig-economy companies. These uses are 
likely to grow. 
•  AI will perform tasks normally performed by humans, 
augmenting the productivity of some workers and 
displacing others. The list of tasks AI can perform is 
long and growing. Such systems include AI-based 
robots like self-driving vehicles as well as effector 
robots capable of manipulating, assembling, painting, 
inspecting and so on. They also include autonomous 
decision-making / decision support systems widely 
used in government and industry, as well as chatbots 
and other systems that analyse and generate text. 
•  AI will also create new types of work. These will 
include high-value jobs like coding and managing the 
deployment of AI systems as well as low-value jobs 
such as preparing data for use in AI training. 
How will AI in the workplace 
change Aotearoa?
We are sceptical of attempts to predict with any 
accuracy the numbers and types of workers that will 
either benefit from AI augmentation or be displaced 
by AI in the coming decades. Much depends on 
decisions yet to be taken by governments, industries 
and consumers. We suspect, though, that widespread 
technological unemployment is unlikely, as the cost of 
unemployment for individuals is so high that most will 
choose even low-value, precarious work over no work 
at all. While AI will create new types of work, we cannot 
predict the ratio of high-value to low-value jobs that AI 
will create. Given the unpredictability of future innovation 
and future labour markets, our education system should 
focus on producing graduates that are broadly skilled 
across the humanities, science and commerce. But 
steps will be required to protect the growing number of 
workers in precarious employment.
The history of previous industrial revolutions and the 
deployment of other general purpose technologies 
such as electricity, telephony, and the production line, 
suggests that the deployment of AI will have significant 
near-term risks including displacement of workers and 
transition costs for legacy industries. It will also have 
significant medium-term benefits. It will enhance and 
make more affordable many goods and services. Overall, 
it will exert downward pressure on the cost of living.
Although we cannot accurately predict the numbers 
of jobs that will be created and destroyed, we can 
predict that New Zealand’s economy and society will 
be subject to three countervailing forces: It will enable 
some workers, by enhancing their productivity and 
incomes, and it will replace or displace other workers.
Some of the displacing AI will be owned ‘onshore’, in 
New Zealand, and some of it will be owned ‘offshore’, 
by large data-rich international entities such as the 
FAANG companies. We cannot know in advance which 
of these forces will predominate in particular jobs and 
industries. So, the challenge for Aotearoa is to prepare 
for an unknown mix of the ‘enabling’, ‘replacing onshore’ 
and ‘replacing offshore’ scenarios. As with previous 
industrial revolutions, there is a significant risk that the AI 
revolution will increase inequality. Addressing inequality 
will be particularly challenging if the profits of the AI 
revolution disproportionately land offshore. 
We suggest a number of possible solutions to the 
replacing offshore scenario. These include enhancing 
New Zealand’s sovereign wealth fund to invest in, and 
hence draw profits from, offshore AI-driven companies 
that are difficult to tax. We also suggest that New 
Zealand might identify AI based industries in which 
we are well placed to compete, such as social media. 
Homegrown AI-based services could be promoted via 
targeted investment or even by government setting up 
New Zealand-based companies, as we set up Kiwibank 
to compete with offshore banking concerns. 
As the large-scale social and economic effects of AI 
are complex, it is essential that government promotes 
a national conversation about how we want AI to 
change life and work in Aotearoa. That conversation 
must be broad, giving particular attention to Māori and 
Pasifika voices. National and international research 
shows that New Zealanders are prone to overwork 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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which exacerbates a wide variety of health and social 
problems. If AI leads to increases in productivity in 
Aotearoa, we should pay particular attention to whether 
it can be used to help us work less. 
Decreasing the length of the work week or the work day 
would have many valuable benefits for New Zealand. It 
would help us to share out high-value, well-paid work 
and it would enhance our quality of life, helping to build 
vibrant and resilient communities in which it is easier 
for all of us to look after our kaumātua, tamariki and 
mokupuna. Local and international research suggests 
that, in many types of employment, decreasing work 
hours has surprisingly little effect on productivity, while 
greatly enhancing the wellbeing and enthusiasm of 
workers. However, in operational roles (such as bus 
driving or nursing) decreasing work hours would directly 
decrease productivity. So, if all New Zealanders were to 
benefit equitably from a shorter work week, government 
would need to provide some form of subsidy for 
employers of operational workers, perhaps similar to 
kurzarbeit schemes familiar to many Europeans. This 
would also effectively increase the number of such jobs 
available to New Zealanders. 
How will AI change work?
As well as addressing these big picture questions, 
this report investigates what it will be like to work 
alongside AI, assessing regulatory changes designed 
to maximise the benefits and minimise the harms of 
AI in the workplace. It is difficult to assess claims that 
AI will generally enhance jobs. As with previous types 
of automation, AI will sometimes relieve us of onerous 
and unpleasant tasks and sometimes leave occupations 
deskilled, reducing the mana and bargaining power of 
workers. 
This report pays particular attention to the way AI 
will change hiring, monitoring, and managing staff. AI 
promises to make hiring faster and less expensive, to 
better match applicants to jobs, and to help increase 
diversity in the workplace. However, there is also a 
risk that AI will introduce unfair bias in job advertising 
and in the vetting of job applicants. When algorithms 
are trained on historical data that reflects historic 
discrimination or inequality, this use of ‘dirty data’ is likely 
to skew outcomes for already disadvantaged individuals 
and groups.
AI is already used widely in the recruitment of workers, 
in targeting job ads to potential employees, shortlisting 
applicants, and evaluating the performance of 
candidates in interviews. There are dangers of unfair 
discrimination at every stage.
AI can also be used in management of workers, 
performing a variety of tasks that were previously 
the preserve of human managers. New AI-based 
management methods promise to improve accuracy 
and efficiency in decision-making, and to reduce 
opportunities for human favouritism and unconscious 
biases. Algorithmic management also has the capacity 
to improve the lives of workers. It could be deployed 
in consultation with workers, so as to accommodate 
the needs of workers with families, enhance leisure 
time and educational opportunities. At the other end 
of the scale, it could leave workers feeling isolated and 
dehumanised, or placed under greater levels of pressure 
or surveillance. It is essential that AI not entrench deep 
disparities between the power of workers, managers, 
and capital owners. 
An algorithmic management system trained on profiles 
of previous workers could make recommendations or 
predictions based on characteristics that are irrelevant or 
discriminatory. Such AI threatens to entrench historical 
discrimination. Managerial decisions in general are 
covered by both the Employment Relations Act 2000 
(ERA) and the Human Rights Act 1993, but issues may 
arise regarding implementation, compliance monitoring 
and enforcement of the legislation. A range of auditing 
tools already exist to help employers avoid inadvertent 
discrimination, but as with recruitment, concerns exist 
about the criteria employed by different tools—what 
notions of bias or fairness they use, for instance, and 
what jurisdiction’s laws they are aligned with.
The opacity of AI systems that could potentially inform 
discipline or dismissal makes it difficult for those affected 
to assess whether employers have complied with their 
legal obligations. Employers should make sure task 
allocation algorithms are ‘explainable’, in terms that are 
meaningful to their workers. 
Another concern relates to growing use of AI-enabled 
workplace surveillance, which can threaten the 
autonomy and dignity of workers. In due course, these 
technologies may require specific legislative attention. 
In the meantime, we would welcome attention from 
the Privacy Commissioner to the possibility of a code of 
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practice directed at workplace surveillance technologies, 
or perhaps workplace surveillance more generally. 
WorkSafe could also have a role to play in regulating the 
potentially harmful effects of algorithmic management 
and surveillance.
Increasingly AI will appear in the workplace in the form 
of collaborative robots (cobots). These may greatly 
enhance productivity but will force a rethink in the way 
we address safety concerns. It will no longer be possible 
to ‘separate and contain’ such machinery, as it will be 
working amongst us. WorkSafe should consider issuing 
a code of practice dealing with workplace robots and 
particularly ‘cobots’, perhaps based on the ISO standard 
for collaborative robots.
AI is a new phenomenon in most workplaces and it is 
poorly understood by many of those who now use it or 
are affected by it. Efficiency gains and cost decreases will 
drive its rapid adoption in many industries. New Zealand 
government and regulatory agencies should facilitate 
this transition to ensure that harm does not come to 
workers or other stakeholders. 
•  Consideration should be given to requiring hiring 
tools to include functionality for bias auditing, so that 
client companies can readily perform audits of each 
recruitment decision process.
•  Discussions should take place between developers, 
employers’ organisations, unions and other relevant 
stakeholders to consider the development of 
guidance and standards for auditing of algorithms 
used in employment situations. 
•  The New Zealand private sector should use algorithm 
impact assessments, assessing factors such as 
privacy and equality. Given the likely challenges 
for smaller employers developing these in-house, 
templates should be made available along the lines 
of those developed by the NZ Privacy Commissioner 
for Privacy Impact Assessments.
 
Effects on consumers, professions 
and society
As well as considering the effects of AI on workers inside 
organisations, this report also considers the ‘outward-
facing’ effects of AI on the consumers of their services: 
customers, clients, patients, and so on. Our main focus is 
on a subset of services delivered by what are commonly 
referred to as ‘the professions’. Work in these fields 
involves a distinctive mixture of specialist knowledge, 
formal and informal value systems, and elaborate 
accreditation processes. They are technically complex 
and play important roles in society. 
AI in the professions has been said to offer many benefits. 
•  Automation of the more routine, burdensome 
aspects of a role could free up time for those tasks 
uniquely suited to human beings.
•  It could help professionals sort and sift high volumes 
of information about, for example, new medical 
treatments. 
•  It could decrease the time taken to provide decisions 
and advice, and it could increase the accuracy of 
certain types of decisions. 
•  It could democratise access to expensive services 
such as legal advice; legal chatbots developed in 
New Zealand by CitizenAI are a promising example of 
this sort of benefit. 
It is unlikely in the near future that we will encounter 
any serious proposal to replace, e.g. healthcare or legal 
professionals entirely with AI, but AI is already taking 
over particular aspects of those roles, or particular tasks 
within them. Concerns that arise in this context are 
considerably more immediate. Some of these relate to 
well-rehearsed concerns about how AI systems get their 
results. These include accuracy, control, transparency 
and bias. We reviewed these concerns in our earlier 
report on government uses of AI (Gavaghan et al., 
2019). However, some of these issues take on particular 
significance in the provision of professional services. 
Concerns about accuracy, for example, are likely to be 
particularly acute in very high stakes domains such as 
healthcare—mental health chatbots deployed in the 
United Kingdom have recently been shown not to detect 
pleas for help that would have been easily spotted by a 
human professional. 
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The lack of transparency of some AI is also of particular 
concern in health contexts in which it’s required that 
patients be able to make informed choices or give 
informed consent. These issues may affect which types 
of AI are able to be used in such contexts, but they may 
also be ameliorated by advances in ‘explainable AI’. 
Bias in professional judgements is not always 
problematic; we want whoever assesses our scans and 
test results to ‘err on the side of caution’ and over-
diagnose malignancy, at least to a point. However 
more pernicious forms of bias are being identified, as 
where images of skin disease manifesting in darker skin 
types are not sufficiently included in training data. The 
potential for such bias occurs in many professions. 
There is considerable debate about the assignment of 
responsibility for harms caused by AI, specifically where 
harms are caused by autonomous AI that learns from 
its environment. In our view, though, these concerns 
are often overstated. Most current AI has very limited 
autonomy and the majority of the ‘learning’ takes place 
in-house, during initial development of the product, or 
during development of a product update. There will 
still be challenges in establishing responsibility and 
liability when AI systems go wrong, but they will more 
commonly relate to the sorts of issues identified in 
Tyndaris v VWM (discussed in Chapter 4).
AI is becoming more humanlike in its dealings with 
clients, customers and such like. This is raising concerns 
about deception and manipulation. This has led to 
regulatory initiatives such as California’s Bolstering 
Online Transparency (BOT) law, which “requires all bots 
that attempt to influence California residents’ voting 
or purchasing behaviors to conspicuously declare 
themselves.” Mandatory ‘bot disclosure’ is something 
that merits serious consideration in New Zealand, at 
least in relatively high-stakes contexts such as high value 
purchases or political campaigning.
It’s common for chatbots to ‘escalate’ cases to human 
workers. This may be due to risk management, the 
chatbot being unable to interpret what humans are 
saying to it, or just a user asking to speak to a human. 
The way such ‘handovers’ work can have important 
consequences for the effectiveness of the system and 
on the way it ameliorates risk in high-stakes contexts. 
Where transitions occur between humans and chatbots, 
service providers should be transparent about how and 
when these will take place, and what information will be 
passed between them.
Much discussion about the increasing automation of 
professional roles relates less to technical concerns 
about accuracy, transparency and the like, and more to 
concerns about the removal of distinctly ‘human’ factors 
such as trust, empathy and ‘the human touch’. At least 
in more high-stakes or emotionally sensitive areas, such 
as health or elder care, we should take seriously the 
possibility that concerns about dehumanisation will 
resonate with many people. However, we should not 
become over-reliant on generalisations or assumptions 
about how people might feel about interacting with AI. 
It’s possible that some people, in some situations, might 
find dealing with AI helpers or carers empowering, or 
less undignified than reliance on humans for certain 
intimate roles. When considering matters such as 
‘empathy’, and whether AI is capable of providing 
them, we should recognize that this can refer to several 
different things, and think carefully about what sorts of 
‘empathy’ or ‘trust’ are valuable in which situations. 
Some professions hold monopolies on offering 
certain services. Other rules govern who can advertise 
themselves as a member of a given profession. Most 
(or all, depending on how we define a ‘profession’) 
have rules applicable to those practising within them. 
Some of these rules are more AI-ready than others. All 
New Zealand professions will have to think through the 
implications of increasing use of AI in their workplaces
In New Zealand, healthcare is regulated in part by rules 
aimed at therapeutic devices, and in part by rules aimed 
at human practitioners. Some healthcare AI seems to 
straddle those two streams. Insofar as it is viewed as an 
artefact, it will be subject to the therapeutic products 
regime, oriented towards risk minimisation. But in those 
contexts where AI performs in a more ‘human’ way—
communicating directly with healthcare consumers—
then it should also be evaluated against the framework 
that exists to ensure that human healthcare providers 
conduct their duties in a respectful and culturally 
competent manner. Whether the new Therapeutic 
Products Bill, and the regulatory system it creates, makes 
adequate provision for this remains to be seen.
Provided they offer legal information in general 
terms, rather than legal advice in response to specific 
situations, it seems likely that AI legal chatbots such as 
those introduced by CitizenAI will comply with the terms 
of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 Act. As the 
technology progresses, though, it may be that legal AI 
will be developed that is able to offer advice tailored 
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to a particular client’s needs. Were that to become 
possible, those using such a service should take care to 
ensure that:
•  With regard to legal advice in general, they do 
not describe the chatbot as a ‘lawyer’ or make 
misleading claims that it is being supervised by a 
lawyer;
•  With specific regard to advice about court 
proceedings, the chatbot would not be allowed to 
offer ‘advice’ at all.
Much current discussion of AI in the professions centres 
on the extent to which the use of AI should be restricted 
in various contexts. Given the projected benefits, though, 
we should also take seriously the possibility that there 
may sometimes be a professional obligation to use AI. 
Some overseas case law has already started pointing in 
the direction of such a duty.
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This report presents our findings from the second part 
of our New Zealand Law Foundation-funded project: 
Artificial Intelligence and Law in New Zealand. The overall 
focus of the report is on the regulatory issues surrounding 
uses of AI in New Zealand. In the first phase of this 
project, we looked at the use of AI – and particularly 
predictive algorithms – in New Zealand Government. 
(Gavaghan et al., 2019) In this phase, we examine their 
impacts on work and employment.
This is a topic that has received a great deal of attention 
in recent years. It was the subject of numerous reports 
(e.g. International Bar Association 2017; International 
Labour Organisation 2018; Royal Society and British 
Academy 2018; World Economic Forum 2018), books 
(e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Ford 2015; Pasquale 
2020), academic articles and media coverage. Much of 
that has focused on attempts to predict how many jobs 
are likely to be taken over by AI and related technologies 
such as robotics, or on which sectors are most likely 
to be affected. In particular, the predictions made in a 
highly influential 2013 paper by Carl Frey and Michael 
Osborne, and a later paper offering a very different 
perspective from David Autor, have commanded a great 
deal of attention. 
It’s not our purpose here to add our own predictions 
to that particular debate. For one thing, we are not 
economists. For another, we are somewhat sceptical of 
the accuracy of any such predictions, especially given the 
additional economic uncertainty in the wake of the Covid 
crisis. Rather than trying to estimate how many jobs 
will be lost or created, our focus is on other questions: 
not how many jobs will be affected or displaced, but 
how will they be affected? We also look at the history of 
industrial revolutions as a means of addressing some big 
picture questions about changes in the nature and value 
of work and about when New Zealand might ideally 
want to gain from an AI revolution. 
While we are sceptical of attempts to quantify the 
displacement effect of such technologies, it seems safe 
to predict that, for the foreseeable future, there will still 
be human workers, and equally safe to surmise that, in 
many cases, their working lives will be touched by these 
technologies. How will the technologies with which we 
are concerned – principally artificial intelligence and 
associated technologies such as robotics – change their 
roles? What will it be like for those required to work 
alongside, or even under, AIs and robots? What sort of 
benefits and harms might result from those changes? 
Of course, it won’t only be the workers occupying those 
roles whose experience is likely to change as a result of 
those technologies. Our focus will not only be on the 
people doing those jobs, but on the clients, patients 
and others who interact with them. What will it be like 
when helplines are ‘staffed’ by artificially intelligent 
chatbots, or to be advised by an ‘AI lawyer’ or treated by 
a ‘robo-doctor’? Are there genuine risks or detriments 
associated with such a change, and if so, how could they 
be minimised? 
In this report, we’re concerned with both of these 
situations: that of the service provider and of the service 
consumer. Or, in more common terms, the worker and the 
client. Our enquiries will inevitably touch on a variety of 
possible impacts: economic, social, psychological, ethical. 
We are not setting out, though, to foretell the future. How 
AI impacts on work will depend very significantly on the 
sorts of choices we as a society make about them. And 
it’s with those choices that we are ultimately concerned 
here. The question at the heart of this report is a large 
and complex one, but it can be stated quite simply: what 
sorts of rules and policies should we have about AI as it 
impacts upon the world of work?
We begin by examining the sorts of technologies that 
are already being deployed across our workforce, or 
that are likely to be deployed in the near future. Chapter 
1 gives a layperson’s introduction to the relevant AI 
methods, highlighting technologies that are having 
the most impact on jobs. We make a key distinction 
between AI systems that are used to administer human 
jobs (in recruitment, management and monitoring of 
workers), and AI systems that are used to take on jobs 
or tasks that have traditionally been done by people. 
We also set out a range of roles those technologies are 
likely to play, from advertising vacancies and recruitment, 
via other administrative and managerial roles, to 
performance of aspects of those roles. We also consider 
some of the new roles that might come into existence in 
response to these technologies.
Chapter 2 consists of a broad analysis of the nature and 
value of work, and some broad recommendations for 
government planners. The history of major industrial 
revolutions and of the development of general purpose 
technologies (such as electricity and the internal 
combustion engine) provides a useful indicator of 
likely large scale, medium term costs and benefits. 
These include effects on individuals, communities and 
companies as well as changes in the cost of living and in 
New Zealand’s productivity and resilience. 
INTRODUCTION
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As AI will bring major change to New Zealand 
workplaces, it is essential that we begin by considering 
the ways in which work is valuable to New Zealanders. 
For most people, work is primarily valuable as a means 
of getting money. For many, though, work is also a 
contributor to wellbeing; it can provide opportunities for 
social interaction, provide a structure for our days, and 
create a feeling of self-worth. How is the introduction 
of AI likely to affect those aspects of work which are 
valuable to people? 
As we noted at the outset, unlike many commentators, 
we refrain from making strong predictions about how 
much work is likely to be taken over by AI, or even how 
working life will change. Instead, we sketch three possible 
scenarios that policymakers can anticipate and prepare 
for: what we’ve termed the enabling scenario, the 
replacing onshore scenario, and the replacing offshore 
scenario. In each of those scenarios, there are policy 
options that we believe would mitigate adverse outcomes 
such as inequality and maximise benefits such as a higher 
standard of living or decreased hours of work.
In the remainder of the report, we move away from 
issues of future policy to take a more detailed look at 
how AI technology is currently entering the workplace. 
In Chapter 3, we focus on the experience of individual 
workers. The chapter is structured around the ‘life-cycle’ 
of employment. A worker is first recruited, through job 
ads and selection processes. If engaged, the worker is 
then managed, by being assigned tasks, in which her 
performance is monitored and evaluated. AI is becoming 
involved in all of these processes. While this often 
simplifies and streamlines employee-facing tasks, it also 
creates several concerns.
Many of these are familiar from the earlier work on AI; 
concerns about transparency and bias, for example, 
are common to most domains in which AI is discussed, 
though they can raise distinct concerns in the present 
context. Other concerns – around workplace health 
and safety, and privacy and surveillance – are familiar 
from the realms of employment law, labour studies 
and management. But the intersection of these 
subjects poses new challenges, and perhaps requires 
new solutions. This chapter also allows us to consider 
whether some of the key concepts underpinning our 
employment law are likely to be fit for purpose in a 
future where workplace AI is commonplace.
In Chapter 4, we consider how AI’s use in workplaces 
producing goods and services will impact on consumers 
of these products, and on society more generally. In 
2017, technology commentator Adam Greenfield issued 
the following warning about the impact of the latest 
automation revolution on the world of work: 
We now stand at a juncture where there is no 
pursuit that cannot in principle be undertaken by 
an automated system, and we need to come terms 
with what that might mean for the economy, the 
ways in which we organize our societies, and our 
own psyches. (Greenfield 2017, p.185)
While it’s plausible that this new industrial revolution 
will impact on just about all sectors of the workforce 
to some extent, for the purposes of this report we will 
focus on a particular subset: that part of the workforce 
commonly regarded as the professions, with an 
emphasis on the legal and healthcare professions. 
There are a number of reasons for this emphasis. One is 
that, while the professions have been relatively insulated 
from the impacts of previous waves of automation, 
this is widely considered not going to be true of the AI 
revolution. As a 2014 Pew Research Centre report said: 
“Impacts from automation have thus far impacted mostly 
blue-collar employment; the coming wave of innovation 
threatens to upend white-collar work as well.” (Smith and 
Anderson 2014) Indeed, the level of disruption that may 
follow from this latest industrial revolution have led some 
influential commentators to forecast that the professions, 
as we have known them, will be steadily dismantled. 
(Susskind and Susskind 2016)
Even if this is an exaggeration, any significant degree of 
disruption would of course have profound implications 
for those who currently work – or who expect to 
work – in those professions. But the impact on the 
professions could have an even wider societal impact. 
Professions in general, and perhaps some in particular, 
are often thought not only to be keepers of certain kinds 
of specialised knowledge, but also, to be custodians 
of certain ethical values. This is reflected in the fact 
that professions are often (or always, depending on 
which definition one chooses) already subject to quite 
extensive regulation, either self- or externally imposed. 
As Richard and Daniel Susskind acknowledge, though, 
“their exponents are ordinarily thought to be bound 
by a common set of values over and above any formal 
regulations that apply to them.”
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What would it mean if the humans charged with 
upholding those values were replaced, in whole or 
substantial part, by technology? What would it mean 
for the clients, patients, students and others who 
avail themselves of those services? For society more 
generally?  We will consider these questions in general 
terms, but many of our case studies will be drawn 
from law and medicine, which are well suited for the 
discussion, having been subject to extensive academic 
attention regarding the ethical dimension of those roles.
While this makes them ideal candidates for case studies, 
this in no way means that we consider these professions, 
nor those working within them, to be generally more 
important than other parts of the workforce. If it were 
not already clear, the Covid crisis has emphasised the 
importance to societal functioning of many workers 
outside of the professions: cleaners, delivery drivers, 
supermarket staff and all the other ‘essential workers’ 
who were deemed to indispensable to be subject to 
lockdown. It is likely that their lives too will be impacted 
by AI algorithms, not least in what has come to be 
known as the ‘gig economy.’ Some of these more general 
implications will also be addressed in this report.
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In this chapter, we will introduce the AI technologies 
that feature most prominently in discussions of AI and 
employment. We won’t assume any special technical 
knowledge; instead we’ll focus on providing practical 
examples of AI systems that are in actual use. Our 
purpose in introducing these examples is to outline a set 
of use cases for current AI systems, to serve as a platform 
for the ethical and regulatory questions about AI and 
employment which we consider in subsequent chapters. 
AI impacts on employment in three broad ways. Firstly, 
AI systems are used to help administer employment 
in organisations. In this role, AI systems operate in the 
domains of Human Resources (HR) and Personnel 
Management, which recruit human employees, set them 
particular tasks, coordinate their activity, and oversee 
their work. We will discuss these systems in Section 
B. Secondly, AI systems are used to help perform the 
tasks which define the purpose of the organisation: the 
creation of particular products or services. In this role, 
AI systems can assist human employees in their day-to-
day work in a variety of ways, or even replace certain 
human employees altogether. We will discuss these 
systems in Section C. There’s some degree of overlap 
between these categories, of course: organisations 
normally employ people to perform HR and Personnel 
Management roles, so AI systems that contribute to 
these functions will also be assisting or replacing human 
employees. But it is still useful to distinguish between 
AI systems that support the human infrastructure of 
an organisation and those that produce its goods or 
services. Finally, the AI industry has created some new 
areas of human employment: certain human jobs that 
didn’t previously exist. We will discuss these new jobs  
in Section D. 
The AI systems that perform administrative and 
production functions for organisations are in some 
ways extremely diverse, as our survey will demonstrate. 
However, modern AI systems also tend to rely on certain 
core technologies, in the field of machine learning. 
Understanding something about these technologies 
is helpful in understanding the diverse roles that AI 
systems can play in organisations, and in understanding 
the potential and limitations of current AI systems. 
We will begin in Section A by briefly introducing these 
technologies.
A. A core component of current  
AI systems: machine learning
A traditional computer program is written by a 
programmer, as a sequence of instructions for the 
computer to execute, written in some programming 
language. Modern AI systems certainly include hand-
written code of this kind. But the code is often 
supplemented with algorithms that have been produced 
automatically, rather than written by hand. The 
‘producer’ of these algorithms is a separate computer 
program called a machine learning system,1 which 
discovers the algorithm which ‘works best’, according 
to some specified criterion. Rather than directly writing 
code to perform some task, AI engineers often use a 
machine learning system that will learn an algorithm 
that performs the task as well as possible. Their effort 
can then be focused on specifying the task in precise 
detail, so that the machine learning system can learn 
most effectively how to do it. 
There are different kinds of machine learning, which 
specify the task to be learned in different ways. But in 
each case, task specification involves supplying a body of 
training data from the task domain. Informally speaking, 
training data for a machine learning system is like 
‘experience’ for a human employee. Human employees 
tend to learn on the job, improving their skills as their 
experience grows. In a similar way, the performance of 
a machine learning system typically improves the more 
data from the task domain it is trained on. A key reason 
why AI systems have improved in recent years is that 
online data in relevant domains has become available 
in ever-increasing quantities, which can be configured 
as training data for machine learning systems. We’ll 
briefly review the three most prevalent machine learning 
paradigms in the remainder of this section. 
1. DEFINING THE TECHNOLOGY OF INTEREST
1 In this chapter, we will use bold face for technical 
terms when they are introduced. 
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Supervised learning
By far the most widely used machine learning paradigm 
is supervised learning. In this paradigm, the training 
data consists of a set of specific situations or scenarios 
to which the system must respond, each paired with 
the response the system should produce. Each item of 
training data consists of an input pattern, representing 
a situation or scenario, paired with an output pattern, 
representing the desired response. In relation to human 
jobs, training data of this sort plays the role of an 
employee mentor, telling a new recruit ‘If this happens, 
you should do this’. The system learns to respond 
appropriately to the training inputs—and hopefully, also 
to inputs that are similar to the training inputs. (A key 
purpose of all machine learning systems is to generalise 
away from the supplied training data, so as to behave 
sensibly for unseen inputs, in virtue of their resemblance 
to seen training inputs.) 
A typical example of a system trained with supervised 
learning is a visual object classification system, 
whose purpose is to recognise objects in computer 
images. In this case, each training item is an image of 
a certain object (an array of pixels), paired with a label 
identifying what type of object it is (for instance, the 
label ‘dog’, or ‘cat’, or ‘table’). The system’s task when 
given an image is to produce the label that correctly 
identifies it. After training on many examples of dogs, 
cats, tables and so on, the idea is that the system 
should be able to recognise unseen images of these 
object types. Of course, human employees learn these 
simple object-recognition skills long before entering a 
particular workplace—but such skills are important in 
many jobs. For instance, a driver needs to be able to 
classify objects in her field of view as pedestrians, cars, 
buildings, road signs, and so on. But workplace learning 
often involves similar perceptual skills. For instance, a 
radiologist needs to learn to classify mammograms 
as cancerous or cancer-free, or bones as fractured or 
unfractured, and this learning typically happens through 
supervision, by being shown instances of the different 
categories. Actually, a wide variety of human skills can 
be approximated with supervised learning. For instance, 
a supervised learning system can learn to recognise 
different types of legal document (Wan et al., 2019), 
to rank prospective employees based on their blog 
posts and LinkedIn profile (Faliagka et al., 2012), and to 
produce written texts that plausibly continue a supplied 
initial passage (Radford et al., 2019). We will discuss 
these systems in Sections B and C. 
Machine learning systems need good training data—
but they also need good learning methods, which 
can learn tasks with some degree of complexity, and 
whose learning extends in the right way to unseen 
inputs. Learning methods include well-known statistical 
techniques. For instance, the statistical technique of 
regression, which has been in wide use for decades, 
can be understood as a supervised machine learning 
method. However, the current boom in AI is largely due 
to somewhat more recent machine learning systems—in 
particular to deep neural networks. We will therefore 
take a moment to introduce deep networks as an 
example of a supervised machine learning system.2
A neural network is a program whose execution is 
loosely based on the way computation happens in 
the brain. The brain represents information in activity 
patterns within groups of neurons. And it performs 
computation through the synapses that link neurons 
together, which cause activity patterns in one part of the 
brain to activate patterns in other parts. A deep neural 
network represents its input and output patterns as 
numerical activity values in banks of units, which loosely 
model patterns of activity in groups of neurons. The 
network links input patterns to output patterns through 
large arrays of connections, which loosely model 
synapses. Typically, these connections run through 
intermediate layers of ‘hidden units’, as illustrated 
in Figure 1. (In a ‘deep’ network, there can be many 
intermediate layers.)
2 In the remainder of the report, regression methods will be included 
in the family of ‘AI methods’. We won’t distinguish between older 
supervised learning methods like regression and newer methods like 
deep networks. 
Figure 1. A neural network mapping an input representation onto an 
output representation, via an intermediate layer of units. (Connections 
are shown as lines linking units.)
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The connections between units can have different 
weights. Those with high weights pass signals on 
strongly, while those with weak (or zero) weight pass 
signals on weakly (or not at all). Different functions 
from inputs to outputs are implemented in a network 
by setting different patterns of connection weights. In 
this computation scheme, the computer’s algorithm 
is specified by defining particular weights for all the 
connections in the network. A working deep network 
may have tens of millions of weights—so this way of 
telling a computer ‘what to do’ is very different from 
writing computer code by hand. 
The learning method for a deep network begins by 
setting all the weights in the network to random 
values. In this state, each training input will be mapped 
onto an output which is also essentially random. 
Learning happens by comparing the actual output 
for each training item to its desired output—and then 
incrementally changing all the weights in the network, so 
the actual output produced becomes fractionally closer 
to the desired output. (The algorithm that makes these 
changes is called backpropagation.) With extensive 
training, a good network can map training inputs quite 
closely onto the desired training outputs—and can also 
map unseen inputs onto sensible outputs. 
A deep network can reproduce certain types of human 
expertise quite well. Visual object classification is a 
case in point: current systems perform better than 
humans, on many kinds of object (see e.g. He et al., 
2015). In fact, a deep network may at some level be 
a reasonably good model of the human visual object 
classification system (see e.g. Kriegeskorte, 2015). 
But as already mentioned, deep networks can also 
approximate human performance in more abstract, 
high-level tasks, such as document classification and text 
generation. In these domains, the networks approximate 
human performance through processes that are quite 
different from those taking place in humans. A deep 
network is just a very expressive, flexible function 
approximator. Backpropagation is just a very effective 
way of minimising a network’s error on a set of training 
examples. If a deep network is trained on a large and 
detailed enough training set, its performance can often 
be somewhat human-like—enough for organisations to 
consider using deep networks to supplement or replace 
certain human tasks. 
In practice, it is often the simple, repetitive, time-
consuming work in a company that is most readily 
amenable to automation using AI methods. And often, 
supervised learning methods are the most suitable 
learning paradigm. 
Reinforcement learning
A second machine learning paradigm is reinforcement 
learning. Here again, the system must learn to map 
inputs in some domain onto responses. But in this 
case, the system is not told precisely what the response 
should be: it produces responses, and for each, the 
trainer issues a reward, or a punishment. In relation to 
human jobs, this training paradigm is somewhat similar 
to a boss who congratulates employees when they do 
something right, and reprimands them when they do 
something wrong (but doesn’t suggest what they should 
have done instead). It’s also similar in some ways to a 
performance-related salary scheme, where employees 
get more money the better they perform. In such a 
scheme, every bad interaction with a client, each missed 
sale, incurs a penalty, and each good interaction brings 
a bonus. 
Reinforcement learning systems are particularly common 
in domains where the agent can perform sequences 
of actions, and where a reward is only obtained after 
certain specific sequences are performed. Robots often 
operate in domains like this: typically, a robot must 
perform a sequence of motor movements in order 
to achieve a particular goal state. (This is true, for 
instance, if the robot receives a reward when picking 
up a given object, or manipulating it in a certain way.) 
A reinforcement learner must essentially learn its own 
training set, which specifies what actions to do in what 
situations. In most current systems, these training sets 
are then used to train a deep network, of the kind 
already described, to produce individual actions. 
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Unsupervised learning
A final machine learning paradigm is unsupervised 
learning. In this paradigm, the system is simply shown 
data from some given domain, with no additional 
training signal at all. The system’s task is to learn 
patterns, or regularities, in the data. For instance, an 
unsupervised system could be presented with data 
about supermarket shopping trips, and learn that 
customers who bought several bottles of alcohol on 
a Friday on hot days during the Summer also tended 
to buy barbecue materials. In relation to human 
employment, unsupervised learning involves learning 
generalisations, which characterise customers, tasks, 
or other situations encountered by employees. A 
supervisor training a new employee might express 
these generalisations explicitly in conversation, to 
convey useful facts about the nature of the employment 
domain. (‘On hot days during the Summer, people often 
come in shopping for barbecues...’) 
Technically, unsupervised learning methods typically 
perform some kind of clustering of their input data. This 
clustering identifies broad categories of input patterns—
often in a way that usefully simplifies or compresses the 
raw data. Often, the input data supplied to a supervised 
learning system has undergone some form of clustering, 
which simplifies the learning task to be achieved
Unsupervised learning systems can also be useful for 
detecting unusual patterns in a dataset. An unusual 
pattern is one that falls outside one of the detected 
common patterns. Identifying unusual circumstances can 
be useful in domains like security and fraud detection, 
and also more generally in tasks where someone or 
something needs to be monitored. 
B. AI systems in HR and Personnel 
Management
When we consider ‘the impact of AI systems on 
employment’, a useful place to look is the role of 
AI systems in administering employment: in hiring, 
monitoring and managing an organisation’s employees. 
There is some evidence that AI systems are making a 
particularly large impact in these parts of organisations 
(see e.g. Volini et al., 2019). There could be several reasons 
for this. For one thing, HR-related tasks vary comparatively 
little from organisation to organisation, creating large 
markets for these tasks. (Accounting tasks are also 
relatively constant across organisations. But conventional 
programming is still the best way of automating these 
tasks; machine learning has a more subsidiary role to play.) 
For another thing, HR tasks often involve high volumes 
of relatively simple, repetitive activities, which are good 
targets for machine learning systems. 
We’ll discuss three types of HR/Personnel Management 
task in this section: employee recruitment, employee 
monitoring, and gig-economy job assignment. 
Employee recruitment systems
Organisations have to advertise for employees when 
they have a vacancy. People seeking work must in turn 
hunt for suitable positions in suitable organisations, and 
in due course, submit applications for their preferred 
positions. Companies often receive large numbers of 
applications for their advertised positions, and must 
assess these. Typically, an application comprises a CV 
and a covering letter. Companies normally process these 
written application documents, and rank applicants, to 
create various long lists and short lists. Often, shortlisted 
candidates are invited for an interview in which a more 
detailed assessment can be made. 
The Internet has affected every stage of this process. 
General ‘job websites’ such as Indeed, ZipRecruiter, 
and LinkedIn have become large clearing-houses for 
job seekers and job advertisers. The main service they 
provide is to match job seekers with job advertisers. 
(This is a service for which both seekers and advertisers 
are willing to pay.) Typically, applications are submitted 
online, via email or web forms. Scrutiny of applications 
sometimes includes accessing applicants’ public social 
media presence, though this practice violates privacy 
laws in some jurisdictions, for instance in the EU, unless 
candidates’ permission is sought and granted (see 
EU Data Protection Working Party, 2017). Finally, it’s 
increasingly common for job interviews to be conducted 
online too, via video tools such as Zoom. 
As tasks related to recruitment move online, they 
become increasingly amenable to modelling by AI 
systems. There are now AI tools that address each 
step of the recruitment process. Job websites deploy 
tools that learn how to perform the task of matching 
job seekers to vacancies. This learning typically 
involves extracting desired candidate attributes from 
job advertisements, and actual candidate attributes 
from CVs, and passing these extracted features to a 
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candidate ranking algorithm, which learns to reproduce 
the rankings of human experts (see Liu, 2009 for a 
generic ranking algorithm). A simple keyword-based 
version of the attribute identification task can readily 
be done with an accuracy of around 90% on unseen 
applications (see e.g. Intuition Engineering, 2018). The 
task of mapping the text of a CV or job ad to a set of 
keywords can be achieved with supervised learning, 
if training sets of documents with manually specified 
keywords are prepared. 
When an organisation placing a job ad processes the 
applications it receives, it must perform its own version 
of the task of matching job ads to applicants, for this 
particular vacancy. In this case, there is an additional 
emphasis on identifying the best applicants, so CVs 
and covering letters are assessed for quality, rather 
than just for job description matching. There is some 
evidence that machine learning systems can actually 
perform better in this task than human HR managers. 
For instance Hoffman et al. (2015) trained a model 
to predict the performance of low-skilled workers in 
a company (which was evaluated separately when 
they were at work), based on a questionnaire. They 
then gave HR managers access to a decision support 
system that graded new candidates using these 
predictions. Managers could ‘accept’ or ‘override’ the 
system’s recommendations. They found that overriding 
the system’s predictions led to worse hiring decisions. 
A similar study (Chalfin et al., 2016) found that 
candidate grading models trained on actual employee 
performance were helpful in improving the performance 
of an organisations’ employees. 
In processing candidates’ applications, companies may 
scan their social media sites, in jurisdictions where this is 
allowed, or where candidates have granted permission 
to do so. One common focus here is in identifying 
applicants’ personalities. Job descriptions often require 
particular personality types. Applicants’ social media 
pages hold rich information about their personality 
(see notoriously Youyou et al., 2015). It is quite easy 
for applicants to dissemble about relevant personality 
traits in a CV or covering letter, but much harder for 
them to do this in their social media pages. Social media 
sites also offer information about candidates in the 
form of images and videos. Image classification most 
readily delivers information about candidates’ lifestyle 
and ethnicity—both of which are normally irrelevant 
for job suitability, except in special circumstances, and 
can be expected to raise challenging questions about 
discrimination and bias. 
Even the task of interviewing candidates is one where 
AI systems are increasingly deployed. The interview 
involves a type of AI system called a chatbot, which 
we will discuss in more detail in Section C. Many 
of the most popular interview chatbots operate in 
a typed phone message conversation. The market 
leader in this space is probably Mya, which is already 
used at scale; for instance, one Mya client processed 
over 140,000 applicants for a warehouse job in three 
months (Schweyer, 2016). Mya appears to make 
large improvements in recruiter productivity: its own 
website claims an improvement of 140%, though we 
may have to make provisions for self-interest in this 
report. Other chatbots operate over the phone (e.g. 
Curious Thing). Still others operate over a video link, 
observing the interviewee through a camera. HireVue 
is a well-known system of this kind. These latter 
systems involve additional complexity (for instance, 
speech interpretation, visual gesture analysis), but 
potentially capture additional relevant information 
about candidates—in particular, cues to candidates’ 
emotions, expressed in speech or physical behaviours 
(facial expressions and body language). These cues 
are supposedly informative in job interviews. However, 
nonverbal cues to behaviours like lying are not reliable 
(see e.g. Vrij et al., 2019), and methods for automatically 
identifying emotions through facial expressions and 
gestures are still in their infancy (see e.g. Ko, 2018). 
These multimodal chatbots also open new roads for 
discrimination and bias, similar to systems that trawl 
social media sites. However, we should note that 
considerable bias already exists in human-operated 
recruitment processes. It is possible that AI systems 
could eliminate some of the bias that already exists 
in recruitment processes. Indeed, some recruitment 
companies claim their systems do exactly this: we will 
discuss the case of Entelo in Chapter 3. 
There is a large online discussion around how 
candidates should behave in job interviews to optimise 
their chances for AI processing. Similarly, there are many 
suggestions about what material candidates should 
include in their CVs. (Mentions ‘Oxford’ and ‘Cambridge’ 
and so on are encouraged.) Of course candidates can 
be coached for human job interviews—but there is a risk 
that AI systems pick up on superficial behaviours that 
can be more easily faked. 
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There are many questions that must be asked about 
an AI system used in a recruitment task. We briefly 
enumerate these here; they will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter 3. 
•  Quality: how accurately does the AI system perform 
its task? (Does it perform like humans? If not, 
then it will have a potentially large impact on an 
organisation’s employee makeup.) 
•  Bias: does the system act in the same way towards 
all applicant groups? It may be that it is more 
accurate on some groups than others. It may also be 
that it is more favourable towards some groups than 
others in its assessments. (Bogen and Rieke, 2018 
are a useful reference here.) But it may also be that 
systems can be built that eliminate or reduce human 
bias, as we will discuss in Chapter 3.
•  Gaming: can candidates game, or fool the system, if 
they know how it is being used? 
•  Oversight and control: do human recruiters remain 
sufficiently involved in the hiring process, if they are 
aided by the system? 
•  Privacy: does the system infringe on applicants’ 
private data? (This question arises for non-AI 
methods too, but it may be that automating 
processing of social media sites enables infringement 
on a scale that would not otherwise be possible.) 
Employee monitoring and evaluation 
systems
AI tools are also used to assess employees’ performance 
in organisations after they have been appointed. Again, 
the potential for AI assessment arises because information 
about employees’ work and behaviour is increasingly 
available online. This is partly because employees often 
work on computers, where activity can be directly logged. 
Currently, 43% of US companies monitor employees’ email, 
45% track employees’ computer keystrokes or time spent 
at the keyboard, and 43% store and review employees’ 
computer files (American Management Association, 
2019). To a lesser extent it is because of monitoring 
devices like GPS receivers, personnel trackers and video 
cameras, which are increasingly a part of workplace 
environments. 7% of US companies use video surveillance 
to track employees’ on-the-job performance, and 8% use 
GPS to track company vehicles (American Management 
Association, 2019). 
It is important to distinguish between AI and non-
AI-based methods of evaluating employees. If an 
organisation simply logs online activity, or GPS 
coordinates, or collects information about this data in 
a database or spreadsheet, no AI techniques are being 
used. We can still ask many questions about intrusive 
practices, oversurveillance, and employee privacy. What 
we will focus on in this report are systems that use data 
of this kind as input to a machine learning system. This 
system could involve supervised learning, if the employer 
wants to predict some higher-level evaluation score. For 
instance, in 2014, the analytics company Sociometric 
Solutions fitted Bank of America call centre employees 
with personal trackers, and used the tracking data to 
build a model predicting performance. They found that 
employees who took breaks in large groups performed 
better, and were less likely to quit. They introduced 
shared coffee breaks for large groups of employees, 
and found this improved productivity by over 10%, 
while reducing turnover by 40% (The Week, 2015). The 
machine learning system analysing employee activity 
could also use unsupervised learning, if the employer 
simply wants to get a broad picture of the types of 
activity employees engage in, and/or the types of 
employee in the organisation. 
Note that assessment technology can supply data 
about employees that can be retrospectively paired 
with their job applications, to generate training sets 
for the CV evaluation tools described in Section B. This 
practice appears to be increasingly common: employee 
assessment products are often now paired with job 
applicant assessment products. This pairing considerably 
reduces the amount of hand-annotation needed to 
train the job applicant assessment tools. But it also 
means the accuracy of these latter tools is limited by the 
accuracy of the assessment systems. 
The questions that need to be asked about employee 
assessment AI tools are largely the same as those for 
AI tools used in recruitment: they relate to quality, bias, 
gaming, oversight, and privacy. 
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Job assignment systems in the gig 
economy
Human employees must be engaged, and their 
performance must be monitored—but they must also 
be assigned work. This task is normally the preserve 
of a human manager. But AI systems are intervening 
in management processes too. Sometimes, human 
managers use AI systems and other algorithms to 
inform their decisions. Sometimes, algorithms take over 
the task of management altogether. The latter type of 
management is especially associated with the so-called 
‘gig economy’. 
A gig-economy company is in some ways like a job 
recruitment service, in that the key task is to match 
human workers with jobs. But in a gig-economy 
company, the jobs in question are short-term and casual, 
rather than long-term and official: they are one-off ‘gigs’, 
rather than salaried employment arrangements. Gigs 
can be many different kinds of work: logistics (taxi rides, 
delivery jobs), white-collar services (language translation, 
business or legal advice), healthcare (elderly care and 
nursing work (Caulfield, 2019), counselling, education 
(tutoring, assignment grading), and construction.3
Many commentators see the current gig economy as a 
temporary transition: units of work that are simple and 
systematic enough to be assigned as gigs are in many 
cases likely to be among the first to be automated (see 
e.g. Prassl, 2018). If this is the case, the new gig economy 
may provide a key piece of the infrastructure for the 
gradual automation of human jobs, with the largest 
gig economy companies transitioning into the largest 
robot companies. The trajectory of Uber and other 
transportation gig economy companies explicitly builds 
in a timeline like this: these companies are investing 
heavily in the technologies that will enable automation 
of the jobs they are currently assigning to humans as 
gigs. But in this section, we will focus on the technologies 
that do the assignment. (We will discuss the types of AI 
technology that replace jobs in Section C.)
The management of a gig economy company happens 
mostly online. Workers who are looking for casual jobs 
can upload details of the kinds of work they are looking 
for, and the skills they have. Organisations which have 
small jobs to be done upload details of these jobs. A 
computer system then matches workers with jobs, and 
presents workers with possible jobs and organisations 
with possible workers, which they can accept or reject. 
If both parties accept, then a short-term work contract 
is agreed. For a given contract, both the contracting 
organisation and the contracted worker have the ability 
to rate the other partner. These ratings have a bearing 
on subsequent matching decisions: poorly rated workers 
are recommended less to contracting organisations than 
highly rated workers, and poorly rated organisations are 
recommended less to workers than highly rated ones. 
The matching algorithm that suggests worker-job 
pairings fulfils a function which is somewhat similar to 
that of a human manager in a traditional company. A 
traditional manager assigns employees tasks, and rates 
how well they perform these tasks, adjusting future task 
assignment in the light of assessed performance (and 
possibly dismissing employees who perform badly). 
Gig economy companies are different in that workers 
are able to decline offered jobs they don’t want, and 
have no fixed work hours—both very attractive features 
for many workers. But in practice, many gig economy 
workers enter into fairly stable work arrangements with 
particular employers. In these cases, the gig economy 
matching algorithm essentially tells them what to do 
during their working day.
How much AI is there in a gig economy matching 
algorithm? These algorithms are certainly not just 
AI algorithms. Many of the best-known matching 
algorithms are at base types of optimisation algorithm, 
which consider many possible assignments of jobs, 
and pick the one that minimises some economically 
relevant variable. For instance, the Uber algorithm for 
assigning Uber drivers to driving jobs probably aims to 
minimise the time taken for a driver to reach a customer, 
while maximising the overall number of rides (see e.g. 
Voytek, 2014). However, these optimisation algorithms 
often incorporate a good smattering of domain-specific 
applications of AI. For instance, the Uber algorithm 
also tries to predict future traffic conditions when it 
is matching drivers to customers, using a model that 
has learned what traffic conditions to expect in various 
circumstances (Bell and Smyl, 2018). More generally, 
job-matching algorithms can learn how to perform 
their task, using workers’ and contractors’ ratings as a 
criterion for success. (The goal here is to learn matchings 
that maximise ratings for both parties.) In addition, gig 
economy companies are increasingly using unsupervised 
3 Construction work has always had a large gig-economy component, 
with many workers being self-employed, or working on casual 
contracts. The novelty now is that the work is administered online. 
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learning techniques to identify different types of worker 
and types of gig, so that matching can be informed by 
assigned types (see e.g. Estrada-Cedeno et al., 2019 for 
a recent example). 
The most widely discussed ethical and regulatory 
questions that arise for gig-economy companies 
relate not to the technical features of job-matching 
algorithms, but to the legal status of workers in these 
companies, in comparison to workers in ‘standard’ work 
arrangements. The main contentious issue is that gig-
economy workers are legally self-employed contractors, 
rather than company employees. This means that 
companies aren’t liable to pay tax contributions for their 
workers. In addition, it is much harder for gig workers 
to establish collective structures such as unions. These 
issues don’t relate directly to AI, and we won’t tackle 
them in the current report—but in Chapter 3 we will 
discuss gig economy work in the more general context 
of ‘algorithmic management’. 
C. AI systems affecting human jobs 
As discussed in the previous section, AI systems are 
exerting an increasing influence on how human jobs are 
administered. We turn now to the content of this work: 
the production of human goods and services, and how 
AI technologies are impacting on this production. 
We will use our review as an opportunity to introduce 
the key types of AI system. From a technical perspective, 
AI systems can be grouped into some fairly well-defined 
types. Our survey will be organised by these types, 
rather than by economic sector, since many types of AI 
system are used in several economic sectors.
Robots
A ‘robot’, as we use the term, is a physical device, that 
can move or behave with some degree of autonomy.4 
It perceives the world through one or more sensors, 
which can be of many different types; it achieves effects 
on the world through one or more actuators, which are 
essentially moving parts it can control—again of many 
different types. 
Robots come in a wide variety of guises. (A thermostat 
is a robot, according to the above definition, because 
it can both sense and control its environment. So too 
is a smart house, which has many ways of sensing and 
regulating itself.) We will focus on two broad classes 
of robot, with particular implications for employment: 
driving robots and effector robots. 
Driving robots
A self-driving car (or truck) is a robot, whose main 
actuators are steerable wheels. Its control system is 
relatively simple, with three degrees of freedom: a 
steering wheel, an accelerator and a brake. The sensors 
of a robot car are more complex. They have to replace 
the perceptual abilities of a human driver. Humans 
have many senses, but they rely mainly on vision (and 
a little on hearing) when they are driving. In a robot 
car, however, much of the sensing task is typically 
performed by a laser-based system called LIDAR, which 
can construct a map of all the objects and surfaces close 
to the car in all directions.5 Machine vision is also used, 
to identify the important objects (particularly those 
close to the vehicle’s current path) and to read street 
signs and road markings (to supplement what it knows 
from stored map data). Supervised machine learning is 
the standard way to build these vision functions. Some 
vehicles also use instrumented roads, which convey 
signals specifically designed for cars. 
Self-driving vehicles are already a practical, used 
technology. Fully driverless vehicles are in deployment 
in many restricted roles, particularly in warehouses 
(Steininger, 2020) and in short-hop public transport 
(Fabulos, 2020). In the public transport field, the 
New Zealand company Ohmio is close to deploying 
an automated vehicle to transport passengers in 
Christchurch airport, and is engaged in several other 
trials around the world. Many cars that travel on 
public roads already have self-driving functions built 
into them—for instance, automatic parking and lane-
changing. These vehicles all still require a human 
driver behind the wheel. However, fully self-driving 
cars that don’t require a driver at all are being road-
tested intensively by many companies; GM’s Origin and 
Amazon’s Zoox robotaxis are two examples. Google’s 
self-driving car Waymo has now logged 20 million 
miles of road driving (Pressman, 2020). Self-driving 
4 The term ‘robot’ is also used to refer to software, but we won’t use 
the term in this way.
5 Tesla is an exception: it uses radar and an array of cameras to 
perform this task. 
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goods trucks are arriving on public roads (see. e.g. 
Heilweil, 2020). Self-driving tractors are also expected 
to make some impact in agriculture (FutureFarming, 
2019), though we expect the benefits in this area to be 
most substantial in very large farms. The transportation 
industry is one of the largest employment sectors 
worldwide, accounting for 9% of the workforce in the US 
in 2016, and 5% of the workforce in the EU (ILO, 2020). 
In New Zealand, it employs 4% of the workforce (MBIE, 
2020); it is only a matter of time before self-driving 
vehicles make a real impact on human jobs in this area.
Effector robots
We define an effector robot as a robot with arm-like 
or leg-like attachments, which it can position with some 
degree of flexibility. They tend to have more degrees 
of freedom than driving robots—legs typically have at 
least two degrees each, and arms tend to have at least 
three. A legged robot has applications in transportation, 
in places inaccessible to wheeled vehicles, such as 
pedestrian routes involving stairs, or certain types 
of rugged terrain. Robots with arm-like attachments 
have applications in a virtually unlimited variety of 
manipulation tasks, from picking up and placing objects, 
to assembly, inspection, painting, and so on. 
A market leader in both types of effector robot is the 
US company Boston Dynamics, which produces a range 
of quadrupedal and bipedal robots, some with arm-
like attachments (see e.g. Guizzo, 2019 for a range 
of products). These robots are somewhat unusual in 
the AI space, because their control systems don’t rely 
much on machine learning; they rely instead on well-
known control strategies (Burridge et al., 1999). But 
many other effector robots use a larger component of 
machine learning. Reinforcement learning is a common 
method: this method just finds the effector movements 
that most efficiently achieve some designated effect on 
the manipulated object. Market leaders in this area are 
Google DeepMind and OpenAI (see e.g. Gu et al., 2016; 
OpenAI, 2018). 
In New Zealand, the agricultural sector probably 
provides the most opportunities for effector robots. 
Systems are already quite widely deployed in the 
fields of meat carcass processing (Scott Technologies). 
Automated milking systems are also being used, 
though industry commentators don’t anticipate human 
milking being superseded for decades (McBeth, 2019). 
New Zealand is at the forefront of experiments with 
automated fruit handling: local company Robotics 
Plus has operated a robotic apple packer since 2018 
(Groeneveld, 2020), and the first commercial robot 
apple picker was deployed this year in Hawkes Bay 
(Farm Weekly, 2020). These systems use machine vision 
methods, for instance to identify fruit or twigs. The 
machines operated by self-driving tractors can also be 
regarded as manipulating effectors. 
Objects can be manipulated in such a wide variety 
of ways that most current manipulation robots are 
purpose-built for a particular job. However, research 
is ongoing into the building of domain-general 
manipulation robots. These are robots whose physical 
design allows them to perform an open-ended variety 
of tasks in an industrial workplace or around the 
home. The key bottleneck here is in teaching a robot to 
perform some particular task. This can involve creating a 
customised reinforcement learning regime (achievable, 
but impractical for non-technical end-users, and very 
time-consuming) or learning by imitation (more feasible 
for non-technical users, but with worse results at the 
time of writing). Practical domain-general robots are still 
some way away. 
Decision systems
While robots perform a physical task for a human user, 
decision systems perform a more cognitive task. An 
autonomous decision system makes some decision, 
based on a collection of relevant evidence, without the 
need for human intervention. For instance, the photo 
processing system in an automated passport control 
gate makes a decision about whether a person matches 
their passport photo, which is not routinely deferred to 
a human operator. (The gate also counts as a simple 
‘robot’, because the barrier opening mechanism is a 
physical actuator.) In other cases, a decision system 
provides a human decision maker with advice, and the 
decision is ultimately made by a human. We will use the 
term decision support system in this latter case.6 
6 Often, AI applications contain a multitude of embedded components 
that could be thought of as decision systems. For instance, the object 
classifier in a self-driving car constantly makes decisions about the 
categories of objects in the road. However, these decisions are all 
means to a larger end (driving), which is not itself a decision. We 
will reserve the term ‘decision system’ for systems whose primary 
purpose for the user is making (or assisting with) a decision. 
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There are two common ways of building decision 
systems. One way uses supervised machine learning. 
For these systems, a training set of example decisions 
is created, containing some ‘model’ decisions that the 
system should learn to emulate. These training decisions 
are sometimes based on decisions made by model 
human decision-makers, and sometimes based on past 
cases, where the true facts are now known. The other 
way uses optimisation—that is, methods for finding the 
optimal value of some specified term. For instance, a 
decision system of this kind is often used to suggest 
the most efficient way to pack containers for freight, or 
to find a timetable with the fewest clashes. Formally, 
such optimisation tasks are often very complex, and 
in practical contexts it is often impossible to find the 
provably optimal solution; in these cases we must rely 
on techniques which approximate the optimal solution. 
The best approximations often make use of learning 
methods, (in particular reinforcement learning methods; 
see e.g. AlibabaTech, 2018). 
Decision systems trained using these methods are used 
in many areas of the public sector. In criminal justice, 
decision support systems predicting recidivism are used 
to inform bail and parole decisions, as we already noted. 
They are also used by police forces to suggest how to 
deploy police patrols (though not yet in New Zealand, 
to our knowledge). In social care, decision support 
systems are sometimes used to make predictions about 
risks for children or families (again not currently in New 
Zealand, but certainly in the US—see Eubanks, 2018; 
Vaithianathan et al., 2019). New Zealand’s Accident 
Compensation Commission (ACC) has recently adopted a 
fully automated decision system making decisions about 
applicants’ treatment in certain simple cases (with more 
complex cases being deferred to human case workers), 
with the loss of around 300 jobs (see Pullar-Strecker, 
2019). We discussed public sector decision systems in 
our first report (Gavaghan et al., 2019). 
Decision systems are also in widespread use in industry. 
For instance, automated decision systems are routinely 
used to buy and sell shares in high-frequency trading. 
Decision support systems are used in various aspects 
of managerial work, such as economic forecasting and 
risk management (see e.g. McKinsey, 2017). Lower-level 
operational decisions can also benefit from decision 
support systems: for instance, they can be useful in 
the logistics industry, to plan routes for freight vehicles 
(ODSC, 2019), and in the insurance industry, to identify 
claims that merit special attention. They are increasingly 
used in medicine, both in the public and private 
sector—for instance, in medical image classification 
(Litjens et al., 2017), medical diagnosis (Loh, 2018) 
and medical research (see e.g. Mak and Rao Pichika, 
2019). In agriculture, decision systems help farmers 
with a number of decisions: for instance relating to 
how and when to irrigate or fertilise (Talaviyah et al., 
2020), or how to pair animals for breeding (Nayeri et al., 
2019). Often these agricultural systems are integrated 
with sophisticated sensor systems embedded in the 
farm, gathering detailed data about soil moisture, and 
monitoring individual animals. 
The adoption of decision support systems often allows 
decisions to be made by staff with less experience. 
For instance, after the adoption of a decision system 
assessing creditworthiness, decisions in some German 
banks are now made by staff with less expertise (see 
e.g. Floegel, 2019 for a case study). If decision systems 
can run fully autonomously, then again, fewer staff are 
required in various jobs. CCTV surveillance jobs are a 
case in point here. Certain types of event in videos 
can be increasingly accurately identified automatically. 
As accuracy improves, the need for the unskilled staff 
scanning videos for these events will drop (see e.g. 
Seldon, 2019). 
To summarise: if there’s any aspect of a human job 
where skilled judgements of a certain well-specified 
type are made repeatedly, on the basis of electronically 
available information, these judgements are amenable 
to being automated by a decision system. Throughout 
the public and private sectors, a new generation of 
technically minded entrepreneurs are analysing human 
jobs to find isolable judgements of this kind, and 
developing decision systems that replicate them. 
Both automated decision systems and decision support 
systems can have an impact on human jobs. In the 
private sector, where profit is a primary motive, we 
should expect to see managers actively restructuring 
human jobs to incorporate decision systems wherever 
this allows services to be delivered better, or more 
efficiently. This is simply what effective managers in 
the private sector do. In many cases, we can expect 
that such restructuring will result in job losses, or in the 
reassignment of jobs to less qualified personnel. The 
public sector isn’t immune to such efficiency measures 
either, as the restructuring of work at New Zealand’s  
ACC testifies.
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Decision systems potentially have an impact not just 
on the production and transportation of goods, but 
on the fields of human work that are responsible for 
structuring and regulating society. Their potential impact 
in these areas merits special scrutiny, and our study 
will pay particular attention to this question. Our study 
on the impact of AI ‘on employment’ focusses not just 
on how AI systems impact on individual workers and 
their jobs, but on the impact of these systems more 
collectively in the way society runs. This is a topic that 
is often overlooked in discussions about AI’s impact on 
‘jobs’, which focus heavily on individuals, rather than 
institutions. It will be our focus in Chapter 4, where we 
consider AI’s impact on ‘professions’, understood very 
broadly as fields of human work that are instrumental 
in organising society. This definition includes in its scope 
the traditional ‘Professions’ of medicine and law.7 But it 
extends beyond these, to government service (including 
policing and social services) and to education (including 
both school and university education), and to journalism 
(including both print and online journalism). It also 
includes some aspects of industry—particularly those 
relating to HR and personnel management. All of these 
‘professions’ contribute to creating the character of a 
society. This happens through various codes of practice 
that individual workers are bound to uphold, sometimes 
officially and sometimes unofficially, that in some way go 
beyond their official job description. For instance, medical 
professionals and teachers have a duty of ‘pastoral care’ 
to their patients and pupils. University teachers have 
a duty to act as the ‘critic and conscience’ of society. 
Journalists have a duty to act as ‘upholders of truth’. Civil 
servants have a duty to preserve and strengthen society’s 
institutions, and guard against corruption. Managers have 
a duty to run their companies fairly. While all of these 
principles are clearly aspirational in character, they still 
impact on the decisions that individual professionals 
make—if not all the time, then certainly some of the time. 
If decision systems become widely adopted in any of 
these professions, it is possible that these principles may 
no longer be so tightly adhered to—either because they 
are hard to implement, or because system designers 
are simply not thinking about them. Consequently, for 
decision systems, we pose one other question about the 
role of AI on human jobs: 
•  Impact on professions: what impact (if any) would a 
decision system used widely in some role within  
a particular profession have on the profession as  
a whole? 
Chatbots 
Decision systems automate relatively isolated, ‘stand-
alone’ human decisions. Other aspects of human work 
involve more extended interactions, with clients, or other 
workers. Human interactions happen most naturally in 
natural language conversations: these can happen face-
to-face, or on the phone, or by email, or increasingly, 
on various social media platforms. Another type of 
AI system aims to replicate various human abilities 
to conduct conversations: these systems are called 
chatbots. A chatbot is an AI agent with certain simple 
conversational abilities. This agent sometimes interacts 
solely using written text (for instance in a phone 
messaging app, or by email). Sometimes it uses speech 
(for instance, by phone). Sometimes it uses a video link, 
so the human user’s nonverbal behaviours can also be 
processed. Sometimes computer graphics techniques 
are used to give the agent a simulated physical head 
or body too: in this case, the agent can generate facial 
expressions, or hand gestures, or point to objects in a 
computer display. 
The current generation of chatbots can’t understand 
language in the way that humans do: proper natural 
language understanding is still an unsolved problem. 
However, in certain very well circumscribed domains, 
chatbots can give a reasonable impression of being able 
to understand a human dialogue partner. They achieve 
this through the use of a dialogue script, which is 
created by hand by a human author. A dialogue script 
specifies a number of dialogue contexts that can arise 
during a dialogue in a given domain. For each context, 
the script anticipates a smallish set of possible things 
the human interlocutor might say, represented as a set 
of utterance types. For each utterance type, in each 
7 It also includes religion, though this won’t be a focus of ours for 
obvious reasons: religion arguably has less of an organising role than 
it used to; it no longer employs large numbers of workers; and AI 
techniques are essentially absent from this field. (Frey and Osborne 
(2013) list ‘clergy’ in the bottom 5% of jobs at risk from AI—and we 
are very surprised it is not listed lower.) 
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context, it also indicates (a) what utterance the agent 
should produce in response, and (b) what the new 
dialogue context will then be. In this new context, it 
waits for another user utterance. 
Current chatbots make heavy use of supervised machine 
learning to interpret utterances. The script author needs 
to supply, for each context, and each utterance type, 
a set of several different ways the human user might 
express this utterance type—the more comprehensive, 
the better. This creates a training set for an utterance 
classification system, which can then learn that in 
some given context, the utterances “I’m hungry”, “I 
am starving”, “I haven’t eaten all day” (and so on) 
are functionally equivalent, and require the same 
response. A good script author is good at anticipating 
the different types of utterance that might occur in any 
given conversational context, and at comprehensively 
enumerating the different specific utterances that convey 
these different types of message. 
Chatbots designed in this way can be built to perform 
conversation tasks in many different fields of human 
work. In the domain of HR, we have already mentioned 
that chatbots can be used to conduct pre-screening 
interviews with job applicants (see Section B). Chatbots 
are also used in other areas of HR; for instance, chatbots 
like AskHR and Lexy are able to guide employees 
through various administrative tasks, to do with payroll 
or leave booking, which often fall to HR personnel (see 
e.g. Westfall, 2019). Chatbots are also increasingly used 
in health domains. They are used to conduct patient 
interviews, prior to consultation with doctors. (Covid 
screening interviews are a common current application 
– see e.g. Vanian, 2020). They are particularly commonly 
used in counselling domains, where conversation is used 
not only to perform diagnosis of conditions, but also 
to provide treatment. (Again, Covid applications are a 
current trend; see e.g. Simonite, 2020). Another branch 
of medicine (and social services) where chatbots are 
finding many niches is in elderly care. Here, chatbots 
are often designed to play a mixture of roles: medical 
(giving reminders about pills to be taken, or exercises 
to perform), assistive (answering questions about the 
care environment, giving information about available 
activities), and purely social (being a friendly and 
entertaining ‘companion’). Chatbots are also widely 
used in companies’ telephone or online call centres, to 
answer customer enquiries and complaints, to respond 
to technical support queries. In these domains, human 
call centre employees are often given a script as part of 
their training, which gives some indication that script-
based chatbots will be able to reproduce the desired 
work. Chatbots are also involved in sales and marketing 
contexts (Rauthan, 2019). Companies routinely 
advertise their products on websites: these websites 
can now be augmented with a chatbot playing the role 
of a salesperson, which can conduct a personalised 
interaction with every website viewer who chooses to 
engage. (Salespeople are also routinely given a ‘script’ 
as part of their job training, suggesting that their jobs 
are also ripe for automation.) Finally, chatbots are also 
making some inroads into educational domains (Smutny 
and Schreiberova, 2020). Teaching interactions often 
happen through dialogues; in some ways, a one-on-one 
dialogue with a tutor is an ideal educational paradigm. 
Sometimes, educational chatbots incorporate domain-
specific problem-solving functionality in the domain 
of instruction—for instance, the ability to set and solve 
problems in a particular field of physics or maths, and 
to assess student answers, and perhaps identify certain 
classes of misconception and mistake (see e.g. D’Mello et 
al., 2010 for a pioneering system of this kind). 
In each case, what makes a dialogue task suitable for 
emulation by a chatbot is the limited domain of the 
task. Script-based chatbots are not good at open-ended 
conversations; they need to keep the conversation 
running on a known track. In practice, dialogue engineers 
often ensure this by building systems where the dialogue 
agent takes most of the conversational initiatives. Human 
conversations are often ‘mixed-initiative’, featuring 
initiatives from different participants at different times. 
Chatbot conversations often involve the chatbot agent 
issuing instructions, or asking a series of questions, to 
elicit maximally predictable user responses. 
Again, in domains where human workers are supported 
by chatbots, various kinds of restructuring of human 
jobs are likely to happen. For one thing, certain human 
jobs are likely to change in some interesting ways. 
It may become more common for the pro-forma or 
routine aspects of a client interaction to be conducted 
by a chatbot, who then hands over the client to a 
human practitioner, with an appropriate summary. 
This kind of hand-over already occurs between human 
practitioners—for instance, in the health domain, it is 
an accepted part of many workflows. (A GP may hand 
a patient over to a consultant, for instance.) In the 
future, handovers of clients from chatbots to human 
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workers may become a common feature of workplace 
interactions. We will discuss some regulatory issues 
relating to chatbot handovers in Chapter 4. But however 
chatbots enter human workplaces, we anticipate that 
the efficiencies created by their use are likely to lead to 
redundancies in some form. We envisage jobs where 
conversations are most predictable and ‘scriptable’ will be 
most automatable. Even if handover to humans is quite 
common, the adoption of chatbots will require fewer 
humans to conduct the required volume of conversations. 
Question-answering systems
A simpler form of language interaction is a question-
answer exchange. People often have information needs 
that can be expressed in the form of questions. The 
first generation of Internet search engines required 
users to express queries as unstructured sets of query 
words—but open-domain question-answering systems 
now process queries expressed as full sentences, and 
respond with full-sentence answers. This can be done 
using extensions of regular Internet search methods 
(see e.g. Harabagiu et al., 2005) or using more recent 
machine learning methods (see e.g. Kwiatkowski et 
al., 2019). Many chatbots incorporate open-domain 
question-answering functionality. For instance, popular 
systems like Amazon’s Alexa, Google’s Assistant and 
Apple’s Siri all support open-domain question answering.
Humans are not typically employed in open-domain 
question-answering tasks – this task is simply beyond 
them, so these systems are unlikely to cause any job 
losses in their own right. But domain-specific chatbots 
are often improved by a little open-domain functionality. 
For instance, a sales chatbot is often more effective if 
it can incorporate some general chitchat (about the 
weather, or sports, or current celebrity gossip): so they 
are likely to have some impact on job losses through 
this route. In addition, there are also domain-specific 
question-answering systems, that are configured to 
handle questions in one particular domain, for which 
a structured database is available—for instance, sports 
results, or music or film trivia, or maths questions. These 
systems emulate particular areas of human expertise, 
but again, there are few human jobs which involve 
nothing but question-answering. However, scripted 
chatbots are often considerably improved by domain-
specific question-answering systems. These systems 
allow users to take some initiatives in the dialogue—at 
least, if these initiatives are questions. They often allow 
chatbots to deliver customers actual services, particularly 
in sales or travel booking domains, where the customer 
can ask questions about products, and be offered 
products for purchase in response. 
Text analysis systems
AI systems are also useful in analysing large volumes of 
text for particular customised purposes. For instance, if 
we have a large corpus of customer reviews for some 
product, it is useful to be able to assess whether these 
reviews are positive or negative. This is a task amenable 
to supervised learning: text classification systems can 
be trained to place texts into predefined categories, 
using training sets where the relevant categories have 
been assigned by hand, by human judges. The utterance 
classification systems used in chatbots are small-scale 
examples of text classification systems.
Text classification can be used in many contexts. For 
instance, text classification systems are becoming widely 
used by law firms, to provide quick analyses of contracts 
and other legal documents (see Faggella, 2020 for a 
recent review). The classifier in this case often operates 
on individual clauses, so a given clause can be classed as 
an indemnity clause, a penalty clause, and so on. Legal AI 
companies often offer companies an overall analysis of the 
contracts they are bound by, which is helpful in assessing 
risk. Text classification is also used to make automated 
predictions about the outcome of cases. In commerce, 
text classification has a myriad of functions. For instance, it 
can be used to create structured databases of documents 
of particular types, or in marketing, to identify online 
promoters and detractors of a product. 
Note that the training sets used to train a text classifier 
must be classified by human analysts, who possess the 
abilities the system aims to replicate. For instance, legal 
document classifiers must be trained using training 
data created by legal workers—typically junior staff. 
Junior legal staff have always been assigned relatively 
mundane, repetitive text-analysis work of this kind. The 
difference is that if their work is being used to train a 
text classifier, subsequent generations of junior legal 
staff won’t have to do such work. Creating training data 
for an AI system is a ‘one-time only’ human job, as we 
will discuss in more detail in Section D. If certain types 
of work suitable for junior staff are automated, this 
might have an effect on the career structure of some 
professions. For instance, this junior work might have 
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a useful function in staff training, or in assessing staff 
performance and deciding about promotions; if the 
work is automated, new ways of accomplishing these 
functions will have to be found. 
Text generation systems
Another type of text-processing AI application is a text 
generation system. A text generation system takes 
information expressed in some non-linguistic format 
(for instance, a spreadsheet or database) and expresses 
it in sentences or paragraphs of text. There are many 
applications for this technology: see Gatt and Krahmer 
(2018) for a review. For instance, simple types of news 
report can be produced using text generation, without 
the need for a human writer. Text generation systems 
are commonly used to write weather forecasts and 
weather reports, and stock market reports; increasingly 
they are used to generate summaries of sports events. 
An interesting application is in local journalism: if 
databases in a standard format are available for 
each region of a country, a system can be built that 
automatically produces a news story for each region. In 
this case, the human journalist creates a text generation 
system that is able to report a certain type of story, 
which is then deployed to produce many instances 
of this type. A UK company, Radar AI, specialises in 
generation systems producing local news of this kind.
Text generation systems are also widely used to create 
the text of web pages. When users browse a company’s 
product catalogue, they are often reading text that is 
partly generated automatically, from a database entry. 
This helps keep text up to date, as product databases 
change. Sophisticated webpage generation systems 
can produce text tailored to particular users, based on 
their known preferences, or on information about other 
products they have already seen (see O’Donnell et al., 
2001 for the original system of this type). 
We should finally note that machine translation 
systems are a special case of text generation systems. 
Modern machine translation systems rely heavily on 
machine learning. The learning in this case requires 
a large training set of hand-translated sentences, 
produced by human translators. Here again, the human 
work of creating the training set is a ‘one-time-only’ job: 
by contributing their work to this task, human translators 
are to some degree imperilling, or even eliminating, their 
own future jobs. 
D. Human jobs created by the  
AI industry 
In discussions of AI and employment, the point is often 
made that new AI technologies, like all technologies, will 
create new jobs as well as eliminating some old ones. 
Commentators point to previous industrial revolutions, 
where this was indeed always the case. The status of this 
historical argument is not very clear, since the ultimate 
objective of AI as a discipline is to replicate all human 
abilities, not just some subset of them. Even in a future 
world where AI systems are able to perform most human 
tasks, it is still possible that services performed by ‘actual 
humans’ could acquire special cachet and value, and 
open the way for new fields of human work: this is an 
issue we will discuss in Chapter 2. But those questions are 
outside the scope of the current chapter, which is mainly 
concerned with introducing existing AI technologies. 
In the short term, at least, the existing AI technologies 
undoubtedly create some new jobs for humans. 
The most obvious new jobs will be in the development 
and deployment of the new AI systems. These jobs 
will be highly technical in nature, and will require highly 
trained engineers. We also anticipate there will be 
many new jobs in testing and overseeing AI systems, 
to make sure they behave as they should. New uses of 
AI will introduce new requirements for accountability 
and explainability, as we will discuss at length in this 
report: skilled workers will be needed to implement 
these requirements. So we can certainly expect more 
jobs for skilled AI engineers. But we will conclude by 
mentioning two interesting categories of new job that 
aren’t primarily about engineering. 
The first of these is the job of content authoring, which 
is required in the construction of most current chatbot 
systems, and in many current text generation systems. This 
job is interesting, in that it requires a mixture of technical 
and humanities skills. The humanities skills are in creating 
textual content that is coherent and/or compelling for 
the target audience—a task that calls for the same skills 
as a playwright or screenwriter uses to create convincing 
dialogue, or a writer uses to create convincing monologue. 
The technical skills are in expressing this content within 
a general text generation or dialogue management 
algorithm, which defines a large space of possible texts 
(or conversations). We note in passing that workers in 
this area would benefit from an education that spans 
the humanities and the sciences. Often, the best content 
authors have exactly this formation. 
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The second job is that of training data preparation.  
This job requires different levels of skill for different tasks. 
Some jobs are suited to almost anyone with sufficient 
persistence and concentration: the job of identifying 
objects in images is one of these. Others require certain 
specific qualifications, such as the job of classifying the 
clauses in legal documents, or the job of translating 
sentences (both discussed in Section C). Others require 
high expertise, such as the job of classifying medical 
images (again discussed in Section C). In this latter case, 
preparation of training data is likely to be an imposition 
on top of an already busy schedule. 
For both content authoring and training data 
preparation jobs, a key question we will ask relates 
to the ‘one-time-only’ nature of the work. As noted in 
Section C, when a human worker uses some human skill 
to produce a dataset which is used to train an AI system 
that can reproduce that skill, she is essentially doing 
work that eliminates the need for this kind of work in the 
future. The whole point of content authoring jobs, and 
of training data preparation jobs, is that once the human 
work is done, that same work can thereafter be carried 
out by the system that is built—in arbitrarily many copies, 
and indefinitely. Of course, as AI technologies improve, 
new systems will have to be built and deployed, and this 
will require skilled engineers, as already noted. But the 
amount of human work needed here is largely a function 
of the pace of technological development, rather than 
of the scale of system deployment. To summarise the 
question we wish to discuss: 
•  One-time-only work: should any special status be 
accorded to the ‘one-time-only’ human work through 
which an AI system is created that eliminates the 
need for similar human work in the future? 
It’s interesting to note, in passing, that the low-end 
training data preparation jobs are typically brokered 
in the gig economy. In fact, the original gig economy 
site, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, is one of the world’s 
largest contractors for human services in training data 
preparation (see Ipeirotis, 2010 for indicative data). This 
task was one of the earliest uses of Mechanical Turk, 
so it helped to bootstrap the gig economy revolution. 
Workers preparing training data on gig platforms are 
insecure both in having minimal health and social 
security benefits at work, and minimal collective 
bargaining rights (see Section B), but also in performing 
work which is often by its very nature temporary. 
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A.  Jobs, work and COVID-19
In the face of the global pandemic, the effects of 
artificial intelligence on jobs and work might seem like 
the least of New Zealand’s worries. But in fact, the 
health crisis is accelerating changes which will alter both 
the way we work and the way we think about work. 
Alert levels and lockdowns have taught us a great deal 
about jobs and work in Aotearoa. 
Although at the time of writing the unemployment 
rate in New Zealand remains surprisingly low, there has 
been a marked increase in ‘underemployment’ — that 
is, part-time work where the worker has the desire and 
availability to work longer hours (Dann, 2020; Statistics 
New Zealand, 2021). More importantly, the effects of the 
pandemic on jobs and work have been uneven (Reich, 
2020). Many workers, particularly white-collar workers, 
were able to work successfully from home in jobs that 
have remained relatively secure. Conversely, hospitality 
and tourism workers saw their incomes evaporate. The 
lack of job security for those in non-standard work, 
such as gig-economy work, now seemed much more 
problematic than it did in a strong economy.
Most jobs became more onerous. Essential ‘frontline’ 
workers coped with life behind PPE as well as the threat 
of infection. Those who could work remotely had to 
adapt to work online with varying degrees of success 
and fatigue. Non-essential workers who could not 
work from home experienced enforced time off work, 
wondering whether their jobs would be casualties of the 
economic downturn. Those who made it back to work 
returned to new socially distanced workplaces in which 
even simple tasks had to be reinvented. 
In adapting to the pandemic, all of us discovered a new-
found flexibility in the way we work. Businesses as well as 
professions have been forced online. For some, the move 
was long overdue, but results have been mixed. Telehealth 
and e-learning have often proved imperfect substitutes 
for the face-to-face versions of medicine and teaching. 
Most workers discovered their jobs to be ‘non-essential’. 
Admittedly, what counts as essential work during a 
pandemic lockdown is perhaps not what would count 
as essential in other circumstances. Even so, many of 
us have considered the importance of the work we do 
and, as a society, we have had to focus on what John 
Maynard Keynes called absolute needs (food, water, 
warmth, comfort, security, companionship…) which he 
contrasted with relative needs—goods and services seen 
as essential in some cultures but not in others. 
Given the complex and unpredictable nature of the 
pandemic (and of global responses to it), jobs we once 
thought secure, now seem less so. Many New Zealanders 
have considered what life would be like if they worked 
less and earned less. Lockdown showed many of us 
how much we value close contacts with workmates 
and the structure and satisfaction found in good work 
environments. Conversely, many discovered that they 
enjoyed a world with less noise, with more time for 
family, and without the stress and time-cost of the daily 
commute. In some industries, moving online using tools 
like Zoom and Slack enhanced collaboration with distant 
colleagues and enhanced the quality of life of workers. 
But, the costs and benefits of enforced working from 
home were unevenly shared between men and women, 
workers with and without young children, and workers 
in different types of living accommodation. Even so, 
many employers were surprised to discover that their 
workforce was no less productive when based at home. 
When surveyed (O’Kane et al, 2020), the majority of 
New Zealanders working from home said they would 
like to keep doing so, at least in part. The benefits of 
working from home have been so pronounced in some 
industries that large international companies like Twitter 
and Square have announced that they will permanently 
allow employees to work remotely (Kelly, 2020). 
In the face of a perceived threat of mass unemployment, 
New Zealanders seemed prepared to countenance 
radical changes to work and income, such as a 4-day 
week (Burrows, 2020) or Universal Basic Income 
(Mills, 2020). To many New Zealanders such changes 
would have seemed unthinkable just six months earlier. 
This openness to change has been partly driven by 
a newfound post-lockdown realisation for many New 
Zealanders that unemployment is as likely to be the 
result of bad luck as of poor life choices and that levels 
of income can be similarly unfair. Many were also struck 
by the incongruity of a lot of essential workers being 
amongst the lowest paid of New Zealanders. This is 
partly due to preexisting inequities such as the gender 
pay gap (Human Rights Commission, 2011) and the fact 
that labour markets reward skills that are scarce and 
easily monetised more than they reward skills that help 
to secure society’s absolute needs. 
Paradoxically, during the pandemic, some have grown 
richer. While many faced periods with reduced earnings, 
others kept earning but faced periods with reduced 
spending. Because many of those who maintained their 
income were originally well paid and hence able to save 
effectively, overall personal savings rates sky-rocketed. 
2. THE CHANGING NATURE AND VALUE OF WORK
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In the US, these rates normally fluctuate around 8%, but 
fears about possible future hardship saw them balloon 
to 33% in May (Fitzgerald, 2020). 
This concrete demonstration of the unequal distribution 
of work and income has sparked popular anger at 
inequality. Protest movements like Black Lives Matter 
have been driven by (particularly young) people 
looking with fresh eyes on political and economic 
systems that acknowledge the pernicious effects of 
persistent inequality (Meyers, 2020) but which remain 
philosophically opposed to the redistribution of wealth 
(Piketty, 2014). Everybody knows someone who has lost 
work and/or income, and we have all seen headlines 
trumpeting the injustice of the owners of well-placed 
tech companies like Amazon and Zoom getting rich 
at a time when most people fear getting poor. Black 
Lives Matter demonstrates, if demonstration were 
needed, the failure in most countries of the level playing 
field, assumed by the meritocratic ideals that have 
underpinned most developed countries for the past 
four decades. In The Tyranny of Merit (2020), Harvard 
political philosopher Michael Sandel argues that we are 
experiencing the effects of a more fundamental failing in 
meritocratic democracies around the world. Even if they 
worked as intended, they necessarily engender hubris 
among the ‘winners’ and humiliation for the ‘losers’. 
These ideas are not new—in 1762, Rousseau wrote “The 
good man can be proud of his virtue because it is his; 
but of what is the man of genius proud?”. Even so, the 
current erosion of democracy has lent such ideas new 
weight. The rate of that erosion is, of course, sensitive 
to the magnitude of inequality—the amount the winners 
win, and the amount the losers lose. 
All these challenges exist against the backdrop of 
a world experiencing rapid social and economic 
change, driven by new technologies fuelled by AI. 
Crises have a tendency to speed up pre-existing social 
and economic trends (Haas, 2020) and this one is 
no exception. Despite a sharp global downturn, the 
profits and share prices of AI-focused companies have 
jumped in industries such as computing (Apple) social 
media (Facebook), retailing (Amazon), entertainment 
(Netflix), financial technology (Square), and transport 
(Tesla). Although not all driven by AI, automation 
in general is the focus of renewed interest. This is 
partly driven by struggling companies searching for 
efficiencies (Chandler, 2020) but it is also influenced 
by the particular conditions of this public health crisis. 
Workplaces that have traditionally involved people 
working in close proximity (e.g., meat workers) are now 
looking to robotics as a means of maintaining production 
threatened by lockdowns and demands for social 
distancing of their workforces (Bunge and Newman, 
2020). The trend toward increasing automation is 
also partly caused by politics. In the face of economic 
headwinds, many countries are seeing increasing 
calls for the ‘reshoring’ of manufacturing jobs. This is 
predicted to increase automation, due to the inability 
of such companies to cover increases in labour costs as 
jobs are moved from developing to developed countries 
(De Backer, 2016, p.26). 
Although 2020 was a terrible year in many respects, 
it was a good time to reflect on the nature and value 
of jobs and work, and on the way the working lives of 
New Zealanders could be affected by increased use 
of AI in the provision of goods and services and in the 
workplace. At a time when so much seems under threat, 
it is tempting to think that AI is yet another threat to the 
jobs and incomes of New Zealanders. But the real story 
is more complex and, in some ways, more hopeful. 
This chapter addresses the great variety of predictions 
about the effects of AI on jobs and work, but it also 
addresses a deeper issue—what is it that we would 
want AI to do for us in the workplace? Can AI take the 
drudgery out of work? Will it be the spur to upskill New 
Zealanders into more interesting and better paid jobs? 
Will it finally make good on the age-old promise that 
automation will be labour-saving? 
In 1930 John Maynard Keynes wrote a much-
quoted essay entitled “Economic Possibilities for our 
Grandchildren”. He argued that, if the standard of living 
continued to rise through the 20th century, technological 
progress would allow his grandchildren to work a 15-hour 
week. Standard of living is notoriously difficult to measure 
and it is an average and hence, insensitive to important 
inequalities of various types. Also, the 20th century turned 
out to be very turbulent, so increases in standard of living 
were far from smooth. Nonetheless, many indicators 
did show a rapid rise through the 20th century. In New 
Zealand, inflation adjusted GDP per capita doubled from 
1900 to 1950 and doubled again from 1950 to 2000 
(Maddison 2003, pp. 85–87). Moreover, there is good 
reason to think that GDP has undercounted the benefits 
of technological innovation8. 
8 This is a vexed and longstanding issue in the history of national 
accounting. As far back as 1966 the influential Boskin Commission 
report in the United States concluded that failing to take account of 
the quality changes in goods such as computer, cameras, and phones 
meant that the US. Consumer Price Index had been overstating 
inflation by 1.3% per year and correspondingly understating real GDP 
growth (for further discussion see Coyle, 2015, pp. 88–90).
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Keynes’s predicted “that the standard of 
life in progressive countries one hundred 
years hence will be between four and 
eight times” as high as it was in 1930. 
The Yale economist Fabrizio Ziliboti 
reassessed these predictions (2008) 
and found that the fourfold increase 
had happened by 1980 and that by 
2030, we might see a seventeen-fold 
increase. But despite technology making 
us better off, humanity has not taken 
to working shorter hours or fewer days 
of the week. This is partly explained 
by Keynes’ observation that “there is 
no country and no people, I think, who 
can look forward to the age of leisure 
and of abundance without a dread. 
For we have been trained too long to 
strive and not to enjoy”. It is also partly 
explained by the fact that no country has 
solved the technical problem of evenly 
distributing the fruits of technological 
progress across their population, or 
devised economic conditions that 
allow for a gradual decrease in hours 
worked while maintaining a reasonable 
level of income security. Instead, most 
developed countries have stuck to the 
post-World War II 40-hour work week 
(Suzman 2020, p. 340). Up until relatively 
recently few political leaders have seen 
decreasing the work week as a politically 
viable aim, although at the start of 2020 
Iceland’s new Prime Minister Sanna Marin 
announced the long-term goal of having 
Icelanders work just six hours a day four 
days a week (Kelly 2000). 
Whether or not we think working less 
is desirable, AI will undoubtedly change 
the way we work and, for some, the 
amount we work. If we are to assess the 
likely effects of these changes on the 
wellbeing of New Zealanders, we will first 
have to address the question—what is it 
that makes work valuable to people? We 
will then critically comment on a variety 
of predictions about the effects of AI on 
jobs and work in New Zealand, before 
addressing ways in which we might 
adapt to likely changes. 
Figure 2. New Zealand Treasury’s Living Standards Framework.
B.  Work and wellbeing
Work is obviously valuable as a source of income. So, AI-induced 
changes in work and income will have important consequences for the 
livelihoods of New Zealanders and on the wealth of communities, iwi 
and the country as a whole. Issues regarding AI’s effect on earnings, 
GDP and particularly on wealth inequality are addressed in later sections 
of this chapter, but for now we want to address a larger question. In 
the medium-term AI will increase productivity and decrease our cost of 
living (see Section A of Chapter 3). There is also good reason to think 
that New Zealand could implement economic policies which help to 
distribute those gains across the population—we have, after all, had 
much more redistributive economic policies in the past (Morgan and 
Guthrie, 2011). So, leaving earnings aside for now—what effects will AI 
have on us if it changes the types and/or amount of work available to 
New Zealanders? Those concerned about technological unemployment 
(Rifkin, 1996, and Russell, 1932) have often framed this problem in 
terms of gains and losses of quality of life. So, how might wellbeing be 
sensitive to changes in, or loss of, work? 
Since New Zealand moved from the largely financial evaluation of policy 
outcomes to a broader wellbeing framework, a great deal of effort has 
gone into understanding what it takes for New Zealanders to flourish. 
This is exemplified by the Living Standards Framework developed by 
New Zealand Treasury, summarised in Figure 2. 
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As befits Treasury’s purposes, this is a not an exploration 
of ways in which people can maximise their wellbeing so 
much as it is a recipe designed to provide an adequate 
level of wellbeing for all New Zealanders. While ‘jobs and 
earnings’ appears as one of the domains of wellbeing, 
our ability to work and the sort of work we do clearly 
influences all of the other domains. This effect is partly 
financial and partly due to work being psychologically 
important to people’s identity and status. It is suffused 
with social connections and it is, for many of us, the 
major use of time in our lives. To evaluate the importance 
of these non-financial aspects of wellbeing we need to 
dig deeper into the nature of wellbeing itself. 
Academic work on wellbeing has produced many 
theories about its nature. It is a long-standing and varied 
discipline (Crisp, 2017). At one end of the scale are 
‘thin’ characterisations of wellbeing, based on positive 
and negative mental states. Jeremy Bentham (1789) 
begins his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation: “Nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 
It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do”. 
But most philosophers think the hedonist’s calculus is 
too simple to capture what people really want from life, 
or alternatively, the many ways in which people’s lives 
can be successful. Thomas Carlyle famously described 
Bentham’s view as “the philosophy of swine”, as it placed 
rooting round in the muck—the favourite pastime of 
pigs—on a par with what John Stuart Mill (1863) would 
have called “higher pleasures”, such as enjoying art or 
excelling in sport. At the other end of the scale are ‘thick’ 
characterisations, which try to capture what humans 
would ideally like to achieve in life. In this context, the 
ancient Greeks focused on ‘eudaimonia’ (εὐδαιμονία) 
which is often translated as ‘human flourishing’. Socrates 
argued that eudaimonia comes from exercising virtues 
such as self-control, courage, justice, and wisdom. For 
Aristotle, wellbeing was gained by developing our highest 
and most human capabilities. The Stoic philosophers 
(such as Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus) focused on 
living in agreement with nature, stressing qualities like 
justice, honesty, moderation, simplicity, self-discipline, 
resolve, fortitude, and courage (Baltzly, 2019). 
Modern psychological characterisations of wellbeing 
tend to focus on the features of life that help to achieve 
the eudaemonist’s rich notion of wellbeing. Perhaps 
the most famous is Richard Seligman’s PERMA theory 
(Seligman, 2011). The acronym represents the five 
elements necessary for a meaningful life. These are: 
Positive emotions, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning, 
and Accomplishments. Part of the reason for diversity 
in characterisations of wellbeing is that the concept is 
doing a variety of tasks. The hedonist seeks a snapshot 
of how we are feeling now. The Eudaimonist seeks a 
recipe for maximising happiness and satisfaction across 
our lives. It’s also interesting to note that the virtues 
promoted by Socratics and the Stoics enhance, not just 
your life, but also the lives of the wider community. The 
PERMA theory seeks the building blocks of a successful 
life. These are the independent variables by which we 
might influence our success. It is this latter sense of 
wellbeing that we think will be particularly useful in 
evaluating the effects of changes in jobs and work. 
Assessed against Seligman’s criteria, work has a variety 
of effects on our quality of life. Desirable jobs are great 
sources of wellbeing, but the most recent Statistics 
New Zealand report, Survey of Working Life, shows that 
wellbeing is eroded by work that is low-skilled, repetitive, 
insecure, allows limited social engagement and personal 
autonomy, and has little perceived social value (Statistics 
New Zealand).9 As these wellbeing criteria can be 
satisfied by non-work activities (e.g., art, sports, hobbies, 
engagement with friends and family, charitable activities, 
adult learning etc.), low quality work can be doubly 
harmful as it leaves the individual with little time or 
energy to pursue other more beneficial activities. 
In the survey, 88% of workers reported being satisfied 
or very satisfied with their main jobs, while 4.3%, or 
about 113,000 people, reported being dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied. Encouragingly, this suggests, that work 
is often an effective way to enhance our wellbeing. That 
said, measures of job satisfaction do little to inform us 
about the extent to which work makes our lives better 
than they would otherwise be. This satisfaction contrasts 
starkly with Gallup’s State of the Global Workplace 
Report (2017, p. 20), which found that very few people 
are engaged by or interested in their jobs—just 15% 
worldwide across 2014–2016. 
Obviously, for most adults, work is compulsory and 
so assessments of job satisfaction are likely to be 
assessments of how good our current job is compared 
to other jobs we think we might plausibly get. 
Presumably, ‘satisfaction’ with work would be lower if we 
were asking people whether going to work is better than 
going camping or watching the netball. Interestingly, 
9 These issues are revisited in Chapter 3.
29
in his excellent Work: A history of the way we spend 
our time, James Suzman notes that much recreation 
consists of tasks that used to be work (pottery, fishing...) 
but without the division of labour that has become the 
hallmark of the modern workplace (2020). All else being 
equal, leisure activities ought to be better at promoting 
wellbeing than work activities. That is, after all, what 
they are supposed to do. But in one respect, all else 
is not equal. As Keynes noted, in his day (and in ours) 
education is largely directed at work-related skills and 
not at teaching people how to enjoy their leisure hours. 
Moreover, for many people work is such a large and tiring 
part of life that, once the household chores are done, 
remaining leisure time is spent resting or ‘blobbing out’. 
There is also evidence that many New Zealanders 
have more work than they can handle. ‘Job strain’ is a 
measure devised by the OECD to capture non-economic 
aspects of employment. A worker experiences job 
strain if the job demands they have (time pressure or 
physical health risk factors) outweigh the job resources 
(workplace autonomy and positive relationships) that 
they have at their disposal. In New Zealand 34% of 
employees report being under time pressure and 25% 
of employees count as being under job strain. 
New Zealand has an enviable score on the OECD Better 
Life Index (OECD, 2020). Our only strongly negative 
statistic is work-life balance. 15.1% of New Zealanders 
average more than 50 hours work per week. This places 
New Zealand 33rd out of 40 OECD countries, but it is 
notable that the top 19 countries all achieve less than 
5% of workers averaging more than 50 hours work per 
week. Our tendency to overwork is very much a cultural 
phenomenon, with New Zealanders proud to report that 
they are busy or even ‘snowed under’. Countries with 
higher GDP than New Zealand tend to praise efficiency 
rather than long work hours. Germans who send work 
emails in the evenings or the weekends are considered 
inefficient, rather than hard working. 
This chapter began by asking how our wellbeing might 
be affected if AI changes the types of work we do or 
the amount of paid work available to us. The answers to 
that question are complex. Apart from being a source 
of income, work for many New Zealanders is a source of 
enjoyment and satisfaction. But a great deal depends 
on the sort of work you do. The proportion of us that 
experience workplace time pressure, job strain, and 
overwork, tells us that many New Zealanders are harmed 
by the nature and quantity of the work they do. So, there 
is certainly opportunity for AI to make our working lives 
better if it decreases workplace stress or overworking. 
But there is a corresponding risk that it might make our 
working lives worse, for example by decreasing the skill 
levels required of some workers, forcing them to work 
longer hours to achieve the same income. 
What if AI increases GDP but decreases the overall 
amount of work available? While full-time or close to 
full-time paid work is important to the wellbeing of 
many New Zealanders, such paid work is nonetheless 
not a necessary condition for wellbeing. Many (mostly 
retired) New Zealanders lead happy and fulfilling lives 
despite not having significant paid employment. There is 
considerable debate about the nature of the well-known 
happiness U-curve (Graham and Pozuelo, 2017), but 
there is little disagreement that most people’s reported 
happiness increases as they near and then pass 
retirement age. 
It is also important to note that different cultures make 
different assessments about the intrinsic value of work. 
In some cultures, work is an end in itself: the USA is the 
paradigm example here (see e.g., Thompson, 2019). In 
other cultures, supporting one’s family and community 
are seen as the fundamental goals in life, and work is 
mainly important insofar as it advances these goals. 
New Zealand culture is an interesting blend of these 
attitudes. The population as a whole may have work-life 
balance issues, but, within Māori and Pasifika cultures, 
there is a clearly identifiable focus on community and 
family over career (see e.g. Houkamau and Sibley, 2019 
for a Māori perspective; Lopesi, 2020 for a Pasifika 
perspective, and Theodore et al., 2017 for a combined 
study). If AI decreases the amount of work available, and 
curbs our ability to find fulfilment through work, we may 
have a lot to learn from Māori and Pasifika communities, 
which showcase alternative and possibly more resilient 
value systems. We also note that time away from paid 
work allows people to focus on goals related to the 
environment, and to other sustainable development goals. 
 RECOMMENDATION 1: We encourage 
government to acknowledge Māori and 
Pasifika perspectives on work-life balance 
in evaluating New Zealand’s response to AI.
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We can now make some preliminary conclusions. 
Contemporary New Zealand doesn’t just suffer from 
inequality in wealth, but also from inequality in work. 
This is true both in the quality of people’s jobs and 
workplaces, and in the amount of work that they do. 
Many people have more work than they can handle, 
while at the other end of the scale many have too 
little work. Such evidence as we have suggests that 
if AI decreased our hours of work by say, 20%, and 
productivity increased and the cost of living decreased 
such that we were not economically worse off, then our 
quality of life would increase rather than decrease. Such 
an outcome would seem idyllic to many New Zealanders, 
but of course much rests on whether such scenarios are 
likely to come about. 
C Predicting changes in jobs and 
work in New Zealand 
There are two types of predictions made about the effects 
of artificial intelligence on jobs and work. The first rests on 
the historical analysis of large-scale changes in production, 
often described as industrial revolutions. The second 
much more detailed analysis predicts future numbers of 
employees required for particular types of work in the 
near to medium term. We begin with the history. 
Learning from the history of innovation
AI is often touted as the fourth industrial revolution 
(see for example Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; 
Schwab, 201 6). If the analogy is a good one, the news 
is not great. Most workers at the beginning of the first 
industrial revolution didn’t live long enough to enjoy its 
benefits. It spanned the eighteenth and the first half of 
the nineteenth century (Mokyr, 2009) and for much of 
that time workers experienced displacement into new 
and poorly regulated workplaces. Evidence from health 
records suggests that most Britons became steadily 
poorer for at least the first half of what was a very long 
period of innovation and displacement. Despite the 
industrial boom, the average height of English men 
decreased by 1.6 centimetres over each decade of the 
eighteenth century (Komlos and Küchenhoff, 2012). Real 
wages couldn’t keep up with the price of food until well 
into the nineteenth century (Allen, 2009). 
But there are important disanalogies between the 
coming AI revolution and the first industrial revolution. 
This time, the scale will probably be much greater and 
the pace will probably be much faster (Dobbs et al, 
2015). The social impact of the AI revolution will be 
different in kind. The first industrial revolution saw most 
of the population moved from agrarian work into a 
relatively small range of almost wholly unregulated jobs 
in cities that were quickly bursting at the seams. This 
time round, we are at least starting out with established 
labour laws. These will need to be adapted, but not 
invented (for discussion of the adequacy of existing 
employment law see Chapter 3). While there will be 
dislocation, that will mostly involve retraining and 
movement into new jobs, although we might yet see 
long-term acceptance of working from home (perhaps 
with inner city real estate, redeveloped to meet New 
Zealand’s housing needs). Social and political conditions 
have also come a long way. In the first industrial 
revolution, most of the populace was not enfranchised 
and ordinary people had no power to scrutinise or 
influence the actions of large companies. In the United 
Kingdom, unions were illegal under the Masters and 
Servants Act until 1871.
We also note that AI is a very particular type of 
technology, known as a general purpose technology 
(Lipsey et al. 2005). These are characterised by 
“pervasiveness, inherent potential for technical 
improvements, and ‘innovational complementarities’, 
giving rise to increasing returns-to-scale” (Bresnahan 
and Trajtenberg 1995). While there is debate about 
exactly which technologies count, uncontroversial 
examples include the steam engine, railways, the internal 
combustion engine, electricity, computers, and the 
internet. In the long run, general purpose technologies 
increase growth and raise standards of living. However, 
in the short term, they are often a significant drag on 
economies. A typical example is discussed by Winton 
(2019, p.3) 
While electrification did cause a discontinuous 
improvement in productivity across every 
manufacturing sub-sector in the 1920s, for 
example, it first placed a drag on the economy for 
more than a decade as businesses were forced 
to restructure to capitalize on the new paradigm. 
To access the promised productivity gains, they 
had to sunset or destroy old infrastructure and 
invest in the new world at a low-yield until the GPT 
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reached critical mass… Electricity only provided 
dramatic productivity improvements in factories 
when the factories were built, from the ground 
up, to take advantage of the unique properties of 
electric power. Early attempts to electrify factories 
involved simply replacing a central steam-engine 
driving a crankshaft with an electric motor driving 
the same. All of the factory equipment remained 
belt-driven by that same central shaft, and so had 
to be clustered uncomfortably to minimize loss due 
to the mechanical transmission of power. Electricity 
can be transmitted nearly losslessly (on a relative 
basis); rather than being configured to minimize 
mechanical loss, ground-up electrically powered 
factories allowed machinery to spread out across 
the factory footprint to logically accommodate 
employee workspace and process through-flows.
So, adaptation to the open-ended and potentially 
far-reaching effects of artificial intelligence will be 
economically challenging for New Zealand. Moreover, 
AI (including robotics) is just one of a group of closely 
related and overlapping general purpose technologies 
that will radically change life and work in New Zealand 
in the coming decades. Others include DNA sequencing 
and editing, blockchain, and the wholesale move 
away from fossil fuels and into battery storage. At the 
intersection of these major new technologies is a host 
of applications that offer exciting advances in goods 
and services such as internet of things, 3D printing, and 
autonomous mobility. But each of these will challenge 
industries that rely on ‘legacy technologies’ such as 
the internal combustion engine. The last time such a 
diverse group of general purpose technologies became 
mainstream was at the beginning of the twentieth 
century (the automobile, telephony, electricity, and the 
production line). These greatly increased in the quality 
of life of people around the world. There is no reason 
to think that the current batch of general purpose 
technologies won’t be similarly beneficial in the medium 
term, but near-term financial challenges are likely to 
encourage innovations that decrease labour costs. 
In an influential paper called “The wrong kind of AI? 
Artificial intelligence and the future of labour demand”, 
Daron Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo (2019) 
distinguish between replacing and enabling innovation. 
In the computing world, these strategies were 
originally called artificial intelligence and intelligence 
augmentation (IA) although the latter term has fallen 
out of favour with both strategies now thought of as 
forms of AI. These ideas reflect a division that has run 
through the development of AI from its very beginning, 
between those aiming to reproduce human abilities 
and those aiming to produce ‘tools’ for people, that 
extend their abilities.10 Both these approaches increase 
productivity. The former does so by decreasing labour 
costs and the latter by enhancing the productivity of 
individual workers. That said, while some technologies 
are designed to enhance (the personal computer) and 
others to replace (airport check-in kiosks), the difference 
between a technology enhancing and replacing is 
often a commercial decision between cutting costs and 
increasing production, rather than a design choice. In 
reality, much AI is both enhancing and replacing. Part 
of New Zealand’s AI challenge is to encourage enabling 
rather than replacing innovation. This will be difficult. 
Maintaining staffing while enhancing the productivity 
of workers increases production which means finding 
new customers in a difficult post-COVID economic 
environment. This is a higher risk strategy than simply 
increasing profits by decreasing staffing. 
AI and the economy
This report is not primarily on economics, but the history 
of innovation both here and overseas, can provides 
useful perspective on our current circumstances. In 
1987, Nobel Prize winning economist Robert Solow 
famously commented that “computers are everywhere 
but in the productivity statistics” (Turner, 2018). But 
Solow’s paradox shouldn’t surprise us. New technology 
poorly implemented replaces workers, driving them into 
low wage, low productivity jobs. But even technology 
designed to enable workers can be expensive to 
implement in the short term, particularly in legacy 
companies.11 There are many voices in New Zealand 
encouraging accelerated adoption of AI—see for 
example Kinley Salmon’s Jobs, Robots & Us (2019), the 
AI Forum’s 2018 report Artificial intelligence: Shaping a 
future New Zealand, and the New Zealand Productivity 
Commissions 2020 report Technological Change 
and the Future of work. All this work is motivated 
by the possibility of long-term enhancement to the 
quality of life of New Zealanders and by short-term 
commercial concerns about New Zealand companies 
falling behind international competitors. These are 
10 For a thorough analysis of this history, see Markoff 2016.
11 See for example the explanation of Solow’s Paradox in Diane Coyle’s 
excellent GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History (2015, pp. 83-85). 
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sensible considerations, but New Zealand needs to think 
carefully about the near-term costs to quality of life in 
an accelerated AI revolution. Faster adoption means 
less time to get to the medium-term benefits, but also 
less time to adapt for our communities, our workforce 
and our regulatory framework. A rush to adopt could 
make it more difficult to monitor and influence New 
Zealand’s progress. This would make it harder to 
incentivise enabling innovation and discourage short-
sighted adoption of the sort that shores up profits at the 
expense of employment opportunities. 
While the profits of the first industrial revolution landed 
extremely unevenly across British society, they did at 
least mostly land in Britain. All New Zealanders are 
familiar with the household names of the AI revolution 
(so far), the so-called FAANG companies (FaceBook, 
Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google). None of these 
companies are based in New Zealand. We would have to 
go a long way down the food chain of tech companies 
to find one that was. Despite their importance to 
New Zealanders, the FAANG companies generate 
few tax dollars and few jobs in this country. Many are 
near-monopolies with all but Netflix facing antitrust 
investigations in the US at the time of writing. All are, 
if not first movers, then at least early movers in market 
segments with high barriers to entry. These companies 
(and others such as Microsoft and Tesla) have built up 
data assets so great, that it would be very difficult for 
New Zealand companies to compete against them. 
This isn’t to say that New Zealand can’t profit from AI. 
It is, after all, a general purpose technology and New 
Zealanders are successfully deploying it in a wide range 
of contexts. But it is to say that a great deal of the AI 
that New Zealanders use adds very little to our GDP. 
We are at a stage in the deployment of the new general 
purpose technologies where inequality is particularly 
problematic. Those who can afford to invest in AI-driven 
companies are growing wealthier while both blue-and-
white collar workers are having to adapt to work in 
disrupted industries. To be sure, there are good new 
jobs being created, but for many (particularly young) 
workers, AI innovations promise dislocation, lower wages 
and increased precarity in the short term. As a recent 
UK report from the Fabian Society (2020, p. 18) puts it— 
“there is a real risk that technology take-up will further 
polarise the labour market so that those who already 
have least end up losing most”.
At the same time uptake of many of these new 
technologies is not yet sufficiently widespread to 
experience a productivity effect (Acemoglu and 
Restrepo, 2019), significantly driving down the cost of 
living. To give a concrete example, fully autonomous 
vehicles are widely predicted to arrive within the next 
five year. Germany is looking to have a permit system for 
such vehicles in place by 2022 (Beedham, 2020). When 
the technology is mature and widely implemented, it 
will drive down the cost of many goods and services, 
but that payoff may be a fair way off. To get there, 
transport intensive businesses will likely have to replace 
or significantly upgrade their vehicle fleets. We will 
likely have to adapt urban planning as well as industries 
like insurance. We will need to update regulatory 
frameworks. And of course, we will have to transition 
those for whom driving is a job, into new types of work
But the news is not all bad. Many of these issues can be 
addressed. Indeed, the aim of this report is to encourage 
New Zealand workers and employers to think carefully 
about how we can secure enabling implementation 
of AI which will successfully serve the needs of New 
Zealanders. We encourage public discussion about the 
likely benefits AI will bring and about ways that New 
Zealand might adapt work practices and distribute 
the work and wealth of New Zealanders in the coming 
decades. Useful starting points these such discussions 
are set out in Section D below. 
In successfully adapting to AI, it would be helpful to 
know which jobs and industries are likely to be most 
affected by its implementation. 
AI and jobs
Most New Zealanders will have seen cautionary news 
articles about the risks that a robot will take their job 
or the jobs of their children. This (often not very high-
quality debate) was fuelled by a 2013 study by Carl Frey 
and Michael Osborne, who found that 47% of total US 
employment had a high probability of computerisation 
from machine learning and mobile robotics. But 
academic study of the effects of AI and robotics on 
jobs has proved challenging, resulting in a bewildering 
variety of predictions. Other studies put the percentage 
of jobs affected as low as 14% (Nedelkoska and Quintini, 
2018) or even 5% (Manyika et al, 2017). Recent analyses 
remain very divided; for instance, Willcocks (2020) is 
skeptical about large-scale job losses, while a report 
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just out from the Fabian Society (2020) highlights the 
threat of automation-induced job losses. Predicting the 
effects of AI across the great variety of jobs in a modern 
economy is a difficult task and the radically different 
results produced in recent studies depend largely on the 
authors’ methodological choices. 
Frey and Osborne modelled 702 precisely defined job 
categories, finding 47% ripe for near-term automation. 
Crucially, they focused on whole jobs. So, if some part 
of a job was estimated to be at risk of automation, 
the whole job was assumed to be at risk. While 
this methodology does detect jobs that are ripe for 
disruption, the idea that all such jobs will disappear 
seems unwarranted. The fact that the typical bank clerk’s 
job description today might only faintly resemble what 
it was in, say, 1980, doesn’t mean there are no more 
bank clerks (Zerilli et al. 2021, ch. 9). Unfortunately, 
this idea of job extinction has become pervasive in 
recent public discussion, driven by books with titles 
such as Jobpocalypse: The end of human jobs and how 
robots will replace them (Way 2013), The robots are 
coming (Oppenheimer, A., and E. Fitz, 2019), Robot-
proof yourself (Schenker, 2017), Alexa is stealing your 
job (Scharf, 2019), Help! A robot took my Job! (Murad, 
2017), and many many more. In reality, the more 
common effect of technological innovation is to change 
the nature of jobs (like the bank clerks) or to change 
the number of people employed in particular jobs. The 
automobile didn’t cause the extinction of blacksmithing 
as a job, but it did massively diminish the demand for 
such work. In light of the tendency of new technology to 
redraw the boundaries of jobs, many studies conducted 
after Frey and Osborne’s have focused less on jobs 
and more on tasks. An OECD task-based study (Artnz 
et al, 2016) found that only 10% of all jobs in the UK 
and 9% in the US were fully ‘automatable’. We also 
note that partial automation can have profound effects 
on workers. Early motor cars were built by teams of 
mechanics. When Henry Ford moved the production 
of his Model T onto a production line, he not only sped 
up production, he also greatly decreased the need for 
specialised labour. Workers lost the job satisfaction, 
status, and bargaining power that went with being a 
trained mechanic. 
Other methodological choices that can have important 
effects on the results of such studies include: how they 
interpret automation and computerisation; timescale; 
judgements about likely scientific advances; and various 
social, economic and demographic assumptions about 
factors such as levels of migration and macroeconomic 
forces (Zerilli et al, 2021). Even if we can agree on 
appropriate methodological assumptions, it is becoming 
increasingly apparent that making accurate fine-grained 
predictions about individual jobs requires high quality 
data that, for the most part, we don’t have. In “Toward 
understanding the impact of artificial intelligence on 
labor” Frank et al. (2019) address the data barriers to 
successful prediction:   
These barriers include the lack of high-quality 
data about the nature of work (e.g., the 
dynamic requirements of occupations), lack of 
empirically informed models of key microlevel 
processes (e.g., skill substitution and human–
machine complementarity), and insufficient 
understanding of how cognitive technologies 
interact with broader economic dynamics and 
institutional mechanisms (e.g., urban migration and 
international trade policy).
All these methodological and epistemic issues imply that 
we should treat with great caution any predictions about 
numbers of jobs that will disappear or be disrupted, not 
because there is no risk, but because there is inevitably 
a high degree of uncertainty about the impact of AI on 
particular jobs. These limitations also affect predictions 
about the creation of new jobs. 
Those in favour of accelerating New Zealand’s adoption 
of AI argue that it will create as many jobs as it destroys, 
and that many of the new jobs will be desirable high-
tech jobs. We agree that the likelihood of large-scale 
technological unemployment is low. The financial and 
psychological costs of unemployment in countries 
like New Zealand are so high that most people will 
accept even very poor quality, low-paid work over 
unemployment. So, there is a socially-fuelled, market-
driven incentive for unemployment to remain low. But 
artificial intelligence enables both high value, high status 
knowledge work and low value, low status jobs such 
as training algorithms and working in e-Commerce 
‘fulfilment centres’ (Prassl, 2018) . Being able to 
predict the rate of churn (as legacy jobs are replaced 
by newly created AI-based jobs), likely demand for as 
yet uninvented products and services, as well as the 
proportion of new jobs that will be desirable and well 
paid, is an even harder task than predicting rates of 
disruption in existing jobs. 
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It’s frustrating to be unable to offer firmer predictions. 
But we believe there is a genuine and intractable lack 
of certainty here, and those who are making stronger 
predictions are misrepresenting the accuracy with which 
the future can be read in this matter. We wouldn’t 
expect people at the beginning of the twentieth century 
to be accurate in predicting the changes in jobs and 
work that would flow from widespread adoption of 
electricity. This sort of inability to make detailed medium-
term predictions about effects on jobs and work is 
typical of general purpose technologies. So, in this 
report, much of our focus is on analysing the strengths 
and weaknesses of the sort of AI we expect to see in the 
near-term, considering how such AI might change jobs 
and work, as well as analysing opportunities and risks 
in domains in which AI is already being implemented. 
In the longer term, we believe the most practical path 
is to anticipate various alternative scenarios about how 
AI develops, so policymakers can prepare responses to 
each of these. It’s to this that we now turn. 
D.  Large-scale adaptation scenarios 
Just as we can try to predict the effects of AI on jobs and 
work at different scales, we can also think of adaptation 
at different scales. Much of this report focuses on specific 
opportunities and problems in workplaces that are 
already implementing AI. But for the remainder of this 
chapter, we look at adaptations that New Zealand may 
want to consider in the face of large-scale AI-driven 
trends in New Zealand’s workplaces and economy. 
The challenge of predicting the progress in AI research 
and its commercial applications makes it imperative 
that New Zealand policymakers prepare for a range of 
possible futures. To understand the effects of AI on jobs 
and work, we need to address five crucial questions, 
all of which are difficult to answer with certainty at this 
stage in the AI revolution, and most of which are largely 
outside the New Zealand government’s control:
 Where will the profits land? —As noted above, 
the household names of AI are US companies that 
do little to bolster New Zealand’s GDP. But we do 
have excellent AI implementation here. In our earlier 
report, Government use of artificial intelligence in New 
Zealand (Gavaghan et al., 2019), we documented 
this country’s world-leading use of predictive risk 
modelling in its provision of government services. Soul 
Machines is an example of a New Zealand company 
that is world-leading in the realism and interactivity of 
its AI agents. Despite these successes, it is uncertain 
whether AI will be a technology that we primarily profit 
from directly or one that we primarily import—which 
might nonetheless benefit New Zealand and New 
Zealanders. We make very few cars in New Zealand 
but our productivity and quality of life is greatly 
enhanced by our ability to import them. Similarly, 
services like internet search also benefit New Zealand’s 
economy even though companies like Google employ 
few New Zealanders and pay little tax here. 
 How will AI affect incomes, inequality, and the 
availability of good jobs in New Zealand? —The mix 
of replacing and enabling innovation that AI brings 
to New Zealand will depend on difficult-to-predict 
future scientific innovation. It will also depend on 
commercial imperatives such as the costs associated 
with enabling and replacing innovation, as well as 
our ability to expand existing markets and move into 
new ones. It is essential for this country, not just that 
we retain adequate employment, but also that we 
retain and create new high value, well paid jobs.
 How will AI affect the cost of living? —As with 
previous general purpose technologies, AI is likely to 
drive down the cost of essential goods and services 
but we have no real way of knowing by how much.
 How will AI affect New Zealand’s balance of 
trade? —Our distance from external markets has 
always been a challenge to exporters. It will continue 
to be so for physical goods that are AI-enhanced 
but not for AI-based services that are ‘delivered’ 
internationally via the internet. That said, the internet 
is a crowded marketplace and a great deal of 
AI-based innovation is being driven by a relatively 
small number of very large, data-rich, primarily US-
based companies. Whether such near monopolies 
are broken up (as happened with previous general 
purpose technologies such as telephony), may have 
an important impact on New Zealand. 
 How will New Zealanders respond to AI? —Will 
we feel safe driving in robotic taxis? Will we feel 
comfortable with AI performing some or even many 
of the functions now provided by doctors, lawyers, 
educators, and other professionals? 
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It is too early to give definitive answers to these 
questions. The effects of AI on our economy and on 
our work and income will continue to change as the 
technology matures, as new applications are invented, 
and as consumers and other stakeholders discover the 
pros and cons of AI in the workplace. 
Because New Zealand is not in a position to accurately 
predict the short-and medium-term effects of AI on jobs 
and work, it is essential that our policymakers analyse 
and prepare for a variety of scenarios. In reality, of 
course, New Zealand will experience some mix of the 
following scenarios. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider 
each as a type of outcome for which we should be 
prepared. 
SCENARIO ONE: “ENABLING”
The dominant effect of AI will be to enhance the 
productivity of New Zealand workers. There is good 
availability of work. Most workers move into higher  
value jobs. New Zealanders experience higher quality 
of life due to some mix of higher income, lower cost  
of living, and better working and living conditions. 
SCENARIO TWO: “REPLACING ONSHORE”
The dominant effect of AI will be to decrease the 
productivity of New Zealand workers as many are 
replaced by artificially intelligent systems and  
displaced into lower value, lower income work. In  
this scenario significant profits from the AI revolution 
land here as New Zealand companies successfully 
deploy AI and robotics, increasing profit by lowering  
the cost of production of goods and services. 
SCENARIO THREE: “REPLACING OFFSHORE”
The dominant effect of AI will be to decrease the 
productivity of New Zealand workers as many are 
replaced by artificially intelligent systems and  
displaced into lower value, lower income work. In  
this scenario most of the profits from the AI revolution 
land offshore as many New Zealand companies are 
outcompeted by international companies with better 
access to data and capital. 
This is work that needs to be done now as some 
plausible strategies would be difficult to deploy and/or 
may take a long time to come into effect. In proposing 
these scenarios, we do not mean to suggest that New 
Zealand is completely at the mercy of a process of 
technological development driven by international 
research and commerce. Government might, for 
example, sponsor the development of New Zealand 
based AI-driven services, as there have recently been 
calls for Australia to develop its own. 
 RECOMMENDATION 2: Government 
should develop and, where appropriate, 
implement strategies responding to 
three possible futures that AI could bring 
about (enabling, replacing onshore and 
replacing offshore). 
Skills and education
Although there is much we don’t know about New 
Zealand’s AI-enhanced future, knowing how much 
we don’t know is itself useful. It is common for those 
predicting the future of jobs and work to encourage 
widespread teaching of computing skills in secondary 
and tertiary education (Walsh et al, 2019). We agree 
these are important skills that can lead to good 
jobs, but it is difficult to know how many graduates 
will be required as AI-based technologies mature 
in the coming decades. It’s possible that computer 
programming will be one of the human jobs that AI 
systems become good at. A sobering pointer in this 
direction is OpenAI’s Generative Pre-trained Transformer 
3 (aka GPT3), released early in 2020, which is the most 
sophisticated model of natural language ever produced. 
A programmer’s task is to convert a natural language 
description of a desired program into a working piece 
of code. Among many other surprising capabilities, 
GPT3 is capable of doing this, at least at a first level 
of approximation (Heaven, 2020). So, while computer 
science is fundamental to the AI revolution, we may 
not need large numbers of coders to take advantage 
of the technology. This should not come as a surprise. 
Decreasing demand for technological expertise is 
typical of maturing general purpose technologies. By 
analogy, early in the twentieth century we might have 
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recommended that young people train as car designers or motor mechanics. But most of the jobs that owe their 
existence to the automobile, have little to do with the construction or maintenance of cars and trucks. New Zealand 
is extremely dependent on motor vehicles but very few of us build them or maintain them, and that number has 
steadily decreased as the technology and methods for its manufacture have matured (Womack et al, 1991). So, while 
we certainly need a good supply of ICT graduates, most young people need to know how to use AI rather than how 
to make it. A Royal Bank of Canada Report—Humans wanted: how Canadian youth can thrive in the age of disruption 
(2018)—analysed the projected skills demand for human workers for all occupations in the face of near-term 
technological disruption. The results are summarised in Figure 3. Although acknowledging that skills in computing 
and data science will be essential and valuable in the coming AI revolution, this report concludes that the important 
skills for the great majority of workers will be those that fit them for tasks to which AI is poorly suited. In order of 
descending importance (where the most important skills are those required by the largest number of jobs): 
Figure 3. Skills most in demand after near-term technological disruption. After RBC Humans wanted: how Canadian youth can thrive in the age of 









9. Judgement and decision making
10. Active learning
11. Service orientation






18. Management of personal resources  
19. Mathematics
20. Systems analysis
21. Systems evaluation 
22. Operation Monitoring
23. Quality control analysis 
24. Operations analysis
25. Operation and control
26. Management of material resources









Automation has always imposed a division of labour on workforces as people are left to do the work that machines 
can’t (or the work for which automation is uneconomic). AI will be no different. So, will analyses like this one tell 
us which skills our education system ought to be focusing on? In the short-term—yes. But schools and tertiary 
institutions train young people for life. While we applaud research into career transitions assisted by mechanisms 
like micro-credentialing, secondary and tertiary education directly post-school will continue to be the most important 
source of educational preparation for New Zealanders’ life and work. So, we should be careful about long term 
predictions of the skills our young people will need for an AI-enhanced world. The limitations to predicting future 
science and future commerce also apply at the level of skills. Advances in affective computing, for example, are 
already making AI much more effective at a range of ‘face-to-face’ competencies that we currently think of as 
distinctly human skills. For instance, the ‘digital people’ produced by the New Zealand company Soul Machines are 
able to recognise emotions in the user, and to communicate emotions themselves, through facial expressions and 
gestures. These abilities may well find application in domains like medicine, education and counselling. 
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Finally, we note that if AI decreases the amount of paid 
work that New Zealanders have to do, we would benefit 
from our education system better preparing people to 
maximise the value of their leisure time in fulfilling and 
socially productive activities. And as noted in Section B, 
we have much to learn from Māori and Pasifika groups 
in New Zealand about how to develop a culture that 
places family, community and social engagement at the 
centre of life, rather than paid employment. 
RECOMMENDATION 3: In the face 
of an uncertain future, New Zealand 
must discourage over-specialisation in 
education. Education and training at all 
levels must equip young New Zealanders 
with a broad array of the skills and 
expertise required for an AI driven world 
(as set out in Figure 3). 
In the face of so much uncertainty, the best thing we  
can recommend for young New Zealanders is a very 
broad skill-set. This will require rethinking university 
education in Aotearoa which has followed international 
trends in recent decades towards hyper-specialisation, 
particularly in STEM subjects. In future, we might 
broaden the skill-sets of graduates by making 
professional training in subjects like Law, Medicine, 
Engineering, Dentistry and Pharmacy into graduate 
degrees, as they are in many other countries. In legal 
education, double degrees are already common, 
providing New Zealand students with a much broader 
base of learning than the UK, where it’s rare to combine 
law with another subject. Courses introducing students 
to Māori and Pasifika value systems will also have a 
useful role to play. We also note that the University of 
Otago has recently developed new degrees designed 
to promote the breadth of graduates (the Bachelor of 
Arts and Science; Bachelor of Commerce and Science, 
Bachelor of Arts and Commerce). The renaissance 
people who graduate with these degrees will be well 
suited to an uncertain and fast changing workplace. 
Loss of income and increased inequality
We think artificial intelligence is an extremely important 
general purpose technology which will likely drive large-
scale commercial innovation and enhance our GDP over 
the medium term. But, for all the reasons just stated, 
we have to take seriously the possibility that in the short 
term it will lead to large-scale disruption and even in 
the medium term, it could cause increasing inequality. 
We are particularly interested in two possible outcomes 
that might befall an AI-rich New Zealand in the coming 
decades: 
1. Many or most New Zealanders end up with too  
little income,
2. Many or most New Zealanders end up with  
much less work. 
We could experience both these effects at once, but 
they are not necessarily connected. If AI is genuinely 
labour saving, we could end up with similar levels 
of income, but less work to do. If the profits of the 
AI revolution are captured by a small portion of the 
population or by people outside New Zealand, many of 
us might have to work harder just to keep our current 
levels of income. We will address income in this section, 
and work in Section C of Chapter 4.
Nobody doubts that AI is extremely profitable. The AI-
enhanced FAANG companies are amongst the fastest 
growing major companies in the world. The title of 
fastest probably goes to Tesla, which aims to be the 
first to offer ‘full self-driving’ electric cars at some point 
in 2021. Its share price has increased nearly 1000% 
on its value a year ago. Apple Computer is now the 
world’s largest publicly listed company with its market 
capitalisation growing from one trillion which it reached 
in August of 2019 to more than two trillion at the time 
of writing. But, as noted above, few New Zealanders 
profit from these companies and their success comes 
at the expense of the legacy companies they are out-
competing. So, what could New Zealand do if AI-driven 
companies leave many of us worse off? 
Loss of income, due to underemployment, should be 
partly offset by decrease in the cost of living, but we 
cannot know when and by how much the cost of living 
will decrease. Winton (2019) predicts that depression of 
GDP due to effects of new general purpose technologies 
on legacy companies is likely to last less than a decade 
with gradual increase in efficiency leading to lower prices 
thereafter. But in such a scenario, even if AI doesn’t 
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leave most of us poor in absolute terms, it could lead to 
spiralling inequality—harmful to individuals (Pickett et al, 
2015), socially corrosive (Lancee and Werfhorst, 2011) 
and politically destabilising (Alesina and Perotti, 1996).
New Zealand already experiences significant inequality, 
which it has mitigated with a mix of taxation coupled 
with redistribution mechanisms such as Working for 
Families. But if AI were to greatly increase inequality, 
New Zealand would have a limited set of options. Recent 
decades have seen growth in real wages fall steadily 
behind growth in productivity in many developed 
countries. This decoupling in New Zealand has been 
amongst the most pronounced in the OECD countries 
(Schwellnus, 2019). Tackling the decline in wages 
relative to productivity will help decrease inequality, 
but it may not be enough to counterbalance a decline 
in the number of people in well-paid work. A further 
strategy would see New Zealand moving to increasingly 
aggressive forms of taxation, perhaps including a 
wealth tax (mechanisms for redistributing increased tax 
revenue are discussed below). These mechanisms could 
be successful if AI drives major productivity growth in 
New Zealand (our replacement onshore scenario)—
perhaps aided by government curtailing the activities 
of international AI-driven companies (as Australia is 
proposing to do with Facebook) or even by sponsoring 
New Zealand-based competition, just as we have in 
banking (Australia is considering an Australia-based 
social media platform, see Meade, 2020). 
Conversely, in our replacement offshore scenario, 
productivity growth remains low in this country and the 
spectacular profitability of AI continues to be a primarily 
offshore phenomenon. How might New Zealand respond? 
While few of us work for the FAANG companies, all of us 
invest in at least some of them. Many of us own shares 
in them through our KiwiSaver portfolios. New Zealand 
as a whole also owns shares in some of in them through 
the New Zealand Superannuation Fund (New Zealand 
Superannuation Fund, 2019). Moreover, an increasing 
number of New Zealanders are investing directly in such 
companies due to the introduction in 2018 of two online 
share trading platforms, Sharesies (sharesies.co.nz) and 
Hatch (hatchinvest.nz). As they sell fractional shares at 
low commissions, even those on modest incomes can 
use them as an alternative to savings accounts which 
at the time of writing offer extremely low interest rates 
due to the economic effects of COVID19. They also allow 
individuals to purchase shares without having to go 
through an established brokerage. Hatch focuses on 
the US market and Sharesies, which has marketed New 
Zealand shares particularly to young New Zealanders 
(McBeth, 2018), has recently begun trading US equities. 
Both are seeing extraordinary growth in participation 
from ordinary New Zealanders for whom this is their first 
experience with retail investing (Hickey, 2020). 
While all these forms of investment allow ordinary New 
Zealanders to benefit from the profits of AI companies 
based overseas, they are certainly not equal. The New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund has been remarkably 
successful. It stands at over 47 billion dollars at the 
time of writing with an average rate of return since 
its inception in 2003 of 9.6%. It is also fundamentally 
redistributive. While wealthier Kiwis pay more tax and 
so effectively invest more into the fund, its profits 
belong equally to all New Zealanders. Being individually 
based, KiwiSaver and retail investment portfolios are 
not redistributive in same way. Online retail investing is 
also higher risk. Because it bypasses normal avenues 
for investment advice, such portfolios seem more 
likely to lack diversification and research on a similar 
platform in the US (Robinhood) has shown users to be 
disproportionately invested in a small number of AI-
enhanced stocks—Apple, Tesla, Amazon, and Microsoft 
(Elmerraji, 2020). 
While New Zealanders are generally nervous of 
investments in shares (Hickey, 2020), most of us 
consider superannuation schemes (which primarily 
invest in shares) a tried and trusted method of saving 
for retirement. So, could New Zealand harness the 
power of financial markets as a means of adapting to a 
possible AI future in which significant numbers of us find 
ourselves with stagnating or even decreasing incomes? 
While some New Zealanders are taking a do-it-yourself 
approach to the problem via retail investing, it is unlikely 
this will become common among most of us, and it is 
likely to remain practically impossible for the poorest 
of us. While we could educate the public and develop 
schemes and incentives (as we have for retirement 
investing), an individual-based approach to investing in 
AI would inevitably leave the poorest New Zealanders 
with the lowest returns. 
If the country as a whole were to invest to insulate 
ourselves against an AI-fuelled economic downturn, it 
would have to be through something like a sovereign 
wealth fund akin to the New Zealand Superannuation 
Fund. In the short term if would require expensive levels 
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of contribution—at the time of writing the New Zealand 
government has just suspended payments to the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund due to the costs of 
dealing with COVID19. But in the medium term, such a 
strategy could help effectively subsidise the incomes of 
working age New Zealanders. Could it be the basis of a 
Universal Basic Income? 
A Universal Basic Income for New Zealand?
A UBI addresses the problem of traditional welfare 
payments creating poverty traps due to them abating 
as recipients find part time work. There is no financial 
incentive for someone to take such work if the pay 
they receive will be deducted from a benefit they are 
currently paid. Because it is universal, a UBI also removes 
the stigma associated with receiving welfare along 
with the complex governmental machinery required for 
assessment, monitoring, and disbursing payments. While 
a UBI is usually conceived of as a universal monetary 
payment, there is no reason in principle why it could 
not consist of, or include, a set level of free access to 
an enhanced suite of public services, such as health, 
education, transport, and energy, some of which are 
already partly free in New Zealand. 
Its main disadvantage is that paying a regular income 
to the whole population is extremely expensive (Morgan 
and Guthrie, 2011) although, as noted above, AI is likely 
drive down the basic costs of living that a UBI is meant 
to cover. As this discussion is hypothetical and future 
focused—and as we are not economists—we make no 
comment on the affordability of a UBI.
A further issue with a UBI is that some people find the 
idea of paying people not to work morally objectionable. 
There is nothing unjust in principle about paying 
people not to work provided payment is equitable. New 
Zealand voters have jealously guarded the New Zealand 
superannuation scheme, which is effectively a UBI 
that starts at 65. There have been periodic proposals 
to means test New Zealand superannuation. All have 
foundered, even though a means tested system would 
be cheaper and arguably better at alleviating poverty. 
The problem appears to be that New Zealanders think 
the current scheme is equitable in that we all pay for 
it and we all receive it. That said, people live for very 
different lengths of time in retirement and hence the 
scheme really only secures equity of opportunity not 
of outcome. So, prima facie, a UBI paid to the whole 
population, would be both inequitable and redistributive 
in the same way that New Zealand superannuation is. 
A further argument against the UBI is that it would 
allow some people to work very little and these people 
would be worse off as work conveys dignity and/or 
is intrinsically virtuous. Paradoxically, such arguments 
often seem to claim both that work is a fundamentally 
valuable aspect of life and that, given even a small 
regular income, many people would no longer want 
to work. The great 20th century philosopher Bertrand 
Russell argued that the idea of the dignity of labour was 
important before the industrial revolution when agrarian 
economies required most people to work all the hours 
they could. But this is no longer necessary. The dignity 
of labour, he suggested, has since become an “empty 
falsehood” preached by the wealthy who “take care to 
remain undignified in this respect.” (Russell, 1932).
Perhaps the most important issue for those promoting 
a UBI, is that the idea itself is open to a considerable 
amount of interpretation: 
Although UBI has a number of core definitional 
attributes (…), basic income is best seen as a 
family of schemes, with variation between them 
in terms of a number of crucial design features… 
The most crucial of these are arguably the level 
of payment, the way UBI is intended to interact 
with other benefits (i.e., whether it is intended to 
replace or run concurrently with them) and the 
wider constellation of labour market policies, and 
how it is funded. … These design features vary in 
line with the goals and objectives motivating basic 
income; in turn, different goals and objectives are 
prioritised according to the political preferences 
of different UBI supporters. UBI supporters come 
from a wide range of political perspectives, a 
consequence of the breadth of the range of 
arguments on which UBI proponents draw. … The 
juxtaposition is such that basic income is argued to 
defy conventional political labels; it is ‘neither right 
nor left but forward’. A more nuanced assessment 
may be that whether it is ‘right’ or ‘left’ depends on 
the specifics of the scheme in question. 
Martinelli (2017, p.5)
A UBI would not ameliorate the effects of the replacing 
scenarios if it effectively subsidised poverty level 
wages, entrenched precarious work, or if it were made 
‘affordable’ by dismantling important aspects of our 
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labour law or welfare provision, leaving our most 
vulnerable New Zealanders worse off. The International 
Labour Office (ILO) notes that a UBI should complement, 
rather than displace “the budget for core social security, 
health, education, active labour market policies and 
other crucial social services” (Piachaud, 2018). 
Despite the objections and potential pitfalls, New 
Zealand could design a UBI specifically aimed at 
decreasing inequality and overwork, removing the 
stigma from state support and increasing the autonomy 
of New Zealanders, allowing them to better enjoy their 
lives. Such a scheme could be beneficial if either (a) AI 
is predominantly enabling, increasing New Zealand’s 
income such that we no longer have to work 40-to-
50-hour weeks or (b) AI is predominantly replacing 
such that work becomes more precarious and income 
becomes more unequal. Of course, in (b) much would 
depend on New Zealand being able to effectively 
harness the profits of the AI revolution to fund a UBI.
New Zealand clearly cannot currently afford to pay a 
UBI that would cover even basic living costs to all its 
citizens. But we might be able to apply a mechanism 
that has long been deployed in Germany and has 
now been exported to many other countries including 
Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Czech Republic, Italy 
and Japan (Connolly, 2020). In Germany, Kurtzarbeit 
(literally “short work”) involves a reduction in the length 
of the work week with the state paying employees 60% 
of their normal income for the hours they no longer 
work. Originally used in 1910, Kurtzarbeit has been 
deployed as a short-term fix to tackle downturns such 
as the GFC and now the pandemic. It could be a useful 
mechanism to help share available high value jobs 
amongst New Zealanders, but it does have drawbacks. 
It is fundamentally designed to help people in work and 
so will not help to alleviate the precarity and stigma for 
those unable to work or unable to find work. Also, while 
it might prevent some New Zealanders being pushed 
out of well-paid jobs into poorly paid ones, for those 
who were forced into low paid work, Kurtzarbeit would 
do little to address the loss of income as its payment 
level is tied to the job its recipient currently does. 
Whether or not we have a UBI, we are already paying 
to redress income inequality through mechanisms like 
Working for Families and New Zealand Superannuation. 
We think that New Zealand will at some point have to 
have a national conversation about the philosophical 
justification for such mechanisms. 
Possible justifications include:
 Poverty eradication: This is the current setting. It 
assumes that distributive justice is generally secured 
successfully by free markets and wealth redistribution 
is only justified to alleviate extreme poverty. 
 A set level of wealth redistribution: This assumes 
that distributive justice is ineffectively secured by free 
markets and so we should redistribute wealth to a 
degree that provides some level of compensation for 
the lack of fairness in labour markets. 
 Wellbeing enhancement: Governments should act 
to secure levels of work and particularly amounts 
of income that will guarantee a good level of 
wellbeing for New Zealanders. This might also involve 
consideration of and amelioration of the high costs 
of high inequality. It might also justify the provision of 
basic income security allowing New Zealanders all to 
pursue activities and projects that will enhance our 
lives and those of the community. 
Given that some forms of policy response to increasing 
inequality would involve costly, long term policy changes 
requiring a high degree of social license, we recommend 
that these discussions not be postponed.
E.  Some choices for New Zealand 
about work and income
As noted above, long run technological progress has 
successfully produced many labour saving devices, but 
contrary to Keynes argument in Economic Possibilities 
for our Grandchildren, they have not resulted in most 
people working fewer hours. Although Keynes was 
writing in 1930 about the coming generations, in 1932 
Bertrand Russell argued that British people could 
already be working a fraction of their normal work 
weeks. Over the five years of the First World War, 
most Britons had been occupied in fighting or in other 
wartime activities. Russell argued that this “showed 
conclusively that, by the scientific organisation of 
production, it is possible to keep modern populations 
in fair comfort on a small part of the working capacity 
of the modern world.” In 2020, COVID19 has again 
demonstrated to us just how little of our economic 
activity is ‘essential’ for keeping people fed, clothed, 
housed and healthy. At the same time, the march of 
global warming is causing many to question the long-
held assumption that the success of nations must rest 
41
on the production of more and higher value goods and 
services, as reflected in higher GDP (Raworth, 2017). 
We have argued that whether AI decreases the amount 
of work available to New Zealanders depends on how 
it is implemented. In the face of the risk of a decline in 
the availability of work, most countries including New 
Zealand have focused on keeping their populations 
in work. We suggest that countries like New Zealand 
should think about retaining current levels of work and 
current levels of income as two problems, not one. If AI 
really turns out to be enabling, increasing productivity 
and saving labour, we may have a choice to make. 
Should we continue to work the same amount and 
have more money to spend OR should we settle for 
our current level of income (more evenly distributed), 
allowing us to work less? A recent UK report argues that 
“The dividends of new workplace technology need to 
translate into higher earnings for all – or into shorter 
working hours, if that’s what people prefer” (Fabian 
Society, 2020). We note that these two outcomes are 
not mutually exclusive, but also that New Zealanders 
may not have a free choice in the matter. Whether most 
of us will be able to continue to work roughly five-day 
weeks may depend on whether affected sectors of our 
economy are able to absorb considerably higher levels 
of production—we could clearly benefit from much 
high productivity in house building for example, but 
perhaps not in sectors such as insurance. So, we should 
consider changing the amount we work in response to 
the deployment of AI for several reasons. There may 
be less work available even in scenarios where AI is 
enhancing for workers. If AI increases productivity, New 
Zealanders may prefer to work less. All else being equal, 
the wellbeing of New Zealanders might be enhanced by 
working fewer hours. 
While working less might seem counter-intuitive in a 
consumption-focussed economy currently experiencing 
economic headwinds due to a pandemic, AI will be 
with us for a long time to come and it will demand 
adaptation in the way we live and work. So, we suggest 
that even in difficult times, it is important to ask what 
sort of working life we would eventually like New 
Zealanders to have. 
We note that there is already a large variation amongst 
OECD countries in the number of hours per year that 
workers actually spend on their jobs. New Zealanders 
average a relatively high 1779. Interestingly, there is 
a negative correlation between the number of hours 
worked and the wealth of OECD nations (OECD, 2016). 
The largest average number of hours worked are in 
Mexico (2250) South Korea (2070), Greece (2035), India 
(1980) and Chile (1970), while the fewest are in France 
(1472), the Netherlands (1430), Norway (1424), Denmark 
(1410) and Germany (1363). Correlation is, of course, not 
causation. These figures do not magically show that if 
New Zealanders worked less, that would cause us to earn 
more. But they do demonstrate that successful countries 
‘spend’ their higher GDPs on allowing their citizens 
enhanced wellbeing through working fewer hours. 
Small scale experiments with a four-day work week, 
both here and overseas, strongly suggest that it 
increases quality of life. Surprisingly, a trial by Guardian 
Life New Zealand found that dropping to a four-day 
week had no negative effect on productivity (Barnes, 
2020). The company attributes this fact to greater 
enthusiasm and wellbeing in its staff as well as studies 
showing that workers in non-operational roles tend to 
spend significant parts of their working days in activities 
that do not enhance productivity (Barnes, 2020, p. 17). 
A trial by Microsoft Japan found a productivity increase 
of 40% (Eadicicco, 2019). No doubt, some of the effects 
of such a move across the board would be sensitive 
to details of particular industries and workplaces, but 
there is increasing acceptance that decreasing the work 
week will benefit staff recruitment and retention. Global 
consumer goods company Unilever will use its New 
Zealand staff to trial a four-day working week, at full 
pay in 2021. If successful, it plans to extend the four-
day working week to its 165,000 employees around 
the world (Parker, 2020). For an extended argument 
in favour of a four-day work week in New Zealand see 
Barnes (2020). If in future, AI decreased the number 
of high value jobs in New Zealand, shortening the work 
week would be an effective way of sharing that work 
more equitably amongst us. Interestingly, this mirrors 
the argument made by the Labour Government in 
power when New Zealand instituted the forty-hour 
week thought the Industrial Conciliation Amendment 
Act 1936 and the Factories Amendment Act 1936. In 
the aftermath of the great depression the Government 
promoted a shorter working week as a means of 
increasing employment opportunities (Burrows, 2020). 
We do not pretend that decreasing the working hours 
of New Zealanders would be simple. Some industries 
would find it much more challenging than others. Even 
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so, if New Zealand is really to take wellbeing seriously, 
we must investigate the effects of working hours and of 
the unequal distribution of work (as opposed to income) 
amongst New Zealanders. Sharing the benefits of new 
technologies is often thought of in terms of taxation, 
but it may yet be just as much about sharing work as 
about sharing wealth. We applaud the Prime Minister’s 
recently encouragement for more companies to consider 
experimenting with a shorter work week. But we note 
that if increasing use of AI exacerbates inequality in work 
distribution, mechanisms like a shorter work week would 
have to be mandated by Government (just as they were 
in the 1930s). In a volatile and competitive economic 
environment, allowing individual employers to decide 
about the introduction of such measures is unlikely to 
achieve widespread change and might make inequality 
between different types of work worse. 
How should New Zealand Respond?
We have said that, beyond the short-term, it is very 
difficult to predict the effects of AI adoption on particular 
jobs. However, we can be certain that New Zealand will 
achieve some benefits from AI. The costs of some goods 
and services will decrease as productivity increases 
in sectors of the economy that manage to harness AI 
effectively. This will push downwards on the cost of 
living and upwards on GDP. This will of course just be 
one factor that influences our productivity and living 
standards in the coming decades. AI will also contribute 
to the invention of new goods and services and to the 
democratisation of access to existing goods and services. 
These changes will be accompanied by the creation of 
new types of work and new ways of working. All these 
changes will be discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4. 
We can also be certain that the rise of AI will have some 
costs for workers and for the country as a whole. Many 
of these are discussed in detail in later chapters but, at 
a big picture level, we know that the jobs of some New 
Zealanders will disappear due to automation. Although 
AI will help to create the new jobs, it is again very 
difficult to predict how many new jobs will be created 
and what proportion of those will be high value, well 
paid jobs. It has been suggested (Turner, 2018) that 
as AI becomes capable of performing a growing array 
of complex tasks (driving, selling insurance, detecting 
cancerous cells in biopsies…), humans will increasingly 
be displaced into low value work. Whether or not we 
can avoid the resulting inequality depends on our ability 
to create new types of work which rest on skills that 
humans can perform and AI cannot. This offsetting of 
automation has tended to happen in the past but our 
sample size of previous industrial revolutions is too 
small for us to be sure that it will again save the day. 
Combatting such an increase in inequality might be 
challenging for New Zealand if the profits from the AI 
revolution disproportionately accrue to large data-rich 
offshore entities such as the FAANG companies. 
So, it is essential that New Zealand is proactive in 
ensuring that we maximise the benefits and minimise 
the costs of the AI revolution. New Zealand already 
has companies and institutions that are deploying AI 
very effectively, but we could do more. If some of the 
profits from the AI revolution are to land offshore, we 
can at least share in those profits by increasing our 
investment through New Zealand’s sovereign wealth 
fund. We should also invest in competing effectively with 
international AI-based companies. We might do this by 
developing government sponsored AI-based companies, 
just as New Zealand developed KiwiBank to compete 
with Australian banks that dominated the New Zealand 
market. Developing a distinctly New Zealand social media 
platform could have many social benefits over and above 
decreasing the amount of advertising revenue that flows 
to Facebook, Twitter etc. We might also revise KiwiSaver, 
enabling and incentivising investment in companies that 
deploy AI responsibly and effectively. 
 RECOMMENDATION 4: New Zealand 
should enhance its sovereign wealth fund 
so as to better profit from the success of 
large international AI-driven businesses. 
At the same time, we should be proactive 
in finding and investing in AI-focused 
niches in which New Zealand companies 
can be successful — particularly in social 
networking, where local products may 
bring other advantages. 
Over and above harnessing AI to increase the wealth 
of New Zealand, we must consider its effects on our 
society. Increasing inequality is a real risk. We should 
also take seriously the question raised above—given 
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that AI is essentially labour-saving, do we want to use 
it to earn more or to work less? We have argued above 
that inequality of work and work strain are serious 
problems in the New Zealand workplace. Overwork is 
the only measure in the Human Development Index 
on which we are significantly lagging other developed 
countries. Overwork takes a real toll on the health of 
New Zealanders, especially mental health. It is also a 
cost to our businesses resulting in burnout, absenteeism 
and low morale. 
We have no doubt that a well-designed universal 
basic income would enhance the wellbeing of New 
Zealanders, but such schemes are extremely expensive. 
It would be very difficult to achieve the level of political 
consensus required to make such a major political and 
economic change. Even if we could successfully budget 
for a UBI, we doubt that enough New Zealanders would 
support such a great expense, particularly in light of 
the huge cost of our response to the COVID pandemic. 
Something like a UBI might well be part of New 
Zealand’s future, but now is not the time. 
A more viable option would be to decrease the 
length New Zealand’s working week as AI makes 
further inroads into the labour market. Business-led 
experiments in a four-day week both here and overseas 
show that decreasing the amount of time people spend 
at work need not decrease productivity and that it does 
result in healthier, happier, more resilient and more 
enthusiastic staff. We noted that the Prime Minister has 
recently encouraged businesses to consider decreasing 
work hours, but we also note that voluntary business-led 
change is likely to be slow and only partially successful. It 
may even exacerbate inequality in the amounts of work 
that New Zealanders are required to do. Ultimately, if 
New Zealand as a whole is to benefit from the labour-
saving nature of AI, Government will have to lead. 
Those in operational jobs (e.g., nursing or bus driving) 
could not decrease their hours without a corresponding 
drop in their productivity. To achieve equity in a 
reduction in the working hours of New Zealanders, 
Government would have to subsidise decreased hours 
for operational workers. This is effectively what European 
governments do when they deploy Kurzarbeit as a 
means of stimulating their economies. While this would 
be a significant cost to Government, it would be much 
less that the cost of a UBI and it would be offset by 
reducing the social and health costs of our current 
level of overwork. Most importantly, such a Government 
subsidy would subsidise the creation of new jobs across 
the operational workforce. In the event that AI causes 
a decrease in the number of desirable, well paid jobs, 
decreasing our work week would increase the number 
of New Zealanders employed across a wide variety of 
operational occupations. 
 RECOMMENDATION 5: As AI advances 
into areas of human work New Zealand 
should consider decreasing the length of 
the working week as a means of securing 
the labour-saving benefits of AI and 
robotics, at the same time, stimulating 
the economy, better sharing high-value 
work, and enhancing the lives of New 
Zealanders and the communities in  
which we live. 
Ultimately, there are huge benefits to be gained for 
our society, our communities, for Kiwis with school age 
children, or looking after those less abled. Harnessing 
the power of AI in this way could make New Zealand an 
even better place in which to live and work. 
This chapter might appear to be very negative in tone, 
but there are plenty of voices telling us that AI is going 
to be a bonanza. New Zealand must consider downside 
risks as well as upside benefits. We also note that 
mechanisms like a UBI, Kurtzarbeit, or a shorter work 
week, could be beneficial for New Zealanders. They 
could decrease stress and mental illness, enhance family 
life, allow more people to actively engage in caring for 
the very young, the very old, and for the environment. If 
New Zealanders were better and more broadly educated 
(for example in the humanities disciplines) that would 
help them to flourish as human beings, and we could 
see a great increase in wellbeing. We might also see 
New Zealand becoming a more community-centred 
culture, reflecting the great strengths of Māori and 
Pasifika life. 
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What will it be like to work alongside – or even under 
– AI algorithms and robots? While much attention has 
been paid to attempts to predict how many jobs will 
be lost to the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, considerably 
less attention has thus far been paid to questions of 
how working lives will be changed by them. What sort 
of benefits and harms might result from those changes? 
And what sorts of regulatory steps could be taken to 
maximise the benefits and mitigate the risks? 
It’s to these questions that we turn in this chapter. 
AI, and related technologies like advanced robotics, 
are likely to have important impacts throughout the 
employment life-cycle.12 The approach we adopt here 
attempts to follow that life-cycle, considering some 
of the main implications at every stage. We begin, in 
fact, with considerations that arise even before the 
employment relationship begins: with the process 
of algorithmic recruitment. Our approach tracks the 
recruitment process from targeting of job adverts, to 
shortlisting, and finally to interviewing. As we show, 
concerns around algorithmic recruitment have already 
resulted in legal developments in some jurisdictions.
We then move on to look at how the workplace itself is 
likely to be affected, and specifically, to what has been 
called algorithmic management. Of course, this will vary 
substantially between different contexts, with some 
workers finding themselves more affected than others. 
Although some of what we have to say is likely to have 
more general effect, we focus on a particular part of the 
workforce that has already been impacted a great deal by 
these sorts of technologies: the so-called ‘gig economy’.
Next, we look at two other categories of concerns about 
the use of AI and related technologies in the workplace. 
Technologically enabled workplace surveillance is an 
issue that has received increasing attention during the 
shift to working from home during the Covid crisis, but 
it has been a growing concern among trade unions 
and those concerned with workers’ rights generally for 
many years. Health and safety considerations are also 
important for these purposes, perhaps especially when 
the technologies are embodied in the form of robots, 
driverless vehicles and the like. 
We conclude by looking at the end of the employment 
life-cycle: in particular, to scenarios relating to ‘technology-
induced redundancy’, where workers leave a company 
because technology takes their place, in some sense. 
In addition to examining the likely impacts of these 
various aspects of employment, the chapter will consider 
some regulatory initiatives that have been suggested or 
implemented in the hope of mitigating some of the risks 
to workers that the discussed technologies might pose. 
Benefits of AI technologies for workers
Before we turn to concerns around the use of AI in 
employment, we would be remiss not to acknowledge 
the many suggested benefits of its use in that context. 
Some of these relate to the prospect of higher wages. 
The RSA report refers to “evidence that AI and robotics 
could boost wages due to sizeable productivity gains, 
which will generate more absolute wealth that can be 
shared with workers.” (Dellott and Wallace-Stevens, 
2017) It should be noted, though, that the report 
tempers this optimism by considering the possibility 
that “[n]ew machines may deskill occupations, thereby 
lowering barriers to entry and reducing the bargaining 
power of workers in existing positions”.
As we saw in the previous chapter, there is much 
speculation about the likely economic impacts of AI, 
and its likely impact on wages will depend significantly 
on some of the questions considered there. Suggested 
benefits for workers, though, are not confined to wages. 
The kind of work they will do, and the conditions under 
which they work, are also likely to change, and some 
have suggested this could be for the better. The World 
Economic Forum has considered one of the more 
optimistic scenarios in this regard: 
Automation technology can help remove the 
burden of repetitive administrative work and 
enable employees to focus on solving more 
complex issues while reducing the risk of error, 
allowing them to focus on value-added tasks. 
(WEF, 2018, p.10)
Perhaps offering more reassurance, a report for the 
International Labour Organisation echoed this sentiment: 
“By substituting human work with automated activities, 
technology can have liberating effects, especially if 
this substitution regards heavy, hazardous or repetitive 
work.” (ILO, 2018, p. 5) 
3. AI AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 
12  We use the term ‘employment’ in a generic sense, such that it 
includes those workers who may not technically be considered 
employees under NZ law.
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The appeal of a future where AI takes over work that 
is dull, dirty and dangerous, leaving human workers 
to focus on better, more rewarding, higher-value roles 
and tasks, is easy to see. While most of this chapter 
will be spent considering the potential risks and harms 
from the use of AI in the workplace, it’s important not 
to lose sight of its potential to improve our lives – and 
particularly, the lives of those for whom work doesn’t 
offer a source of esteem and enjoyment, but monotony, 
indignity and danger. Potential, though, is not certainty; 
as with other impacts of AI on work, much depends 
on the sorts of choices our society will face about such 
technologies, the sorts of incentives and restrictions we 
create around them.
Some other potential benefits of AI in the employment 
relationship will be considered as they arise in particular 
contexts. For the most part, though, our focus will be on 
the concerns raised about these innovations.
Concerns about AI technologies in 
relation to workers
What, then, are the concerns that have been presented 
about the use of AI in the workplace? In the first phase 
of our project (Gavaghan et al., 2019), we identified six 
concerns about use of AI in the government sector: 
•  decision-making control;
•  transparency and the related right to explanations; 
•  bias;
•  informational privacy;
•  questions of liability and the suggested ‘responsibility 
gap’; and 
•  human autonomy. 
To a large extent, these same concerns arise in relation 
to employment, albeit that the contexts, potential harms 
and available responses are inevitably different. As in 
the government context, there’s a lot to unpack around 
these simple-sounding concepts. In the context of bias, 
for example, it’s widely recognised that this can refer  
to different things, and that not all examples of bias  
are problematic. Rather, our concern should be with 
unfair bias. 
But what counts as ‘unfair’ is also a complex and 
contested question. A recent report for AlgorithmWatch 
referred to “the plurality of fairness definitions” (Loi, 
2020, p.23), while a report from the UK’s Centre for Data 
Ethics and Innovation noted that “[n]otions of fairness are 
neither universal nor unambiguous, and they are often 
inconsistent with one another”, going on to say that:
Even in cases where fairness can be more precisely 
defined, it can still be challenging to capture all 
relevant aspects of fairness in a mathematical 
definition. In fact, the trade-offs between 
mathematical definitions demonstrate that a 
model cannot conform to all possible fairness 
definitions at the same time. Humans must choose 
which notions of fairness are appropriate for a 
particular algorithm, and they need to be willing to 
do so upfront when a model is built and a process 
is designed. 
(CDEI, 2020, p.29.) (See also ACAS, 2020, pp. 22-23)
There exists a substantial literature on the subjects of 
bias and fairness, both in the context of algorithms and 
AI (e.g. Eubanks, 2018; Corbett-Davis and Goel, 2018); 
and more generally. We have made our own modest 
contribution to it elsewhere (Gavaghan et al., (2019), 
pp.43; Zerilli et al, 2021, ch. 3), but don’t intend to spend 
much more time on the philosophical question here. 
Instead, our starting position will be that the use of 
algorithms in employment should promote, and certainly 
not obstruct or contravene, whatever idea of fairness is 
appropriate in a particular context. 
Hence, where the law requires employers or recruiters to 
adhere to a particular idea of fairness – most obviously, 
by avoiding certain kinds of discrimination involving 
particular attributes – then the AI tools used should be 
consistent with that requirement. Where employers aim 
to go beyond the minimum requirements imposed by 
law – for instance, if they want to broaden the diversity 
of their workforce – then the tools should allow them to 
do so. This necessarily means that concerns about bias 
and fairness intersect with concerns about transparency. 
Algorithmic unfairness is likely to be easier to control 
for or avoid if users are aware of how it might arise 
and how it might be avoided, while unfair decisions 
and outcomes will be easier to challenge and correct if 
regulators or people subject to those decisions are able 
to see how they came about. 
In addition to looking at these more general concerns 
in the content of employment, however, this chapter 
will identify and discuss some more specific concerns 
around the use of AI in the employment context, or that 
arise at particular points in the employment life-cycle.
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A.  Recruitment
The first significant impact of AI on the world of work 
is likely to be before the employment relationship even 
begins. As we discussed in Chapter 1, algorithms are 
playing an increasing role in recruitment. A recent report 
by the Institute for the Future of Work explained that AI 
can be used throughout the recruitment process:
•  to source candidates, for instance, by using AI in job 
advertisement; 
•  in screening candidates, for instance, in determining 
which candidates to invite for interview; and
•  to inform selections, for instance to predict future job 
performance on the basis of sales, personality traits, 
job tenure, and other metrics. (IFOW 2020, p.23)
While it has been said that “there is a lack of data on 
the global uptake of such technologies” (Sanchez-
Monedero et al, 2020), it has been estimated that over 
98% of Fortune 500 companies are using some form of 
applicant tracking software (Shields, 2018). It has also 
been predicted that the Covid crisis will result in “the 
increasingly pervasive use of automated hiring systems.” 
(IFOW, 2020, p.6)
The attractions of such technologies are easily seen. The 
Upturn Report listed several potential advantages of 
algorithm-assisted hiring processes: (Bogen and Rieke, 
2018, p.6) 
•  reduced time to hire; 
•  reduced cost of hire;  
•  improved quality of hire; and
•  improved workplace diversity. 
While the most obvious benefits will be for the 
employer, it’s easy to see how reduced hiring times 
and more accurate ‘job matching’ could lead to more 
satisfactory outcomes for employees too. Finding out 
about relevant vacancies, reduced delays in hearing 
whether we’ve been shortlisted, and perhaps even 
reduced bias in hiring decisions are all potential benefits 
for the prospective employee. The CDEI report on 
algorithmic bias suggested that “innovation in this space 
has real potential for making recruitment less biased if 
developed and deployed responsibly”, but also warned 
that “the risks if they go wrong are significant because 
the tools are incorporating and replicating biases on a 
larger scale.” (CDEI, 2020, p.46)
Sometimes, AI in recruitment will be used to support 
rather than replace humans. The IFOW report found 
that “few employers have automated the entire hiring 
process, particularly the interviewing and selection 
stages.” (IFOW, 2020, p.23) Some parts of the 
recruitment process, though, may be more amenable to 
full automation. According to the CDEI:
Most algorithmic tools in recruitment are designed 
to assist people with decision- making, however 
some fully automate elements of the process. This 
appears particularly common around automated 
rejections for candidates at application stage that 
do not meet certain requirements. 
(CDEI, 2020, p. 47)
Important to all of these reports is the recognition that 
“[h]iring is rarely a single decision, but rather a series 
of decisions that culminate in a job offer or rejection.” 
(Bogen and Rieke, 2018, p.3) The Upturn Report’s 
authors depict this visually in the form of the Hiring 
Funnel, which shows the stages at which potential 
recruits are filtered out (p.13).
Figure 4. The Hiring Funnel from Bogen and Rieke (2018).
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Advertising
As the diagram shows, the large majority of potential 
recruits are excluded before any contact with the 
employer – indeed, before they even become aware that 
the role exists to be filled. As the Report’s authors say, 
“[h]ow employers advertise can sharply limit, or greatly 
expand, the types of people who even learn a job 
opportunity exists.” (Bogen and Rieke, 2018, p.18)
While job adverts that rely on blatantly discriminatory 
grounds still occasionally appear (Ellis, 2020), an advert 
posted on an open forum will be widely seen and – we 
can assume – widely criticised, perhaps even subject to 
legal challenge. In New Zealand, it is (with a few limited 
exceptions) unlawful for employers to make decisions 
on the basis of prohibited grounds, such as sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, religious and ethical beliefs, 
political opinion, race and ethnicity, disability, age and 
employment status. (Human Rights Act (HRA) 1993, 
s.21(1)) This specifically applies to job application 
forms (s.23) and to recruitment consultants (s.22(2)). 
As the Employment New Zealand website states, this 
prohibition extends to advertising: “You must make 
sure that your advertisement doesn’t reflect unlawful 
discrimination.” (Employment NZ, 2021) 
New Zealand law doesn’t require discrimination to be 
intentional in order for it to be unlawful. It also explicitly 
applies to recruitment by third parties such as recruitment 
agencies (HRA, s 22(2)). According to the Human Rights 
Commission, “[i]f a recruitment consultant places a 
job advertisement on behalf of an employer, both the 
recruitment consultant and the employer are liable for any 
breaches of the Act.” (HRC, 2016, p.24) New Zealand’s 
discrimination law also applies to ‘indirect discrimination’. 
In the present context, that would extend to an advert 
that doesn’t explicitly refer to prohibited grounds, but has 
the effect of excluding or disadvantaging some people on 
the basis of a prohibited ground. This is unlawful under 
New Zealand law (HRA s.65), unless a “good reason” can 
be established. A job advert that required a degree in 
computer science, for instance, might have the effect of 
excluding more females than males (assuming there are 
more males than females with such qualifications), but 
it would be lawful provided there was a good reason for 
requiring that qualification. 
New Zealand law, then, seems to provide an adequate 
response to ads that are (directly or indirectly) 
discriminatory in their content. Furthermore, AI tools 
may actually help in making sure employers don’t 
inadvertently exclude potential applicants by the 
phrasing of their ads. Text analytics company Textio uses 
AI and data science “to reveal the hidden gender bias in 
your writing and suggest alternatives so you can recruit 
from the widest possible pool of qualified candidates.” 
(https://textio.com) 
A potentially more challenging regulatory target is the 
practice of ad targeting. Employers seeking to target 
their advertisements at particular audiences is not a 
new phenomenon. It’s common, for example, for ads to 
be placed in specialist press – education supplements 
of national newspapers, for example, or specialist 
trade publications. The rise of online platforms such 
as Facebook and LinkedIn, though, as well as more 
specialized platforms such as ZipRecruiter, Indeed and 
Entelo, allow a degree of granularity in this targeting 
that has never previously been possible, with adverts 
being targeted at an individual level, based on (real or 
perceived) attributes of the target audience. 
The benefits of so doing are easily seen. As Kim and 
Scott explain:
The power of online recruiting lies in the ability 
it gives employers to precisely target specific 
audiences. By directing their employment ads at 
the most plausible and desirable candidates, they 
can save money and effort. 
(Kim and Scott, 2019, p.97)
Most of us would probably also agree that – if we must 
see adverts at all – we would prefer to see adverts that 
correspond to our interests. Having our social media 
feeds full of adverts for jobs that we have no interest 
in applying for will be little more than a nuisance. More 
importantly, perhaps, is the benefit in not missing the 
chance to apply for jobs that do appeal. 
The danger, as Kim and Scott explain, is that “[w]hile 
targeted advertising enables more efficient outreach, it 
may also open the door to the discriminatory delivery 
of ads.” (Kim and Scott, 2019, p.97; see also Speicher et 
al, 2018) A job advert could be entirely neutral in how 
it describes a role and the qualifications and attributes 
it seeks, but targeting could ensure that is only seen 
by people who satisfy certain criteria. If those criteria 
include prohibited grounds, this certainly seems to 
transgress the spirit of the Human Rights Act, though 
there seem to have been no New Zealand cases where 
this has been tested, and no official statements offering 
advice or guidance.
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RECOMMENDATION 6: While the issue 
has yet to be tested judicially, we consider 
it likely that ad targeting would be 
covered by the discrimination provisions 
of the Human Rights Act. New Zealand 
companies that make use of targeted 
advertising, either by using it themselves 
or outsourcing their ad placement to third 
parties who do so, should therefore be 
aware of their potential legal obligations in 
this respect.
RECOMMENDATION 7: Guidance 
on advertising from Human Rights 
Commission and Employment NZ  
should be updated explicitly to address  
ad targeting. 
New Zealand is not unusual in having little or no law 
specifically addressing ad targeting. Globally, legal 
challenges to ad targeting have thus far been rare. The 
notable outlier in this regard is (unsurprisingly) the USA, 
where several discrimination lawsuits have been brought 
against Facebook’s advertising platform. These actions 
were brought by a range of civil rights organisations, 
trade unions and affected individuals, and related to a 
range of different adverts targeted through audience 
selection tools on the platform. The plaintiffs argued:
that Facebook’s ad platform enabled advertisers 
to exclude certain users from seeing housing, 
employment, and credit opportunities in a 
discriminatory fashion in violation of federal, state, 
and/or local civil rights laws. 
(National Fair Housing Alliance, 2019) 
In a settlement between the parties, Facebook has 
undertaken to make “far-reaching changes and steps 
that will prevent discrimination in housing, employment, 
and credit advertising on Facebook, Instagram, and 
Messenger.” As Facebook Chief Operating Officer Sheryl 
Sandberg announced, this will include ensuring that:
•  Anyone who wants to run housing, employment or 
credit ads will no longer be allowed to target by age, 
gender or zip code.
•  Advertisers offering housing, employment and 
credit opportunities will have a much smaller set of 
targeting categories to use in their campaigns overall. 
Multicultural affinity targeting will continue to be 
unavailable for these ads. Additionally, any detailed 
targeting option describing or appearing to relate to 
protected classes will also be unavailable.
Facebook also committed to greater visibility of ads, with 
Sandberg announcing that they would be “building a 
tool so you can search for and view all current housing 
ads in the US targeted to different places across the 
country, regardless of whether the ads are shown to 
you.” (Sandberg, 2019)
Limiting the options for advertisers to target by 
prohibited grounds is a welcome move, but advertisers 
deliberately using such tools to facilitate biased hiring 
decisions may not be the only problem. Research 
published in 2019 demonstrated how an advertising 
platform – once again, Facebook – can itself play a major 
part “in creating skewed, and potentially discriminatory, 
outcomes” in delivering ads. (Ali et al, 2019) The study 
claimed to show that “Facebook’s ad delivery process 
can significantly alter the audience the ad is delivered to 
compared to the one intended by the advertiser based 
on the content of the ad itself.” For the study’s authors, 
this pointed to:  
the need for policymakers and platforms to 
carefully consider the role of the optimisations 
run by the platforms themselves—and not just 
the targeting choices of advertisers—in seeking to 
prevent discrimination in digital advertising.
In another study, Datta and colleagues developed an 
automated tool that would search and collect data on 
adverts shown on the basis of different user profiles. The 
study found that the stated gender of the user resulted 
in a very different set of results:
The two URL+title pairs with the highest coefficients 
for indicating a male were for a career coaching 
service for “$200k+” executive positions. Google 
showed the ads 1852 times to the male group 
but just 318 times to the female group. The top 
two URL+title pairs for the female group was for a 
generic job posting service and for an auto dealer. 
(Datta et al, 2015)
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The study’s authors, though, pointed out that 
determining how these discriminatory results came 
about was not straightforward:
… we cannot determine whether Google, the 
advertiser, or complex interactions among them 
and others caused the discrimination. Even if we 
could, the discrimination might have resulted 
unintentionally from algorithms optimizing click-
through rates or other metrics free of bigotry.
The differences between requirements in different 
jurisdictions is one of the reasons why it won’t be 
enough to rely on owners of platforms such as Facebook 
and Microsoft (who own LinkedIn) to take appropriate 
steps. Demands are growing for greater transparency 
around advertising platforms. (see e.g. Bogen and 
Rieke, 2018, p.46) A recent proposal from an alliance 
of civil society organisations, co-ordinated by the 
European Partnership for Democracy and including 
AlgorithmWatch and Privacy International, called for 
“meaningful default transparency for all ads” on social 
media platforms. Though primarily a response to the 
opaque nature of some political advertising, the call 
explicitly extends to all advertising, noting that “[u]
niversal ad transparency will help combat discriminatory 
and potentially illegal advertising practices.” (European 
Partnership for Democracy et al, 2020)
The proposal would include the creation of ‘ad libraries’, 
which would “become mandatory for platforms from 
a set number of users onwards.” Such libraries would 
disclose, for each ad, information including the identities 
of advertisers, how much they spent, and – importantly 
for our purposes – targeting criteria and mechanisms, 
and audience actually reached. 
The proposal was oriented towards a European context, 
with calls for the European Commission to take the 
lead in their implementation. In mid-December 2020, 
the European Commission took a major step towards 
doing this. The proposed Digital Services Act (European 
Commission 2020) aims to introduce “a common set of 
rules on intermediaries’ obligations and accountability 
across the single market.” The draft law has significant 
implications for many digital services and providers, but 
for our purposes, the most significant provisions relate to 
online advertising. Article 24 requires that:
Online platforms that display advertising on their online 
interfaces shall ensure that the recipients of the service 
can identify, for each specific advertisement displayed 
to each individual recipient, in a clear and unambiguous 
manner and in real time:
a. that the information displayed is an advertisement;
b. the natural or legal person on whose behalf the 
advertisement is displayed;
c. meaningful information about the main parameters 
used to determine the recipient to whom the 
advertisement is displayed.
Article 30 imposes even stricter rules for “very large 
online platforms”, who will also be required to make 
publicly available information about:
•  whether the advertisement was intended to be 
displayed specifically to one or more particular 
groups of recipients of the service and if so, the main 
parameters used for that purpose; and
•  the total number of recipients of the service reached 
and, where applicable, aggregate numbers for 
the group or groups of recipients to whom the 
advertisement was targeted specifically.
The Digital Services Act is still some way from becoming 
law in the EU, and it may be subject to various 
amendments along its journey. Nonetheless, we see it as 
a welcome development, and one to which New Zealand 
lawmakers and regulators should pay close attention. 
The potential for New Zealand to make demands on big 
international platforms is of course much more limited 
than that of the EU, but NZ employers could certainly 
reap the benefits if European initiatives lead to such 
developments. Domestically, it seems more plausible 
that transparency could be the default for NZ-based 
firms and platforms.
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RECOMMENDATION 8: There is often a 
lack of transparency about the criteria 
used by ad targeting platforms. The  
New Zealand Government should  
monitor international developments  
such as the EU’s proposed Digital  
Services Act, and should seriously consider 
enacting measures that would set 
equivalent transparency standards both 
for NZ-based platforms, and for overseas-
based platforms offering services in NZ. 
There is a strong case for insisting on at 
least as high a level of transparency in 
NZ as will be required in the EU. In the 
meantime, NZ companies considering the 
use of overseas platforms for ad targeting 
should be aware that their targeting 
criteria may not be consistent with NZ law. 
Shortlisting
The next stage in the recruitment process is likely 
to involve processing of applications, including CVs, 
with a view to shortlisting candidates. This is an area 
that the UK’s CDEI identified as one of the few areas 
of the recruitment process that’s sometimes fully 
automated, particularly “around automated rejections for 
candidates at application stage that do not meet certain 
requirements.” (CDEI, 2020, p.47) 
Algorithmic processing of applications is subject to the 
same sort of concerns as targeted advertising: it can 
allow intentional discrimination, but more insidiously, 
lead to highly discriminatory unintended outcomes. 
The most notorious example of this to date concerns 
Amazon’s hiring algorithm. In 2014, as Amazon 
established a team at its Edinburgh office “to build an 
algorithm that could review resumes and determine 
which applicants Amazon should bring on board.” The 
algorithms they developed were trained “to recognize 
some 50,000 terms that showed up on past candidates’ 
resumes.” (Goodman, 2018)
As Jeffrey Dastin has explained in an article for Reuters, it 
soon became apparent to Amazon that “its new system 
was not rating candidates for software developer jobs and 
other technical posts in a gender-neutral way.” (Dastin, 
2018) The reason for this, according to Dastin, derives 
from the fact that the algorithms were trained using 
previous resumes (CVs), which reflected a strongly male IT 
sector and workforce. “In effect,” Dastin wrote: 
Amazon’s system taught itself that male 
candidates were preferable. It penalized resumes 
that included the word “women’s,” as in “women’s 
chess club captain.” And it downgraded graduates 
of two all-women’s colleges, according to people 
familiar with the matter. They did not specify the 
names of the schools.
ACLU attorney Rachel Goodman has written that, when 
algorithms are trained in this sort of way, discriminatory 
outcomes are almost inevitable:
It shouldn’t surprise us at all that the tool developed 
this kind of bias. The existing pool of Amazon 
software engineers is overwhelmingly male, and the 
new software was fed data about those engineers’ 
resumes. If you simply ask software to discover 
other resumes that look like the resumes in a 
“training” data set, reproducing the demographics 
of the existing workforce is virtually guaranteed. 
(Goodman, 2018)
The issue here has strong similarities with what we 
identified in our Phase 1 report, in the context of 
algorithms used in the criminal justice context, like 
RoC*RoI and COMPAS. When algorithms are trained on 
historical data, and that historical data reflects historic 
discrimination or inequality, then steps will have to 
be taken to prevent that discrimination or inequality 
skewing outcomes today. This has become known as the 
‘dirty data’ problem.
One way to guard against this kind of problem is to 
ensure transparency of information such as the training 
data used, the weightings given to different variables, 
and the outputs from the algorithmic process. That way, 
we might hope, inadvertent discrimination could be 
detected and prevented. Calls for greater transparency 
are almost ubiquitous in discussions of AI, but achieving 
it can be a challenge. Algorithms like neural networks 
are resistant to transparency through sheer complexity: 
for these algorithms, there is no simple story about 
‘weightings of variables’ to present. 
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In the context of hiring algorithms, increasing 
transparency by providing information about how they 
work and what they are looking for could, of course, give 
rise to attempts to ‘game’ the process. We are already 
witnessing the emergence of an industry geared towards 
helping job applicants prepare their CVs for algorithmic 
assessment. International recruitment company Hays 
has published a set of tips to “ensure your application 
makes it past the algorithms and reaches their 
shortlist.” (McNeill, 2020) These include advice such as 
“avoid unusual job titles. Even if your official job title is 
unconventional, use an industry-standard title in your 
CV and online profile so it will be recognised.” Another 
recruitment agency advises applicants to “[f]ormat 
your CV appropriately so it contains the content AI 
recognises”. (New Zealand Immigration Concepts, 2021) 
Of course, fine-tuning application letters and CVs 
is hardly a new endeavour, and it may be that the 
attempts to ‘game’ algorithmic recruitment processes 
raise no new challenges. Much may depend, though, on 
whether the algorithms in question have the capacity to 
develop the sort of ‘streetwise’ scepticism that we might 
expect from experienced human recruitment personnel. 
While shortlisting raises many of the same issues as 
advertising (inadvertent bias via proxy characteristics, for 
example), we might hope the shortlisting phase of the 
recruitment process could prove a slightly less elusive 
regulatory target than targeted job advertising. Unlike 
the job seeker who will likely never know what vacancies 
she never sees, the applicant who regularly applies 
without being shortlisted will at least be aware of being 
rejected. If the discriminatory ‘bottleneck’ occurs at the 
stage of shortlisting rather than applications, then an 
employer facing public criticism for an overly narrow 
demographic base of employees will find it harder to 
take refuge behind the claim that they could only hire 
from the pool of those who applied. In shortlisting 
systems, we can also register the size of a given 
demographic group in the pool of selected candidates in 
relation to the size of this group in the pool of applicants 
– while in ad targeting systems, we can’t make a relative 
assessment of this kind. 
On the other hand, previous experiences with 
shortlisting ‘blacklists’ show that discrimination and 
unfairness here can be an elusive target too. In our 
discussions during this project, we have heard accounts 
of recruitment companies using their datasets to secretly 
blacklist/downgrade applications (including applicants 
who ‘make trouble’ by bringing a personal grievance 
or using too much sick leave). These ‘trouble-making’ 
applicants are filtered from the shortlisted candidates 
by the recruitment company, but don’t know that it 
has happened, far less why. They just apply for jobs 
and never get any interviews. They might suspect 
something is amiss, but have no way of knowing what, 
far less proving it. Unauthorised disclosure of personal 
information in this way could well contravene the Privacy 
Act 2020, but any legal challenge would depend on 
awareness that it is happening in the first place. This 
issue is apparently becoming a growing concern to 
employment lawyers and even judges, though no cases 
have resulted yet. 
The use of AI tools in recruitment, then, does not 
create a new problem in this regard. Indeed, it’s worth 
considering whether auditing and transparency of such 
systems might actually reduce the potential for such 
covert practices. We address some of these possibilities 
later in the chapter.
Interviews
Once a shortlist has been drawn up, employers will move 
to the interviewing stage. As we discussed in Chapter 1, 
AI systems are playing an increasingly prominent part in 
this stage, including attempts to draw inferences about 
candidates from speech interpretation, visual gesture 
analysis and such like. A Washington Post article about 
HireVue’s face scanning software reported that:
the system uses candidates’ computer or cellphone 
cameras to analyze their facial movements, word 
choice and speaking voice before ranking them 
against other applicants based on an automatically 
generated “employability” score.
The article went on to claim that “[m]ore 
than 100 employers now use the system, 
including Hilton and Unilever, and more than a million 
job seekers have been analyzed.” (Harwell, 2019)
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Quantitative methods for assessing the personal 
attributes of job applicants are of course not new. 
Psychometric testing has been part of recruitment  
for many years. Nonetheless, various new concerns  
have arisen about the use of AI techniques for this 
purpose. One suggested difference relates to their likely 
accuracy. An article in Harvard Business Review in 2019 
contrasted existing psychometric tests, which they 
claimed to have been:
carefully validated vis-à-vis relevant jobs, identifying 
reliable associations between applicants’ scores 
and their subsequent job performance (publishing 
the evidence in independent, trustworthy, scholarly 
journals) 
with newer algorithmic measures, which they claim:
have emerged as technological innovations, 
rather than from scientifically-derived methods 
or research programs.  As a result, it is not always 
clear what they assess, whether their underlying 
hypotheses are valid, or why they may be expected 
to predict job candidates’ performance. 
(Dattner et al, 2019)
Of course, psychometric tests themselves are hardly 
uncontroversial, and it is perhaps worth noting that 
three of the article’s authors work for Manpower Group, 
one of the world’s largest staffing corporations. Still, 
particular concerns about affect recognition algorithms 
are worthy of attention. One 2019 study found that 
“emotional analysis technology assigns more negative 
emotions to black men’s faces than white men’s faces.” 
In particular, black faces were scored as angrier than 
white, even when smiling. (Rhue, 2019)
Concerns also surround the ability of such systems to 
interpret facial cues from non-neurotypical candidates, 
whose displays of affect may differ from the majority. 
The problem is a familiar one; if the system has 
been trained on a particular population cohort, it 
may misinterpret cues from anyone outside of that 
population, leading to inferences being drawn that are 
inaccurate in the case in question. Again, this would 
be an issue with inadequate design and training of the 
algorithm, rather than anything inherent to algorithmic 
systems, but it is a risk that must be guarded against. 
 RECOMMENDATION 9: As in other areas 
where AI tools are deployed, algorithms 
designed to interpret cues from applicants 
based on speech patterns, facial 
expressions, etc. are often of questionable 
accuracy, and often pose a risk of unfair 
bias. In particular, members of minority 
populations, or people whose affective 
responses are atypical, may find themselves 
subject to inaccurate adverse judgments. 
Care must therefore be taken to ensure a 
sufficiently broad and appropriate range 
of training data is used when such systems 
are being developed. And a good measure 
of the accuracy of recruiting systems should 
be made available.
In its 2019 report, the AI Now Institute took a strong 
stance against the use of such technology altogether:
Regulators should ban the use of affect recognition 
in important decisions that impact people’s 
lives and access to opportunities. Until then, AI 
companies should stop deploying it. Given the 
contested scientific foundations of affect recognition 
technology—which claims to detect things such 
as personality, emotions, mental health, and other 
interior states based on physiological measurements 
such as facial expression, voice and gait—it should 
not be allowed to play a role in important decisions 
about human lives, such as who is interviewed or 
hired for a job, the price of insurance, patient pain 
assessments, or student performance in school. 
Building on last year’s recommendation for stringent 
regulation, governments should specifically prohibit 
use of affect recognition in high-stakes decision-
making processes. 
(Crawford et al, 2019, p.6)
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This concern about the accuracy of algorithms has 
been a recurring theme throughout both phases of 
our research. As hype around ‘AI’ continues to grow, 
it’s easy to imagine mounting pressure on employers 
or recruitment agencies to avoid being left behind. 
Whether they all have the resources available to conduct 
their own validation of the tools likely to proliferate in 
coming years seems doubtful, and raises again the case 
for an independent body with the capacity to conduct 
this sort of important task.
In the meantime, we can expect legal challenges and 
regulatory interventions around such techniques. In 
November 2019, the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC) filed an official complaint against HireVue 
before the US Federal Trade Commission. (EPIC, 
2019) The claim accused the company of engaging 
in deceptive practices for its alleged use of facial 
recognition software, and of unfair practice for its use of 
‘secret algorithms’. At the time of writing, it appears that 
the FTC has taken no action in response. 
The USA has, however, seen its first legislative response 
to the use of AI in interviewing, with Illinois becoming 
the first jurisdiction to have legislated specifically for 
this issue. The Artificial Intelligence Video Interview 
Act, which came into effect at the beginning of 2020, 
provides that:
 An employer that asks applicants to record video 
interviews and uses an artificial intelligence analysis 
of the applicant-submitted videos shall do all of the 
following when considering applicants for positions 
based in Illinois before asking applicants to submit 
video interviews:
 (1) Notify each applicant before the interview 
that artificial intelligence may be used to analyze 
the applicant’s video interview and consider the 
applicant’s fitness for the position.
 (2) Provide each applicant with information before 
the interview explaining how the artificial intelligence 
works and what general types of characteristics it 
uses to evaluate applicants.
 (3) Obtain, before the interview, consent from the 
applicant to be evaluated by the artificial intelligence 
program as described in the information provided.
 An employer may not use artificial intelligence to 
evaluate applicants who have not consented to the 
use of artificial intelligence analysis.
Concerns have already been expressed about how 
the new law will function, and whether it will have 
the desired effect. One article expressed concern that 
“without additional guidance, the required explanation 
of how AI works may be difficult for human resources 
personnel to explain or for an average job applicant to 
understand.” (Stegmaier et al, 2020) As that article also 
points out, the Act “does not specify the consequences 
of violations or methods of enforcement”. Serious doubts 
also concern the role of ‘consent’ to such interviews, 
given the frequent incidence of major disparities in 
bargaining power. In many cases, applicants who refuse 
consent to such processing will justifiably fear that this 
will be counted against them, even if their application 
isn’t rejected at that point. While we therefore agree 
that some manner of legal protection is needed here, 
the Illinois model may not, on its own, prove adequate 
to that task.
This concern about using ‘consent’ as a justification for 
such practices was strongly echoed in a recent report 
by the Commission on Workers and Technology – a joint 
initiative by the Fabian Society and Community trade 
union – which called for a revision to the law and codes 
of practice:
to clarify that employers cannot use consent as 
the basis for processing personal data relating to 
workers or job applicants (because there is  
an unequal power relationship). Without such 
consent workers’ personal data can only be used 
after carefully weighing the interests of both 
employer and worker. This change would mean 
that consent could not be used to bypass other 
restrictions on monitoring or on automated 
decision-making. (Commission on Workers and 
Technology, 2020, p. 50.)
 RECOMMENDATION 10: Lawmakers and 
regulators should be cautious of legal 
protections against AI hiring practices 
that rely on the ‘consent’ of applicants. 
Given the typical disparities in bargaining 
positions, many applicants will simply not 
be in a position to refuse. 
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B.  Algorithmic management
Algorithmic management has been described as “a 
diverse set of technological tools and techniques that 
structure the conditions of work and remotely manage 
workforces.” (Mateescu and Nguyen, 2019, p.3) It 
covers a range of situations where AI takes on tasks or 
roles that were previously those of human managers. 
This can include forecasting demand to allow more 
accurate decisions about stocking and staffing. This is 
what the RSA Report refers to as anticipatory logistics: 
“the process of predicting demand for consumer goods 
before purchases have been made.” The report points 
out that:
This allows logistics firms to improve efficiency 
and cut delivery times. Ocado, for example, uses 
algorithms to optimise its warehouse storage 
structure, meaning popular and soon-to-be 
popular items are in plentiful supply and in close 
proximity to its picking and packing teams. 
(Dellott and Wallace-Stephens, 2017, pp.50-51)
The more significant concerns about algorithmic 
management, though, tend to arise when it is used 
to make decisions about human workers – decisions 
concerning the likes of deployment, shift allocation, 
promotion, disciplinary action or dismissal. As with other 
AI methods, it can be used to support human managers, 
by providing them with information on which to base 
decisions, or to replace them, either with regard to 
certain tasks or entirely. 
An opinion from the EU’s European Economic and Social 
Committee, adopted in 2017, claimed that “[w]ork is 
now often determined and distributed by algorithms 
without human intervention, which influences the nature 
of the work as well as working conditions.” (Muller, 
2016, [3.23]). On the other hand, in his report for 
AlgorithmWatch, Michele Loi noted that the “application 
of AI technology to human resources (HR) analytics 
is still in its infancy, even if one considers a generous 
definition of what kind of technologies AI refers to.” (Loi, 
2020, p.4) Such applications as are currently in use: 
rarely involve automated decisions or even 
recommendations based on data-driven 
predictions. Rather, they often develop and 
visualize an array of HR metrics leaving evaluations 
and decisions entirely to human decision-makers. 
The function of these technologies is to enhance 
the analytical capacity of the decision-makers, 
by virtue of representing and packaging the 
information in a more usable and insightful format.
Nonetheless, he acknowledges that the prospect of AI 
assuming more direct roles in the HR context is neither 
remote nor fanciful:
AI-generated predictions and recommendations 
may be used to pursue all tasks currently 
considered in the domain of data-driven HR 
analytics, for example in order to personalize 
employment offers and contracts, manage 
employee’s [sic] performance, optimize learning 
and talent development activities, manage 
employee engagement and communication, 
decide disciplinary, health and safety interventions, 
organize employees’ holidays, absence, flexible 
working, maternity/paternity leave, and assign 
rewards (e.g. salary and benefits) 
(Loi, 2020, p.5)
In addition, we shouldn’t overestimate how 
readily human users accept machine-generated 
recommendations, especially in repetitive tasks (see 
e.g. Zerilli et al, 2019b). While algorithmic management 
may not actually replace human managers, it may be 
that the role of those human managers will increasingly 
be to implement the algorithmic recommendations, 
rather than take them on board as one factor in a multi-
faceted decision involving meaningful human judgment. 
We return to this point later in the chapter.
A report for the UK’s Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS) identified several areas where 
algorithmic management is becoming increasingly 
prevalent, including:
•  the use of automatic shift allocation software in the 
retail and hospitality sectors; 
•  manufacturing and logistics firms using algorithms 
to micro-manage in ever greater detail the individual 
movements and actions of workers on a minute-by-
minute basis; and 
•  the growth of performance review algorithms, 
designed not to give instructions to workers but to 
collect data on them and feed it back to managers, 
who can use the outputs to make decisions that 
could include pay, promotion or firing. (ACAS, 2020, 
pp. 4-5) 
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Our research, however, has inclined us to be somewhat 
cautious in predicting exactly how algorithmic 
management will come to be used. Historically, 
management and HR practices have tended to follow 
changes in patterns of work. Given the uncertainties 
about how AI will affect work, it’s therefore difficult to 
make confident pronouncements about its future role in 
management. It has been suggested to us, for example, 
that we may see quite divergent responses in the use of 
algorithmic management, with different parallel trends 
emerging in HR/management. The examples we have 
seen to date, then, may reflect specific aspects of those 
forms of work, and may not point to more general 
trends. 
Where it has been deployed, however, the potential 
benefits of algorithmic management are easy to see. The 
ACAS reports lists several, including:
•  improved accuracy of decision making; 
•  more efficient shift scheduling meaning less wasted 
time for both managers and workers; 
•  more efficient task allocation in factories meaning 
increased productivity; 
•  better performance assessments through more 
accurate data collection; and
•  reduced opportunities for human favouritism and 
unconscious biases to intrude into management 
decisions around remuneration, holiday approval or 
shift allocation decisions. (ACAS, 2020, p. 5) 
Their report looks in more detail at shift allocation 
algorithms:
Increasingly common in the retail and hospitality 
sectors, they can also include quite sophisticated 
machine learning algorithms to forecast customer 
footfall, using anything from traffic history and 
point of sale data to weather forecasts. These 
predictions are then used to match to employees’ 
skill sets and calculate which employees should be 
scheduled on any given day, in order for workers’ 
shift patterns to respond to consumer demand. 
Platforms like Rotageek are in use by companies 
including Pret A Manger, O2 and Thorpe Park while 
Percolata is being employed at UNIQLO. 
(ACAS 2020, pp.10-11)
As well as the obvious benefits for employers, this: 
can benefit workers by giving clearer advance 
notice of when shifts will be and making it easier 
to swap and change them. This offers a potentially 
major benefit to workers in industries like retail 
or hospitality, who at present face often being on 
call or ready to turn up for shifts, only to find them 
cancelled or cut short with very little notice. 
Tools of algorithmic management are increasingly 
necessary for ‘just in time’ supply chains, and are an 
integral part of the so-called ‘gig economy.’ Platform-
based transport and delivery companies like Lyft, 
Deliveroo and most famously Uber have become a 
ubiquitous feature of urban landscapes in recent years. 
Alex Rosenblat, who has studied and written extensively 
on Uber’s business model, summarises it like this:
Rather than supervising its hundreds of thousands 
of drivers with human supervisors, the company 
has built a ride-hail platform on a system of 
algorithms that serves as a virtual “automated 
manager.” Freed from the necessity of layers of 
real bosses, algorithms manage drivers directly 
according to the rules that Uber lays out. 
(Rosenblat, 2019, p.3)
Whether the arrival of the ‘gig economy’ is a welcome 
development is, of course, a moot point – the regulatory 
and policy issues raised by gig economy companies 
such as Uber would merit a report all to themselves. 
Much of the uncertainty relates to the legal status 
of drivers, specifically, whether they are properly 
considered employees, contractors or something else. 
(The NZ Employment Court has very recently addressed 
this issue; see Arachchige v Rasier NZ Ltd and Uber 
B.V.[2020] NZEmpC 230). While their use of algorithmic 
management has yet to generate the same degree of 
legal scrutiny, this may be a future locus of legal conflict 
for the gig economy. 
Algorithmic management, though, is not confined to 
the gig economy. It’s been suggested that some of the 
issues that have arisen in the gig economy are likely 
to foreshadow wider concerns as such technologies 
become more widespread. The ACAS Report documents 
“growing evidence that some of these digital 
management practices pioneered in the gig economy 
are starting to spread to the wider labour force.” (ACAS, 
2020, p.12) 
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In this section, we consider a number of concerns about 
algorithmic management. First, we look at some issues 
that are common to other algorithmic decisions, and 
consider how they could play out in the workplace 
environment. In the next parts, we look at some issues 
that are more specific to the workplace context. The 
issues we will consider relate to:
•  autonomy;
•  transparency;
•  discrimination and bias;
•  ratings-based management; and 
•  evaluation, monitoring and surveillance.
Autonomy  
A concern we have encountered throughout our research 
relates to the impact of workplace AI on the autonomy 
of workers – on how they allocate and organise their 
time, and on the degree of discretion they can employ in 
going about tasks. ‘Micro-management’ and ‘Taylorism’ 
are hardly novel practices in the modern workplace, but 
there are worries that AI may allow them to proliferate 
with an unprecedented level of precision and control. The 
ACAS Report provides the following example:  
handheld devices and tablets have long been used 
to give warehouse ‘pickers’ sets of timed instructions 
as to what items to collect from where on a minute-
by-minute basis. Amazon warehouses are now 
taking this to the next level – workers are being 
equipped with a wearable haptic feedback device 
that tells them what to collect, where to find it in 
the warehouse and gives them a requisite number 
of seconds to find the item. They wear these devices 
on their arms and it uses vibrations to guide their 
arm movements in order to be more efficient. 
(ACAS, 2020, pp.10-11)
The privacy and welfare concerns raised by AI-enabled 
workplace surveillance will be considered in more depth 
later, but a further concern for the report’s authors 
related to the autonomy and dignity of the workers:
Taking away people’s autonomy in this way 
can remove an important sense of dignity and 
humanity from work, when workers are denied the 
ability to make even tiny or mundane decisions 
about what size of box to use or how long a piece 
of tape to cut for wrapping, or even where and 
how to move their own limbs. (p.11)
They also point to an interesting irony regarding the 
autonomy of the managers provided with these tools:
these algorithms allow them potentially much 
greater control over their workforce but at the 
cost of paradoxically making their own jobs less 
relevant; if all key recruitment, task-allocation and 
performance review functions can be undertaken 
by algorithms, what discretion is there left any 
more for human line managers? (p.13)
The importance, and potential erosion, of human 
discretion by algorithmic tools has led to frequent 
demands that AI should only be used to support human 
decisions in the workplace, and not to replace them. The 
ACAS Report, for example, proposes that:  
Algorithms should be used to advise and work 
alongside human line managers but not to replace 
them. A human manager should always have final 
responsibility for any workplace decisions. 
(ACAS, 2020, Recommendation 1)
As in our Phase 1 report, we sound a note of caution 
in this regard. The prospect of always maintaining a 
‘human in the loop’ has obvious appeal, but has the 
potential to offer little more than a ‘regulatory placebo’ 
if their role is largely nominal (signing off on what the 
algorithm recommends). We have also written before 
about concerns around algorithmic bias and decisional 
atrophy, where humans rarely called upon to use certain 
skills lose either the confidence or competence to offer 
meaningful oversight of algorithmic outputs (see Zerilli 
et al, 2019b). 
If managers are to work effectively alongside AI systems, 
then there needs to be what Michele Loi refers to as 
“competence alignment.” (Loi, 2020, p.39) 
Ensure you have adequate competences to build 
and implement AI ethically. Organizations that 
aim to produce and implement AI tools in HR 
must recruit experts with the range of skills (and 
informal knowledge, and cognitive styles) required 
to evaluate an algorithm’s intelligibility and fairness. 
(Loi, 2020, p. 47)
Educate potential end-users (e.g. HR professionals) 
to ensure that they have the know-how and skills 
necessary to operate AIs in HR correctly. End-
users should not have blind faith in AI tools, but 
the adequate level of trust combined with critical 
attitudes. 
(Loi, 2020, p. 47)
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RECOMMENDATION 11: As in other 
areas where AI is being deployed, it is 
common to encounter demands to keep 
‘humans in the loop.’ If this is to offer 
more than nominal assurance, though, 
serious attention must be paid to ideas 
like competence alignment, and measures 
to protect against automation bias and 
decisional atrophy.
Transparency
Concerns about transparency of algorithmic 
management are becoming increasingly pressing. A 
report for the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
warned that: 
The way these management systems operate is 
almost never transparent, as companies do not 
share the methods through which ratings and 
customers’ feedbacks over the workers’ activities 
are gathered and processed. Management by the 
rating is also spreading ever more beyond platform 
work, with apps that allow processing patrons’ and 
restaurants’ feedbacks over individual waiters. 
(ILO, 2018, p.8)
This lack of transparency has been reported as a major 
source of frustration among Uber drivers. A 2019 study 
found that:
While the app is learning a lot about them, Uber 
drivers find it frustrating how little they know 
about the app. They find the lack of transparency 
of the underlying logic of the complex algorithms 
frustrating, believing it to be an unfair system which 
manipulates them subtly without their knowledge 
or consent. (Indeed, Uber has previously admitted 
to drawing on insights from behavioral science to 
nudge drivers to work longer hours). 
(Möhlmann and Henfridsson, 2019)  
If algorithmic management is used to inform, or 
make, decisions about dismissal or other actions that 
negatively impact on an employee’s conditions, the 
decisions are still able to be challenged and will be 
measured against the standard of “a fair and reasonable 
employer” in the same circumstances. (Employment 
Relations Act 2000 (ERA), s 103A) The employer’s 
actions must be “justifiable”, and the test of justification 
relates both to the “substantive decision” and the 
“procedural fairness” of the decision-making. There are 
statutory criteria with indications of ‘fairness’ including 
“sufficient investigation,” the right of the employee to 
know what is being alleged and to have any concerns 
raised in advance, the right to be given a reasonable 
opportunity to respond (including enough information 
about the allegations), and an obligation on employers 
to genuinely consider the employee’s response. There 
is a considerable body of case law on the expected 
practices of a fair and reasonable employer in New 
Zealand, and an overarching statutory duty of good 
faith. How these standards will be applied to decisions 
made by AI remains to be seen. While New Zealand 
courts have traditionally been reluctant to interfere in 
matters of ‘managerial prerogative’ when it comes to 
commercial or operational decisions, they will examine 
the fairness of the processes informing those decisions, 
with the processes of obtaining the information 
underpinning the employer’s decisions open to scrutiny. 
Recent cases have also indicated a greater willingness 
to interrogate the basis for commercial or operational 
decisions. As the Court of Appeal has said, an employer’s 
actions cannot be deemed reasonable just because 
the employer considers it was reasonable. (Grace Team 
Accounting Ltd v Brake [2014] NZCA 541, at [89]) 
As with other situations where algorithmically informed 
decisions are open to scrutiny or challenge, this has 
raised questions about the extent to which the reasons 
for those decisions might be rendered opaque by 
the algorithm. As we discussed in our Phase 1 report, 
this opacity might be technical or legal. The latter has 
recently been the subject of yet another legal challenge 
against Uber, launched in late October by the AppDrivers 
& Couriers Union “over failure to provide access to data 
& explanation of algorithmic management as required 
by GDPR [the European Union’s General Data Protection 
Regulation].” (ADCU, 2020)
New Zealand has no direct equivalent of the GDPR, and 
the question of how or indeed whether the output of an 
algorithm could satisfy the requirements of the ERA has 
yet to come before a New Zealand court. Some indication 
can, however, be inferred from how New Zealand law 
has responded to other situations where management 
decisions have been made by reliance on opaque systems. 
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In Gilbert v Transfield Services (New Zealand) Ltd ([2013] 
NZEmpC 71 CRC 46/10) the New Zealand Employment 
Court held that a decision to dismiss the plaintiff was 
unjustified, in part because its decision was informed 
by the results of a psychometric test (administered by 
the hiring company Previsor) which it could not explain 
to him, or it would seem, even understand itself. The 
Court’s decision is worth reproducing at length, in 
consideration as to how readily much of this could be 
applicable to opaque algorithms:
[111] Transfield’s refusal to disclose the actual 
Previsor test scores, combined with its inability 
to have access to the proprietorial intellectual 
property of the testing organisation, including 
questions asked and the actual answers given, is 
not consistent with the requirements of the Act 
for information sharing, disclosure, and objective 
rationality. Not only was this information not 
available to Mr Gilbert but it was apparently not 
available to Transfield. … Although the owners of 
the testing system may have had good reason to 
keep its ingredients and even results secret, that 
illustrates the inappropriateness of its use in a 
process that requires openness and information 
exchange. Employers proposing to use testing 
procedures that they do not fully understand, 
and are not permitted to know about, will have 
difficulties when challenged by employees such as 
the plaintiff to justify the consequence of dismissal 
effected in reliance on the products of such 
systems.
[113] Transfield’s decision to employ an 
assessment tool that was incapable of meaningful 
explanation made it impossible to comply with 
the requirements in s 4(1A) of the Act to provide 
access to employees (including Mr Gilbert) to 
information about the psychometric test. It thereby 
deprived them of an opportunity to comment on 
the results of the test upon which the employer 
relied in the course of determining that Mr Gilbert 
was redundant and dismissing him. As well as the 
psychometric test for recruitment purposes being 
of dubious value to the very different exercise 
of selection for redundancy, Transfield created 
an additional problem for itself by purchasing 
and using an assessment tool which it could not 
and did not understand or explain to affected 
employees or indeed to the Court at the hearing.
The reference to s 4(1A) is to the provision of the ERA that: 
requires an employer who is proposing to make a 
decision that will, or is likely to, have an adverse 
effect on the continuation of employment of 1 or 
more of his or her employees to provide to the 
employees affected—
(i)  access to information, relevant to the   
 continuation of the employees’ employment,   
 about the decision; and
(ii)  an opportunity to comment on the information  
 to their employer before the decision is made.
Internationally, questions of transparency in algorithmic 
management have already begun to generate legal 
scrutiny and conflict. A Texas District Court has already 
heard a dispute concerning “the use of privately 
developed algorithms to terminate public school 
teachers for ineffective performance.” (Houston 
Federation of School Teachers v Houston Independent 
School District 251 F.Supp.3d 1168 (2017)) In 2010, the 
Houston Independent School District had begun “its 
transition to a ‘data driven’ teacher appraisal system”. 
One of the criteria for evaluation, “student performance”, 
was “based on proprietary algorithms belonging to 
a private company” – the Education Value-Added 
Assessment System (EVAAS).
The plaintiffs, a teachers’ union, sought an injunction 
against the use of this algorithm in termination or non-
renewal of contract decisions. Their case rested on a 
variety of grounds, including: 
•  “lack of sufficient information to meaningfully 
challenge terminations” based on the algorithmic 
score, specifically, that “they are denied access to the 
computer algorithms and data necessary to verify 
the accuracy of their scores”; and 
•  the claim that the “system is too vague to provide 
notice to teachers of how to achieve higher ratings 
and avoid adverse employment consequences”.
The employer, the school district, did not calculate 
teacher evaluation scores itself, but rather, delegated 
these to a third party vendor. The employer did not 
verify or audit the scores, and conceded that there was 
no means by which the teachers themselves could do 
so. (The absence of transparency in this system was 
shown by the fact that the plaintiff’s expert was unable 
to replicate the teachers’ scores, even when given access 
to the computer systems.)
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While upholding the defendant’s claim for summary 
judgment13 with regard to several of the plaintiff’s 
grounds, the judge refused to do so with regard to the 
lack of information aspect, holding that “teachers have 
no meaningful way to ensure correct calculation of 
their EVAAS scores, and as a result are unfairly subject 
to mistaken deprivation of constitutionally protected 
property interests in their jobs.” Even while granting 
summary judgment with regard to the vagueness claim, 
the ruling was hardly a ringing endorsement of the 
algorithmic system, noting that “teachers may not be 
able to verify the accuracy of their EVAAS scores” and 
that “it may be unfair or prone to error.”
Later that year, the parties reached an out of court 
settlement whereby the School District undertook not to 
use the EVAAS system or other unverifiable value-added 
scores as a basis to terminate employment (American 
Federation of Teachers, 2017). 
Access to meaningful explanations about managerial 
decisions is an important part of a good employment 
relationship. It can allow mistakes to be corrected and 
unfairness to be identified. More than that, it seems 
integral to a workplace where workers are treated with 
a degree of dignity and respect. As Monique Valcour has 
written, “dignity exists when people are listened to and 
taken seriously regardless of their position – and feel 
they can disagree respectfully and be heard, without 
fear of reprisal.” (Valcour, 2014) Mechanically issuing 
instructions with no opportunity for engagement or 
interaction is corrosive of workplace dignity.
 RECOMMENDATION 12: Employers should 
consider making sure task allocation 
algorithms are ‘explainable’, in terms  
that are meaningful to their workers. 
Workers should be able to ask why they 
have been allocated particular jobs or 
shifts, and to receive a meaningful  
answer. More generally, algorithmic 
management systems could benefit  
from explanation tools. As in other  
areas of algorithmic ‘explainability’, due 
concern should be paid to the level 
of explanation likely to be sought in 
particular contexts. But opaque systems 
are likely to foster workplace resentment 
against algorithmic management.
Draft legislation introduced into the Canadian Parliament 
in November 2020 may provide a model for this kind 
of transparency. Bill C-11 is concerned in general terms 
with consumer privacy protection, but it contains some 
provisions specifically concerned with “automated 
decision systems”, defined as “any technology that 
assists or replaces the judgement of human decision-
makers using techniques such as rules-based systems, 
regression analysis, predictive analytics, machine 
learning, deep learning and neural nets”. Clause 63(3) 
provides that:
If the organization has used an automated decision 
system to make a prediction, recommendation or 
decision about the individual, the organization must, 
on request by the individual, provide them with an 
explanation of the prediction, recommendation or 
decision and of how the personal information that 
was used to make the prediction, recommendation 
or decision was obtained.
While this is intended to have wider application than the 
employment context, it could certainly be used to help 
ensure the sort of transparency to which workers should 
have access. 13 This is where the court rules that the defendant has no case to answer; even if the plaintiff were able to prove all of the facts that 
they allege, there would be no legal remedy available.
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Discrimination and bias
As we’ve already noted, some commentators 
are optimistic about the potential for algorithmic 
management to reduce managerial bias. As the IFOW 
report notes, though, “it also poses considerable risks 
that employers will unwittingly propagate patterns of 
bias, discrimination and inequality.” (IFOW 2020, p.11) 
In particular, concern has been expressed about the 
potentially disparate outcomes of “[t]he increasing use 
of rating and review systems within work contexts” 
(Mateescu & Nguyen, 2019b, p.14).
In many respects, the dangers here are similar to those 
that arise in recruitment. A model trained on profiles 
of previous workers could make recommendations or 
predictions based on characteristics that are irrelevant 
or discriminatory. When those findings flow through into 
decisions about, for example, deployment or promotion, 
then it’s easy to see how historically discriminatory 
patterns could be replicated.
There is a difference between how New Zealand law 
responds to recruitment and algorithmic management: 
while recruitment involves dealing with people who are 
only potential employees, management relates to people 
who are already part of the workforce. This brings them 
within the ambit of the ERA. The ERA states that an 
employee is discriminated against if their employer, by 
reason of any prohibited ground: 
•  refuses or omits to offer or afford to that employee 
the same terms of employment, conditions of 
work, fringe benefits, or opportunities for training, 
promotion, and transfer as are made available for 
other employees of the same or substantially similar 
qualifications, experience, or skills employed in the 
same or substantially similar circumstances; or
•  dismisses that employee or subjects that employee 
to any detriment, in circumstances in which other 
employees employed by that employer on work of 
that description are not or would not be dismissed or 
subjected to such detriment; or
•  retires that employee, or requires or causes that 
employee to retire or resign. (ERA, s 104)
This is in addition to the protections afforded by sections 
22 and 23 of the Human Rights Act, which we discussed 
in the previous section. It’s probably safe to conclude, 
then, that any shortcoming in the regulatory setting may 
be less attributable to a lack of applicable law, and more 
to matters of implementation, compliance monitoring 
and enforcement. 
As with recruitment, there is an obvious connection 
between identifying bias and transparency – both 
in terms of the algorithm’s workings, and in how 
its predictions and recommendation are translated 
into actual decisions. When a workforce is spatially 
distributed – as is often the case with gig economy 
workers – discriminatory effects in dismissal, promotion, 
remuneration or shift/task allocation may not be 
apparent to individual workers. Even were they to be 
aware of these effects, the same issue may arise as 
was discussed in the context of recruitment: it may not 
be clear whether the problem lies with the employer’s 
choices, or the algorithm itself. 
What may be hoped, though, is that such decisions 
may be easier for an employer to monitor than those 
concerning advert targeting. It should be possible for 
HR departments – whether human or algorithmic – to 
monitor trends to check for discriminatory outcomes. 
Indeed, it has been pointed out that various AI tools 
exist to help employers detect such outcomes: 
Algorithmic tools can, for example, analyse 
company payrolls to measure the levels of 
gender or racial pay gaps in different parts of the 
organisation and what factors seem to contribute 
to them. They can assess individual managers 
based on how often they recommend men versus 
women for recruitment, promotion or pay rises 
to identify those who might need additional 
unconscious bias training. They can also scan the 
content of internal communications or external 
job postings for gendered language terms and 
recommend alternatives. In this way algorithms 
could make a huge difference to eliminating the 
gender pay gap and other workplace disparities. 
(ACAS, 2020, p.22)
As with recruitment, though, concerns exist about the 
criteria employed by different tools – what notions 
of bias or fairness they use, for instance, and which 
jurisdiction’s laws they are aligned with. Throughout the 
literature, there is a recognition of a general absence of 
consistent standards for AI auditing tools. We return to 
the issue of auditing later in the chapter.
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Ratings-based management
A specific problem identified with gig economy work 
relates to the increased reliance on metrics such as 
customer ratings as indicators of performance. As 
Rosenblat explains: 
After each trip, passengers are prompted by the 
Uber passenger app to rate drivers on a scale of 
one to five stars on their mobile app. A driver’s 
rating is the average of ratings from his or her last 
five hundred trips. 
(Rosenblat, 2019, p.149)
This could arguably be seen as less an issue of 
management by algorithm, and more about algorithms 
allowing “passengers effectively [to] perform one of the 
roles of middle managers, because they are responsible 
for evaluating worker performance.” Of course, 
customer feedback is likely to play a role in performance 
evaluation in sectors that do not rely on algorithmic 
management; student evaluations in academia are an 
obvious example. The gig economy, though, places 
these front and centre of performance evaluation, 
arguably replacing rather than supporting decisions 
by human managers. Uber drivers whose ratings drop 
below a certain level will find themselves ‘deactivated’ 
– effectively dismissed – without the reasons for those 
ratings being assessed by a manager, or being afforded 
an opportunity to give their version of events.
Rosenblat documents some of the effects of such a 
system on Uber drivers: 
Fearing low ratings and deactivation, these drivers 
try to be extra nice to dissatisfied passengers when 
working for Uber. Drivers thus take on the “care 
work” involved in managing Uber’s relationship 
with passengers, and they provide emotional labor, 
like making passengers feel good, as part of their 
service-economy job.
While the prospect of taxi drivers having to be pleasant 
to customers may initially seem quite appealing, the 
stories told by Rosenblat’s interviews point to a more 
problematic situation; of drivers having to put up with 
racial, sexist or other forms of harassment, or with 
obnoxious or heavily intoxicated passengers, for fear 
of losing the all-important rating on which their future 
with the company depends. As she explains, “[d]rivers 
are helpless against unfair ratings, a demonstration of 
the limits of their power in an employment relationship 
governed by inflexible algorithmic manager.” (Rosenblat, 
2019, p.155)
In theory, Uber drivers have access to an appeal process 
to challenge unfair ratings. Rosenblat, however, is highly 
sceptical of its utility: 
Drivers don’t have a dedicated human manager 
who responds to their inquiries. Instead, they have 
community support representatives (CSRs), located 
at the email equivalent of a call center, often 
located abroad, such as in the Philippines, and 
managed by third-party companies, like Zendesk. 
Effectively, Uber offshores and automates its main 
communications with drivers. Drivers receive 
automated replies to most of their inquiries, which 
often appear to be based on keywords in the text 
of their emails. In other words, Uber is managing 
drivers without a human that understands and is 
responsive to nuances. While automated responses 
might be practical for basic factual inquiries, they 
can prove woefully insufficient when a passenger 
overdoses in the backseat or harasses a driver. 
(Rosenblat, 2019, p.143)
Again, it would be inaccurate to suggest that all such 
problems are unique to the gig economy sector, or 
algorithmic management, still less to imply that human 
managers are invariably more sympathetic to the sorts 
of concerns raised by Uber drivers. Nonetheless, the 
implications of a ratings-driven management system, 
with human oversight present only in a relatively 
nominal form, will be important to monitor.
The use of customer ratings to assess employees’ 
performance in aggregated scores is another practice 
that is gaining ground, seeping over from the gig 
economy to the regular workforce. (ACAS, 2020, p.14)
C.  Evaluation, monitoring and 
surveillance
A final concern around algorithmic management 
relates to increased workplace surveillance. Again, we 
begin by noting that some types of monitoring are 
primarily beneficial for workers, especially in hazardous 
workplaces, where the employer has an obligation 
to keep workers safe, and monitoring (e.g. of worker 
health) is part of the employer’s duty of care. For 
instance, WorkSafe NZ gives detailed guidance about 
monitoring of this kind. (WorkSafe NZ, 2017) However, 
other types of surveillance are clearly in service of 
company efficiency, rather than worker safety: we will 
focus on this kind of surveillance here. In this regard, 
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the ILO report was fairly typical in its warning that 
technology will “increase the possibility of management 
to increasingly monitor working activities in a way that is 
not desirable for workers.” (ILO, 2018, p.1)
The Royal Society and British Academy report refers to:
•  a greater emphasis on measurable aspects of work as 
indicators of performance and drivers of pay (to the 
expense of ‘symbolic work’, including the amount and 
characteristics of interactions with customers); and
•  a move from direct monitoring based on observation 
from a supervisor to continuous monitoring based on 
data. (Royal Society and British Academy 2018, p.54)
The prevalence of workplace technological surveillance, 
at least in the USA, was illustrated by a 2019 report by 
the American Management Association showing that:
•  45% of employers track content, keystrokes, and time 
spent at the keyboard;
•  43% store and review computer files;
•  12% monitor the blogosphere to see what is being 
written about the company; and
•  10% monitor social networking sites. (American 
Management Association, 2019)
Technological surveillance in the workplace is by no 
means a recent phenomenon. (ILO, 2018, p.7; Ajunwa, 
Crawford and Schultz, 2017) As Paul Roth has said, 
“[t]he modern day motivation for collecting personal 
information about workers can be traced back to the 
‘scientific’ management techniques of Frederick Winslow 
Taylor at the turn of the last century.” (Roth, 2016, 
p.57) Nonetheless, as a report from the Data & Society 
Research Institute recently claimed:
Monitoring and surveillance tools are collecting 
new kinds of data about workers, enabling 
quantification of activities or personal qualities that 
previously may not have been tracked in a given 
workplace. Employers may seek to quantify “soft” 
skills such as sociability through tools like facial 
recognition and sentiment analysis. And employer-
provided biometric health trackers may collect 
sensitive data about workers, from stress levels 
to smoking habits, raising questions about both 
consequences at work and growing intrusion into 
personal life. 
(Mateescu and Nguyen, 2019, p.3)
It has also become a matter for particular concern during 
the Covid lockdown, with RNZ reporting that “Sales of 
employee monitoring software have skyrocketed since 
the country went into lockdown, with tech companies 
reporting a 300 percent increase for New Zealand 
customers.” (Hatton, 2020). Other employers have 
achieved the same objective by leveraging existing 
technology. This is by no means unique to New Zealand. 
In May, an article in Slate reported that:
Since the start of the pandemic, many companies 
have begun to even more aggressively track their 
workers’ productivity, and as workplaces start to 
open again, it is likely that the scale and types 
of data collected by employers will continue to 
increase to combat the threat of COVID-19. 
(Chyi, 2020)
Not all of this will involve AI technology, but some will. 
The Slate article refers to a company, Landing AI, that 
claims to have:
developed an AI-enabled social distancing 
detection tool that can detect if people are keeping 
a safe distance from each other by analyzing real 
time video streams from the camera. For example, 
at a factory that produces protective equipment, 
technicians could integrate this software into their 
security camera systems to monitor the working 
environment with easy calibration steps. … [T]he 
detector could highlight people whose distance 
is below the minimum acceptable distance in red, 
and draw a line between to emphasize this. The 
system will also be able to issue an alert to remind 
people to keep a safe distance if the protocol is 
violated. 
(Landing AI, 2020) 
As with other technological responses to the Covid crisis, 
it is not difficult to see the prospective benefits in such 
technology, but equally, easy to see how it could be 
misapplied for less benign purposes. Phoebe Moore and 
colleagues cite one example:
Employee tracking in Amazon warehouses has 
resulted in reports of heightened stress and 
physical burnout. Indeed, employee health and 
safety usually comes secondary to lean logistics 
and speed of work in depot work. 
(Moore, Upchurch and Whittaker, 2018, p.23)
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An account of one of their interviews shows how 
surveillance technology introduced for ostensibly 
innocuous purposes can be subject to a rapid  
‘mission creep’:
One warehouse operative, Ingrid (not her real 
name), who has worked in one warehouse in 
Britain for 11 years, provided information about 
a new worn device that was rolled out in her 
workplace in February 2016. All warehouse work 
floor operatives were unexpectedly required 
to use the hand-worn scanner. The current 
researchers asked what the workers were told 
the devices would be used for. Ingrid indicated 
that management told workers the devices would 
provide them with information about any mistakes 
made and who in the warehouse had made them, 
meaning that they can be used to help to not do 
this again.
In practice, however, Ingrid indicated that the 
technology has been used not only to track 
individual mistakes but also to track individual 
productivity and time spent working and on 
breaks. Workers were told that management would 
hold individual consultations based on the data, 
but this had not happened. Instead, at a specific 
interval in the months that followed the devices’ 
implementation, workers were told that people 
would be fired within days and it transpired that 
data from devices were part of the decision-
making process for who to dismiss. 
(Moore, Upchurch and Whittaker, 2018, pp.23-4)
Technological surveillance has not yet received much 
attention in terms of New Zealand employment law, 
but one case decided before the Employment Court 
may give some insight into how such technologies 
are likely to be regarded. In OCS Ltd v Service and 
Food Workers Union Nga Ringa Tota Inc ([2006] ERNZ 
762), the employer had implemented iGuard, a new 
biometric timekeeping system which required employees 
to have their fingerprints scanned. The employer 
claimed that this increased efficiency by the technology 
affords greater accuracy and efficiency in a business’s 
administration by reducing time fraud and preventing 
‘buddy clocking.’ The employees and their union 
objected, and claimed that the employer had failed to 
attain their consent for the new system. 
Drawing on jurisprudence from Australia, Canada and 
the UK, the judge identified a number of criteria that 
would inform the decision as to the legality of using 
such technology: 
1. Is the technology compatible with the contractual 
obligations of the parties? 
2. There is to be a balance between the need for the 
technology and the level of personal intrusiveness 
involved for the individual concerned. 
3. he employer has the right to introduce different 
systems of timekeeping technology subject only to 
reasonable consideration of valid concerns raised by 
the union and/or employees. 
4. The employer must take the appropriate steps to 
inform employees of the new measures and to 
obtain their consent. ([95])
The judge concluded that the employer’s failure 
adequately to consult with the workers put it in breach of 
its legal obligations. It is informative to note the terms of 
the union rep’s letter, setting out the workers’ concerns:
People feel distressed and deeply hurt by the way 
the company have simply placed this machine on 
the wall (appearing as it has like a fait accompli), 
but also by the implication that there is a lack of 
trust in workers … this very personal means of 
timekeeping … is equated in people’s minds with 
criminals and prisoners. ([22])
The privacy implications of such data gathering exercises 
are likely to engage certain aspects of New Zealand’s 
privacy law. The Privacy Act 2020 lists 13 privacy 
principles, including: 
•  Personal information may only be collected for a lawful 
purpose connected and necessary with a function or 
activity of the collecting agency. (Principle 1)
•  The collecting agency must take reasonable steps to 
ensure that the individual whose information is being 
collected is aware of the fact of collection and its 
purpose. (Principle 3)
•  An agency may collect personal information only 
by a lawful means; and by a means that, in the 
circumstances of the case is fair and does not intrude 
to an unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs 
of the individual concerned. (Principle 4)14
14 The new Act stresses the particular importance of this requirement 
where personal information is being collected from children or 
young persons, but this is presumably less likely to arise in the 
context of employment.
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An agency that holds personal information that was 
obtained in connection with one purpose may not use 
the information for any other purpose. (Principle 10)
It’s not difficult to see how any of these principles 
could be infringed by the use of workplace surveillance 
technologies. All are, however, subject to a range of 
limitations. In relation to Principle 10, for instance, 
information can be used for “other purposes” where: 
•  the individual is not identified; 
•  that use is authorised by the individual; or
•  that other use of the information for that other 
purpose is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious 
threat to public health or public safety.
The public health and safety exception could certainly 
be relevant during the Covid crisis, for instance, with 
regard to the Landing AI example discussed earlier. We 
can also imagine how it could be justified outside of 
that context; for example, by monitoring worker stress or 
tiredness. The authorisation exception is also something 
on which employers could rely, although the extent to 
which employees are free to decline could be a matter 
for concern in some instances. The Hong Kong Privacy 
Commissioner has referred to a “presumption of undue 
influence … where disparity of bargaining power exists, 
such as in an employer- employee relationship”, albeit 
one that “can be dispelled by the provision of genuine 
choices to the data subjects before they decide to 
provide their personal data.” 
Paul Roth has expressed scepticism that our privacy law 
will afford much protection from workplace surveillance:
even if surveillance is covered under the Privacy 
Act, the legislation would be of little avail in the 
workplace, to judge by the few reported cases on 
workplace surveillance. In these cases, the Privacy 
Commissioner found workplace surveillance to be a 
permissible practice. 
(Roth, 2016, p.43)
Roth points out that, while the Privacy Commissioner 
has said that “covert recording is intrinsically intrusive, 
and needs strong justification for its use,” (referring to 
Case Note 101213 [2008] NZPrivCmr 4) the decided 
cases have generally found covert surveillance can be 
justified because employers are lawfully entitled to take 
steps to detect unlawful behaviour. Whether the new 
Privacy Act strengthens these protections is a question 
on which we have heard diverse opinions, but will in any 
case be a matter for ongoing scrutiny.
If, as is widely predicted, AI tools allow new and 
potentially more intrusive levels of surveillance, serious 
consideration should be given to the potential impacts 
on workplace health, wellbeing, privacy and dignity. Such 
concerns should be addressed in early consultations 
with affected workplaces. The ACAS report is just one 
of those to call for consultation with workforces: “[e]arly 
communication and consultation between employers 
and employees are the best way to ensure new 
technology is well implemented and improves workplace 
outcomes.” (ACAS, 2020, Recommendation 7) These 
concerns should be included in the algorithmic impact 
assessment that we discuss later in this chapter.
It’s also possible that regulatory measures could 
help address some of these concerns. The decided 
cases under the old Privacy Act, and doubts about 
the adequacy of its successor, mean that the likely 
response of New Zealand law to algorithmic surveillance 
remains a matter of considerable conjecture. However, 
the possibility exists that the general principles and 
provisions of the Privacy Act could be bolstered in 
certain contexts. A suggestion made during one of our 
expert workshops was the creation of a new, specific 
code of practice. The Privacy Act gives the Privacy 
Commissioner the power to issue codes of practice that 
replace the Privacy Principles in certain contexts. (Privacy 
Act 1993, s 46; Privacy Act 2020, s.32) These codes may 
modify the operation of the Act for specific industries, 
agencies, activities or types of personal information. 
Codes often modify one or more of the information 
privacy principles to take account of special 
circumstances which affect a class of agencies (e.g. 
the Credit Reporting Privacy Code 2004 applies to 
credit reporters) or a class of information (e.g. the 
Health Information Privacy Code 1994 covers health 
information). Codes of practice are a flexible means 
of regulation and can be amended or revoked by 
the Privacy Commissioner at any time. The precise 
regulatory target of any such Code is a matter for further 
deliberation and discussion. Should it be directed at 
particular AI tools or techniques, or specific uses of such 
tools and techniques? Or pitched at a less technology-
specific level; for instance, use of personal information 
in recruitment or workplace surveillance? We would 
welcome further discussion about the most effective 
means of bolstering the Privacy Act with regard to 
this fast-growing and concerning use of workplace 
surveillance technology.
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RECOMMENDATION 13: Workplace 
surveillance technologies are a source 
of growing concern, and this has grown 
during the Covid crisis. In due course, 
these technologies may require specific 
legislative attention. In the meantime, 
we would welcome attention from the 
Privacy Commissioner to the possibility of 
a code of practice directed at workplace 
surveillance technologies, or perhaps 
workplace surveillance more generally. 
D.  Health and safety, and worker 
wellbeing
Aside from privacy concerns, concern has been 
increasingly expressed about the impact of the ‘gig 
economy’, algorithmic management and increasing 
surveillance on worker welfare. The 2019 study of Uber 
drivers referred to earlier identified “three areas of 
consistent complaints about working “for” algorithms, 
concerns that we’ve also seen in other companies using 
algorithmic management.” (Möhlmann and Henfridsson, 
2019) These included the sorts of concerns about 
transparency and constant surveillance that we have 
addressed in this chapter. The third concern, though, 
was what they referred to as “dehumanization”:
Drivers at Uber report feeling equally lonely, 
isolated, and dehumanized. They don’t have 
colleagues to socialize with or a team or 
community to be part of. They lack the opportunity 
to build a personal relationship with a supervisor. 
Those on crowd-work platforms like Amazon 
Mechanical Turk have raised similar complaints 
as they conduct “micro-tasks” such as classifying 
content or participating in surveys. 
To address or mitigate these risks, the report’s authors 
made a number of recommendations for “companies 
who manage all or part of their workforce through 
algorithms”. These included:  
•  information sharing – if not sharing the algorithm itself, 
then at least “the data and goals that informed it”;
•  inviting feedback and involving workers in decision-
making about design and use of algorithmic 
management, “for example by involving them into 
committees or councils that discuss and negotiate 
work related internal regulations”; and 
•  building trust and implementing benefits that 
improve worker’s welfare.
An important recommendation, though, related to the 
worry about dehumanization:
Build in human contact. People need people. 
Organizations should develop formal, supportive 
communities where workers feel like members 
and can make social connections. Adding a human 
element to the way people are managed will help 
workers feel less like they are being treated as 
machines. 
The recommendation pointed to New York ride-hailing 
firm Juno as a positive example, as it was quick to use 
an “extensive human customer support system that 
eagerly helped drivers with questions or problems.” 
Concerns about impacts of algorithmic management 
on worker well-being extend beyond the gig economy 
sector. Attendees at our expert workshops referred to 
an increased risk of  loss of decision-making autonomy 
(including within Human Resources departments!), 
especially when strict ‘lean production’ regimes are 
enforced and digital technologies take over controlling 
tasks which until now had been performed by 
specialised employees. In his most recent book, US law 
professor Frank Pasquale warns that:  
American bosses, in their bid to demand more 
“flexibility” from a restive workforce, could once point 
to laborers abroad ready to take domestic workers’ 
jobs; now those bosses are prone to pointing to ever 
faster machines. Demanding more break time? A 
robot can work 24/7. Want higher wages? You only 
create incentives for the boss to replace you with 
software. Electricity and replacement parts are a lot 
cheaper than food and medicine. 
(Pasquale, 2020, p.227)
The possibility of employers using the ubiquitous threat 
of technological replacement as a way to coerce workers 
into acceptance of ever worsening pay and conditions is 
certainly one of the more troubling prospects to emerge 
from the AI revolution. Of course, it’s a threat that has 
been made in previous generations too, and as Pasquale 
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acknowledges, it isn’t only the threat of technological 
replacement that can be used in this way. It is not clear, 
then, that the answer to this prospect lies with any 
technology-specific regulatory response, as opposed to 
a more general realignment of the balance of power 
between workers and employers. 
Pasquale recognises that AI may in fact have a positive 
role to play in this rebalancing:
AI should not entrench deep disparities in the 
power of workers, managers, and capital owners. 
Rather, it can help unions and worker associations 
bring more prerogatives of self-governance to the 
workplace. For example, algorithmic scheduling 
of workers need not be based merely on cost 
minimization, upending workers’ lives with zero-
hours contracts. Instead, organized laborers can 
demand that the relevant AI accommodate their 
needs dynamically, enabling exactly the type of 
family time, leisure, and educational opportunities 
that a more productive economy should be 
delivering to everyone. 
(Pasquale, 2020, p.176) 
A strong and consistent theme at our workshops 
was that discussions about the threat and promise of 
workplace AI must be located within the broader context 
which has seen trade unions and the bargaining power 
of workers weakened in New Zealand and in many 
other developed societies. While not a problem specific 
to the context of AI, it is one that AI has the potential 
to exacerbate or mitigate, and this is something that 
should be borne in mind when framing responses to 
uses of this technology. 
Concerns have also arisen about physical safety, mostly 
in the context of humans working alongside embodied 
robots. It is often suggested that robots can make work 
safer, when used:
to replace workers who carry out unhealthy, tedious 
or unsafe work, thus avoiding exposing people to 
dangerous substances and conditions, and reducing 
physical, ergonomic and psycho-social risks. 
(Mercader Uguina and Muñoz Ruiz, 2019)
WorkSafe NZ has recognised that using robots can 
remove the more traditional hazards of working with 
machinery, as well as taking on high-risk work, such as 
in the biotechnology field. (WorkSafe NZ, 2014) Safety 
concerns have, however, grown, particularly in the 
wake of highly publicised tragedies such as the deaths 
of Wanda Holbrook in 2017 (Agerholm, 2017) and an 
unnamed German worker in 2015. (Gander, 2015)
Many robots currently used in an industrial setting will 
not use any element of AI. They will be straightforwardly 
programmable pieces of equipment, that have 
limited or no autonomy or capacity to respond to 
their environment. As a report produced by research 
organisation TNO for the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment in 2016 noted:
In general, industrial robots that are used extensively in 
factories:
•  are often in controlled environments;
•  carry out repetitive and pre-programmed tasks; 
•  have no direct interaction with people (including 
third parties and visitors)
•  around them; and
•  are not yet able to adapt to new situations. (TNO, 
2016, p.16)
When this is true, it seems that they can be readily 
accommodated within existing product liability and 
workplace safety legislation. While WorkSafe NZ’s 
current Safe use of machinery guideline specifically 
addresses the use of robotics in the work environment 
(WorkSafe NZ, 2014, 9.11), it makes no reference at all to 
artificial intelligence or autonomous robots. The control 
measures WorkSafe NZ recommends for robots seem 
predicated on the assumption that they can be kept 
separate from human workers; they include enclosing 
the robot, restricting access and turning the robot off 
when people are near.
As the TNO report goes on to acknowledge, though: 
Much effort is therefore being expended in the 
field of robotics on developing robots that can 
move autonomously, that are able to ‘see’ their 
surroundings and respond accordingly, that can 
work alongside people, and that are suitable 
for more than one task. These are referred to as 
‘general purpose robots’. 
(TNO, 2016, p.16)
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In a report from December 2019, the European Agency 
for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OHSA) also noted that:
Collaborative and smart robots, so-called cobots, 
will become a familiar presence in the workplace 
as highly developed sensors make it possible for 
people and robots to work together. 
(EU-OHSA, 2019b)
The report noted that “Amazon already has 100,000 AI-
augmented cobots supporting its distribution activities”, 
predicting that: 
With the increasing use of AI, robots will be 
able to carry out not only physical tasks but also 
increasingly cognitive tasks. Robots are already 
able to perform a variety of cognitive tasks 
autonomously, such as supporting legal casework 
or medical diagnoses, and will also become 
commonplace in customer-facing jobs. This means 
that the use of smart robots is expected in many 
different sectors and settings, such as in the care 
sector, hospitality, agriculture, manufacturing, 
industry, transport and services. 
The increasing incidence of robots and humans working 
together or in the same environment casts doubt on the 
efficacy of the sort of ‘separate and contain’ strategies 
employed with regard to more traditional production-
line robots. As EU-OHSA has acknowledged, “as the 
implementation of AI at work is relatively new, there is 
only nascent evidence of OSH risks and benefits.” (EU-
OHSA, 2019a, p.15) This has not, however, deterred the 
organisation from casting a speculative eye towards the 
sorts of risks that could arise as cobots are deployed:
the growing proportion of mobile, smart robots in 
the workplace may increase the risk of accidents, 
as injury could occur from direct contact with 
robots or from the equipment they use. As smart 
robots are constantly learning, although efforts 
are made to factor in all possible scenarios in their 
design, they may behave in unanticipated ways. 
Workers having to keep up with the pace and level 
of work of a smart cobot may be placed under a 
high level of performance pressure. This may have 
negative impacts on workers’ safety and health, 
particularly mental health. Increased working with 
robots will also significantly reduce contact with 
human peers and social support, which is also 
detrimental to workers’ mental health. 
(EU-OHSA, 2019b, p.6)
To what extent is New Zealand law prepared for these 
new workplace hazards? The Health and Safety at Work 
Act 2015 imposes duties on a person conducting a 
business or undertaking (PCBU) to ensure, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, the health and safety of their 
workers. (s.36) “Reasonably practical” is defined in s 22 
as that which is reasonably able to be done, taking into 
account and weighing up all relevant matters, including:
•  the likelihood of the hazard or the risk concerned 
occurring; and
•  the degree of harm that might result from the hazard 
or risk; and
•  what the person concerned knows, or ought 
reasonably to know; 
•  the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or 
minimise the risk; and
•  the cost associated with available ways of eliminating 
or minimising the risk, including whether the cost is 
grossly disproportionate to the risk.
While the Act explicitly allows for a degree of cost-
benefit analysis, it is notable that the standard for a 
measure not to be deemed reasonably practical is high; 
a PCBU will be required to take a precaution unless its 
cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk. In relation to 
reasonably foreseeable risks of death or serious injury, 
this seems to set a high bar for PCBUs seeking to justify 
any failure to ensure worker safety. Furthermore, while 
offences under the Act (sections 47-49) do not impose 
strict liability, neither do they all require intentional acts 
or omissions (s.54). 
As in the context of privacy law, New Zealand workplace 
safety law also allows for the publication of codes of 
practice (WorkSafe New Zealand Act 2013, s 10(e)). 
These are developed by WorkSafe NZ, and on approval 
by the Minister, become approved codes of practice. 
While not legally binding, adherence to a code of 
practice can have the effect of insulating a PCBU from 
liability under the Act. Section 226 states that, in any 
civil or criminal proceedings under the Act, a court may 
have regard to the code as evidence of what is known 
about a hazard or risk, and rely on it in determining 
what is reasonably practicable in the circumstances to 
which the code relates. 
At the time of writing, approved codes of practice exist 
for many areas of traditional risk, including forestry, port 
operations, and working with asbestos, but as yet, no 
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codes exist with regard to algorithmic management, 
workplace surveillance, workplace robots or AI.15 Indeed, 
no codes of practice exist to address stress, isolation, or 
many other common risks in the modern workplace, a 
situation that has been described to us by one expert 
as “50 years behind Europe and we’ve got nowhere 
even close to robots or AI.” A PCBU could elect to follow 
other standards – most obviously, the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has published 
standards for industrial robots (ISO, 2011) and more 
recently for collaborative robots (ISO, 2016). While this 
lacks the legal effect of an approved code, demonstrable 
reliance on an ISO standard could be used as evidence 
of having done all that was reasonably practical.
While the New Zealand approved codes of practice 
are required to be made freely available online, ISO 
standards are available to purchase. The price is 
relatively modest, particularly we might think to a PCBU 
wealthy enough to afford collaborative robots (the 
collaborative robots standard costs 138 Swiss francs, 
or $220NZ). Nonetheless, publication of equivalent 
standards within New Zealand would have the effect 
of removing even this modest barrier to access – 
importantly, making sure that workers as well as 
employers have access to their content – while clarifying 
their legal status and potentially raising awareness of 
their existence. 
Codes of practice are not a panacea, and concerns have 
been raised about their usefulness. (Dabee, 2016, p.597) 
Even were such a code of practice to be approved, the 
rapid pace of change in the technology would require 
it to be kept under review. In its 2019 overview of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 2015, the Ministry for 
Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE) noted that 
there was a “need to keep up with changes in practice 
and emerging technology to ensure benefits are realised 
and any risks are managed e.g. automated machines 
and industrial robots.” (MBIE, 2019) 
Nonetheless, the possible role of codes of practice 
directed at the more potentially harmful uses of AI 
technologies is something that we feel should be given 
careful attention. Most obviously, these could address 
the physical dangers posed by workplace robots that 
are designed to operate in close proximity to humans. 
Beyond this, however, we see no reason in principle why 
concerns relating to less acute risks, such as increased 
stress from constant monitoring, could not fit within 
WorkSafe NZ’s remit “to promote and contribute to a 
balanced framework for securing the health and safety 
of workers and workplaces.”
 RECOMMENDATION 14: WorkSafe 
NZ should consider issuing a code of 
practice dealing with workplace robots 
and particularly ‘cobots’, perhaps based 
on the ISO standard for collaborative 
robots. The ‘separate and contain’ 
approach contained in the current “Safe 
use of machinery” guideline is not an 
appropriate response to collaborative 
robots whose purpose is to work in close 
proximity to human workers. 
 RECOMMENDATION 15: WorkSafe NZ 
should also consider issuing a code of 
practice relating to workplace surveillance 
and algorithmic management. While this 
may seem to fall more appropriately within 
the remit of the Privacy Commissioner, the 
prospect of psychological harm from the 
inappropriate use of such technologies 
also brings it within the realm of the 
workplace safety regulator. Importantly, 
care must be taken to ensure that this 
issue does not fall between two regulatory 
remits, with the result that it does not 
receive proper attention from either.
15  The Safe Use of Machinery guideline referenced above, which 
makes reference to industrial robots, predates the 2015 Act and is 
not an approved code of practice.
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E.  Technological redundancy
At the end of the employment life cycle, of course, is 
the end of the employment relationship. This can be 
due to retirement, resignation, dismissal or redundancy. 
Fortunately, New Zealand law does not follow the US 
practice of allowing employees to be dismissed at will. 
Rather, the Employment Relations Act 2000 allows any 
employee who has been dismissed by their employer to 
bring a claim of unjustified dismissal (s 103(1)(a)). This 
may be on either substantive grounds (absence of good 
cause) or on the basis that the dismissal was carried out 
in a procedurally unfair manner.
Redundancy is a particular form of dismissal. 
Although not defined in the most recent ERA, the 
previous statutory definition (Labour Relations Act 
1987), captured what we take to be the common 
understanding of redundancy as dismissal on the 
basis that “the position filled by the worker is, or will 
become, superfluous to the needs of the employer”. 
The idea, then, is that it is the position or role that 
becomes redundant, rather than the individual filling 
it. An employee could not be said to have been made 
redundant if their position was subsequently filled by 
another employee.
What would be the situation of an employee whose 
role was taken over by an AI or a robot? Typically, 
employment law has had no difficulty in regarding the 
situation where a human worker’s role is automated 
out of existence as being one of redundancy, and this 
is likely to be true of most of the current and near-term 
examples where workers are displaced by AI and robotic 
technologies. Any legal issues are likely to relate to 
selection criteria, proper consultation, and other matters 
common to other redundancy situations.
Looking further ahead, though, we might wonder if the 
distinction between redundancy and replacement will 
look so clear. In one sense, replacing human workers 
with artificial intelligence may be seen as similar to 
replacing manual workers with plant or equipment. On 
the other hand, if a driverless car, a sophisticated robot 
or an ‘AI lawyer’ is performing functionally the same role 
as the human it replaces, we might wonder whether 
there is a principled reason to treat that replacement 
differently from the situation where a human replaces 
another human – especially if customers and co-workers 
are unable to tell the difference. 
The current legal approach presents no difficulties for 
employers in this regard. And if history is any guide, the 
projected efficiency gains from AI are likely to outweigh 
any argument for protectionism towards human workers 
threatened by technological redundancy. Whether this 
should be the case is, however, another matter. If the ‘AI 
revolution’ raises genuine concerns about widespread 
human unemployment, then a legal situation that makes it 
easier to replace humans with technology than with other 
humans may be something that merits close attention. 
F. Steps and safeguards
Algorithmic auditing
The arrival of AI systems and tools, of various sorts, 
could have a wide range of different impacts for New 
Zealand workers and job applicants. We cannot simply 
assume, though, that the benefits will accrue, or that 
they will outweigh the harms and risks. In the next two 
sections, we consider some further steps that could be 
taken to help ensure that AI tools are used in a manner 
conducive to fairness and dignity in the workplace.
Algorithmic auditing can refer to two different things: 
auditing by algorithms and auditing of algorithms. 
Auditing by algorithm refers to the use of algorithms to 
audit existing practices around hiring or management. 
The IFOW has referred to “a broad and growing” range 
of auditing tools that can be integrated into existing HR 
systems to detect different forms of bias and unfairness. 
These include:
•  Audit-AI: “a tool for detecting bias in a machine 
learning algorithm.”
•  FairTest: “a tool for detecting subgroup fairness 
in an algorithm. Subgroup analysis finds bias on 
intersectional sensitive groupings.” 
•  Textio: “An intelligent writing assistant that can detect 
bias in language (e.g. gendered language).” (IFOW, 
2020, pp.26-27)
The report notes, though, that many of these auditing 
tools “offer limited public information about how they 
define fairness.” (IFOW, 2020, p.29) It also flags up 
potential concern in that some of them are designed to 
use US-specific notions of discrimination, notions that 
may not be applicable in other jurisdictions (see also 
Sanchez-Monedero et al, 2020 for a similar observation).
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Such bias-detection tools could be immensely valuable, 
especially for large organisations, but there is an obvious 
danger if employers are using tools that check their 
practices against standards that have no relevance 
to New Zealand law. The IFOW report makes a range 
of suggestions as to how these limitations could be 
addressed, including:
•  Every auditing tool should state clearly, in plain prose 
and statistical terms, the different definitions of bias, 
fairness and equality used. They should also be clear 
about the sensitive attributes with respect to which 
they evaluate bias, fairness and equality. 
•  Professional and industry standards for auditing 
tools, including auditing for equality, are urgently 
required to maintain high, consistent standards. 
(IFOW, 2020, pp.30-31)
Auditing of algorithms refers to checks on the algorithms 
themselves. Even if employers and recruiters have 
the best of intentions around avoiding bias and 
discrimination, concerns still exist around the potential 
for algorithms to bring about these results. Such 
concerns have led to demands for mandatory bias 
audits before such tools are sold or used. In February 
2020, draft legislation was introduced to New York City 
Council to regulate algorithmic hiring tools. The ‘Fair 
Shot’ Bill (Int 1894-2020) would apply to: 
•  The sale of such tools, which would be prohibited 
unless the technology companies developing them 
had conducted an audit for bias in the year prior to 
sale, and provided further yearly bias audits at no 
additional cost; and
•  The use of such tools for hiring or other employment 
purposes, requiring disclosure to candidates within 
30 days that such tools were used to assess their 
candidacy for employment, and the job qualifications 
or characteristics for which the tool was used to screen. 
For the Bill’s purposes, a “bias audit” is defined as “an 
impartial evaluation, including but not limited to testing, 
of an automated employment decision tool to assess 
its predicted compliance with … any … applicable law 
relating to discrimination in employment.” At the time of 
writing, the Bill was the subject of a hearing before the 
Committee on Technology.
The ‘Fair Shot’ Bill certainly looks like a promising 
development, but it seems to have some quite 
significant limitations. For one thing, the bias auditing 
requirement only applies to algorithmic hiring tools 
which are actually sold. In many cases, we might expect 
that employers will procure the use of such tools 
as a service rather than buying them as a product. 
In other words, they will out-source recruitment to 
hiring companies who may have developed their own 
algorithmic hiring software. Were such an initiative to be 
considered here, we would suggest that it should also 
have application to such tools when they are offered as 
services as well as products. 
The ‘Fair Shot’ Bill also appears not to apply to hiring 
tools developed in-house by employers themselves, and 
doesn’t impose any obligation on employers to audit the 
outputs of such algorithms. The latter is potentially an 
important omission; bias is unlikely to reside in the hiring 
tool itself, and far more likely to reside in the data on 
which it is trained. It’s therefore only when a tool is used 
for some particular purpose by some particular company 
that bias will manifest. This suggests that auditing for 
bias should be done by the companies that use hiring 
tools, rather than by the companies that make them. 
 RECOMMENDATION 16: Consideration 
should be given to placing an obligation 
on manufacturers of hiring tools to ensure 
those tools include functionality for 
bias auditing, so that client companies 
can readily perform the relevant audits. 
In particular, we propose that tools 
should allow, for each recruitment 
decision process, a breakdown of the 
tool’s recommendations by selected 
demographic groups. 
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The CDEI’s inquiry into algorithmic bias reported that 
“most companies we spoke to evaluated their models to 
check that the patterns being detected did not correlate 
with protected characteristics”. However, they added two 
significant caveats: 
•  there is very little guidance or standards companies 
have to meet so it is difficult to evaluate the 
robustness of these processes; and
•  most companies test their tools internally and only 
some independently validate results. … [R]esearchers 
and civil society groups believe this has not gone 
far enough, calling for recruiting algorithms to be 
independently audited. (CDEI, 2020, pp.43-44)
This led them to recommend that:
Sector regulators and industry bodies should 
help create oversight and technical guidance for 
responsible bias detection and mitigation in their 
individual sectors adding context-specific detail 
to the existing cross-cutting guidance on data 
protection, and any new cross-cutting guidance on 
the Equality Act. 
(CDEI, 2020, p.84)
A similar need, and opportunity, exists in New Zealand. 
Various regulatory, advisory and advocacy bodies 
already exist that could make valuable contributions to 
the formation of such codes and guidance, including 
the Human Rights and Privacy Commissioners, the 
Digital Council and the AI Forum, as well as employers’ 
organisations and trade unions. While we are agnostic 
as to which of these should take the initiative in starting 
such discussions, we recommend strongly that steps 
toward such discussions are taken soon.
 RECOMMENDATION 17: The development 
of guidance and standards for auditing of 
algorithms used in employment situations 
is an obvious and urgent step. We 
recommend that discussions should take 
place between developers, employers’ 
organisations, unions and other relevant 
stakeholders to consider ways in which 
such guidance and standards could 
be developed. We believe there is an 
opportunity to do this before major 
problems materialise in this area, but we 
caution against undue delay in getting this 
process underway.
Impact assessments
As well as audits of the algorithms themselves, 
employers could also conduct wider impact assessment 
before deploying algorithmic hiring or management 
tools. There is a range of models – both actually in 
use and proposed – that could be drawn on to inform 
this process. In New Zealand at present, the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner offers guidance on how to 
conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). This:  
focuses on identifying the ways a new proposal 
or operating system, or changes to an existing 
process may affect personal privacy, to help 
organisations make more informed decisions and 
better manage privacy risks. 
(Privacy Commissioner, 2015)
Another useful contribution comes from the IFOW 
report, which proposes that organisations should 
conduct Equality Impact Assessments:
commenced prior to the deployment of an AHS 
system, enabling organizations to assess risks 
and evaluate potential impacts of their system, 
before it is deployed. Evaluation will then continue, 
extending to legal compliance and evaluation of 
actual impacts, and positive steps that can be 
taken at each key decision-making point. 
(IFOW, 2020, p.36)
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In 2018, the AI Now Institute proposed that public sector 
agencies proposing to use algorithms should conduct 
an Algorithmic Assessment Report, that would provide 
for “public notice of system adoption, agency self-
assessment, a plan for meaningful access for researchers 
and experts, and due process mechanisms.” (Reisman 
et al. 2018, p.21) The Canadian Government is currently 
in the process of developing a template Algorithmic 
Impact Assessment questionnaire, “to help you assess 
and mitigate the risks associated with deploying an 
automated decision system.” The Beta version is 
currently available, and is being fine-tuned through 
feedback and online testing. (Government of Canada, 
2020) We hope and expect to see similar measures 
put in place to support signatories to New Zealand’s 
Algorithm Charter. But the need for such measures 
is clearly not confined to the public sector. Impact 
assessments should also become a routine precursor to 
adoption of algorithmic hiring or management by private 
sector employers.
RECOMMENDATION 18: We propose that 
algorithm impact assessments should 
be used by the New Zealand private 
sector, and for employers and recruitment 
companies in particular. Considerations of 
privacy and equality should certainly form 
important parts of an overall Algorithm 
Impact Assessment, though other 
considerations such as explicability and 
worker safety and wellbeing should also 
be included. Given the likely challenges for 
smaller employers developing these in-
house, templates should be made available 
along the lines of those developed by 
the NZ Privacy Commissioner for Privacy 
Impact Assessments, or those being 
developed by the Canadian Government for 
public sector agencies. The development 
of such templates could form part of the 
agenda for the multi-stakeholder discussion 
recommended in the previous section. 
If a template is made available and adopted/adapted 
for a particular business, the next question relates to 
carrying out the assessment of a particular proposal. 
Michele Loi recommends the formation of internal 
ethics committees, whose role would be to “plan the 
introduction of AI in HR, in particular what needs to 
be done to make it fair and intelligible”, and “clearly 
specify what steps are to be taken in order to monitor 
the behavior of the AI in operation.” Such ethics 
committees should “include representatives of different 
departments,” and should preferably “also involve an 
external expert of AI ethics.” (Loi, 2020, p.44)
We support the suggestion to form internal ethics 
committees, who would conduct impact assessments 
prior to the deployment of AI/algorithmic tools. We 
note, though, that smaller employers may lack in-house 
capacity to conduct adequate assessments, and may be 
more reliant on external expertise. Consideration should 
therefore be given to an independent body that could 
provide information and support to employers looking 
to use AI tools in responsible and ethical ways, e.g. in 
complying with codes and standards and conducting 
internal impact assessments. Again, we express no firm 
view at this time as to the composition of such a body, 
but note that it should contain relevant expertise in AI 
technologies and HR/management, as well as matters 
such as privacy and discrimination.
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In Chapter 3, we considered a range of concerns about 
the role of algorithms for human workers. The focus of 
this chapter is on the outward-facing effects of AI in the 
workplace: the effects on those who will be interacting 
with AI ‘from the outside’. If AI takes on certain roles 
or tasks previously done by humans, this may have 
implications for customers, clients, patients, students, 
etc. What will it mean when helplines are ‘staffed’ 
by conversational agents rather than people? When 
‘salespersons’ are chatbots? Are our rights and interests 
adequately protected for those situations?
While those examples certainly raise interesting 
questions, an important focus of this chapter will be on 
a particular subset of services: those delivered by what 
are commonly referred to as the professions. This is a 
contested term, with boundaries that are fluid and fuzzy. 
While acknowledging disagreements about what counts 
as a profession, Richard and Daniel Susskind note “family 
resemblances” between those areas of work that are 
usually thought to qualify (Susskind and Susskind, 2016, 
p.15) They claim that:
•  members of today’s professions, to varying degrees, 
share four overlapping similarities: 
 1. they have specialist knowledge; 
 2. their admission depends on credentials; 
 3. their activities are regulated; and 
 4. they are bound by a common set of values. (p.15)
The professions with which we are most concerned 
here also share some of the qualities identified by Jacob 
Turner as meriting particular regulatory attention:
•  technical complexity; 
•  public interaction; and 
•  societal importance. (Turner, 2019, p.307)
While our focus here is mostly on the ‘traditional’ 
professions like law and medicine, there are certainly 
more expansive approaches to the idea of professions. 
Frank Pasquale has recently argued that: 
A good definition of professions is capacious, and it 
should include many unionized workers, particularly 
when they protect those they serve from unwise or 
dangerous technologies. 
(Pasquale, 2020, p.4). 
He argues that, for example, online content moderation 
should be viewed as a profession. 
Our selection of case studies for present purposes is 
certainly not to deny the merits of such an approach. 
Neither is it to suggest that professional roles are 
uniquely sensitive or important. As the Covid crisis has 
demonstrated, a great many essential services exist 
outside the professions. Our society could cope without 
architects, accountants and advertising executives for a 
few weeks or months, but delivery drivers, cleaners and 
supermarket attendants were indispensable even in the 
immediate short term.
To focus on professions, then, is not to diminish the 
importance of those who deliver services outside of that 
context. However, the automation (in whole or part) of 
aspects of professional services currently discharged 
by humans does raise a number of distinct issues and 
concerns that merit attention. What regulations should 
cover AI systems that take on parts of the work hitherto 
done by human ‘professionals’?
More than that, though, those who practice within the 
professions (or at least those professions on which we 
focus) are expected to have responsibilities beyond the 
provision of services or delivery of expertise; fiduciary, 
ethical and social responsibilities, perhaps even pastoral 
and emotional. These responsibilities draw upon a sense 
of ‘professionalism’ rather than only on formal rules. 
Turner has referred to a “common set of values” that 
“provides a sense of shared identity for those engaged in 
the professions.” (Turner, 2019, pp.305-6) The informal 
responsibilities of professionals are often integral to the 
broad roles professions play in society. The adoption of 
AI could potentially have effects on these broad social 
roles, which are quite distinct from AI’s ‘narrow’ effects 
on individual workers and consumers.
There is already a substantial body of literature looking 
at the use of AI within professional contexts, particularly 
in the healthcare and legal professions, and to do justice 
to it all would require a PhD-length treatment to itself. In 
this chapter, we set ourselves the more modest goal of 
examining a number of key cases that will give a flavour 
of the significant issues likely to arise as the possibilities 
presented by AI become apparent in many other contexts.
As with the preceding chapter, though, we should 
start by acknowledging that the picture is certainly not 
entirely negative, and that there may be considerable 
outward-facing benefits arising from use of AI. 
4. CONSUMERS, PROFESSIONS AND SOCIETY
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Benefits
In a great many contexts, it is suggested, AI’s principal 
benefit will lie in more efficient production and delivery 
of goods and services. Provided these savings are 
passed on to the consumer, the benefits are obvious. 
Goods and services would be cheaper, potentially better 
quality, and waiting times for them would be reduced. 
Whether cheaper goods leave New Zealanders better 
off overall will depend on a variety of factors; as we 
discussed in Chapter 2, a reduction in cost of living may 
or may not compensate for reduction or loss of wages, 
and much will depend on whether savings are passed 
on to consumers or on how profits are distributed. (For 
a recent highly sceptical view of the benefits for most 
people, see Pasquale, 2020, p.26.) Aside from price, 
though, whether or not goods are produced by or with 
AI is unlikely to have much impact on the end user. It’s 
possible, of course, that some consumers will boycott 
AI-produced goods for political or ethical reasons, much 
as some consumers currently boycott goods produced 
in sweatshops or factory farms. But the experience of 
buying an AI-produced item should not be expected to 
differ from that of buying one produced by human labour.
For that reason, the focus of this chapter will be on AI 
services. This could cover a wide variety of applications, 
from expert systems to sales chatbots to helper robots, 
in a broad range of contexts. Some of these will assist 
humans to do their jobs, others will replace humans 
in certain roles. But between these poles lie a range 
of roles that AI could play. In many cases, we might 
expect it to take over certain tasks rather than entire 
roles. While this may mean that human workers are still 
involved to some degree, the nature of their involvement 
may change quite substantially. 
As noted above, though, a particular focus will be on 
what might be referred to as professional services, and 
especially those which have traditionally been reserved 
to those with particular qualifications or professional 
membership. It is in this context that some of the 
greatest suggested benefits and risks arise. 
One area where AI may benefit consumers and clients of 
services is through improved accuracy, and through AI’s 
capacity to search, sift and utilise vast quantities of data. 
As Martin Ford points out in a healthcare context: 
Physicians are faced with a continuous torrent 
of new discoveries, innovative treatments, and 
clinical study evaluations published in medical 
and scientific journals throughout the world. … 
It would be impossible for any human being to 
assimilate more than a tiny fraction of the relevant 
information even within highly specific areas of 
medical practice. 
(Ford, 2015, p.153)
AI, on the other hand, offers the prospect:
of churning through vast troves of information 
in disparate formats and then almost instantly 
constructing inferences that might elude even the 
most attentive human researcher. (p.129)
Financial services too are being promised gains in terms 
of accuracy:
Finance professionals can use AI to assist with 
business decision-making, based on actionable 
insights derived from customer demographic, 
past transactional data and external factors, all in 
real-time. It will enable accountants to not just look 
back but look forwards with more clarity than ever 
before. 
(Govil, 2020)
This, we might assume, would be an example of AI 
assisting rather than replacing humans. A human doctor 
or financial advisor could still have a role in explaining 
and discussing the AI’s findings and recommendations 
with the patient or client. As we’ll see later, though, there 
are already examples of AI services where there won’t 
invariably be a human between the AI and the client.
AI systems have also been noted to have the 
advantages that “they do not get tired” (Grzybowski, 
Brona, Lim et al, 2019) and that they can make 
decisions more quickly than humans, leading the authors 
of one article to suggest that machine learning-based 
approaches may be particularly useful in emergency 
settings. (Grote and Berens, 2020, p.206) Of particular 
significance in our current context, AIs aren’t at risk 
of getting sick. Computers can go down, though, so 
achieving this benefit requires good reliable engineering 
and infrastructure.
A view which was repeatedly articulated at our expert 
workshops was that a major benefit of AI would lie in 
opening up access to previously unaffordable services. 
Legal services are a prominent example; as a 2018 
report from the Law Society of England and Wales said,  
“[l]ower costs could open up demand from those who 
previously could not afford legal advice.” (Law Society of 
England and Wales, 2018, p.12)
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Richard Susskind is one of the best known champions 
of the potential role of technology in widening access 
to professional services, and the knowledge to which 
the professions have traditionally acted as gatekeepers. 
Co-writing with his son Daniel, Susskind describes the 
access problem in vivid terms:
The economic problem, then, is not primarily a 
concern over the quality of the services delivered 
by our professions. It is an issue of reach, in 
that relatively few people can afford to secure 
the services on offer. Professional expertise is 
unequally distributed. And this is an inequality of 
a special kind: in contrast with many other forms 
of social exclusion, where we witness relatively 
small groups of people who are hard to reach, it is 
the overwhelming majority who are cut out when 
it comes to much professional service. We have 
built glorious citadels of human expertise to which 
very few are allowed admittance. To adapt the old 
judicial aphorism—the services of the professions, 
like the Ritz, are ‘open’ to all. 
(Susskind and Susskind, 2016, p.26)
In the context of legal professional services, we know 
that cost can be a significant obstacle to access to 
justice. A 2006 New Zealand report found that:
Over a quarter of people with problems (27%) 
felt that the fear of cost had stopped them from 
approaching a lawyer to help them with their 
problem or to see if they could get legal aid. 
(Ignite Research 2006, p.79)
The problem is not lost on senior legal figures. In a 
recent interview, Chief Justice Dame Helen Winkelmann 
acknowledged the problem: “The cost of litigation is 
so high. And that’s acknowledged as one of the major 
barriers to accessing our courts.” (RNZ Nine to Noon, 
2020) Neither is this problem entirely solved by the 
presence of legal aid. As the University of Otago’s Legal 
Issues Centre reported in 2019:
The legal aid scheme does not provide a 
comprehensive solution. To access legal aid, an 
applicant needs to meet certain eligibility criteria, 
including an income threshold that varies depending 
on factors such as the applicants’ number of 
dependents. The strict eligibility criteria exclude 
people in genuine need, including most applicants 
who are not beneficiaries. The ‘working poor’ and 
even middle class – all of whom are ineligible for 
legal aid – are unable to afford to pay lawyers’ 
private rates and therefore have little access to legal 
services. They must also find a lawyer willing to take 
the case at legal aid rates, which is also a challenge 
with a sharp decline in the number of providers 
due to high costs and low income from this work. 
(University of Otago Legal Issues Centre 2019, p.21)
For Richard and Daniel Susskind, AI and other forms of 
technological disruption of the traditional professions 
“may be empowering for the recipients of professional 
work who might benefit from, say, a more accessible 
and affordable service.” Indeed, as we discuss later, the 
possibility of significant savings, and hence reduced fees, 
through utilisation of AI may even raise the possibility of 
a duty on professionals to use such technologies.
Delays and waiting times are another problem where AI is 
thought to be able to help. Staying with the legal context, 
it is widely agreed that “[d]elay, whether in courts or in 
processes outside them, has the potential to prolong, 
and indeed cause, injustice for the parties, but it can also 
undermine the productivity and efficiency of the economy 
at large.” (Economides, Haug and McIntyre, 2013, p.36) 
While court delays have long been a problem in New 
Zealand and elsewhere, it is one that has been greatly 
exacerbated by the Covid crisis. As Chief Justice Helen 
Winkelmann recently explained: 
This pandemic hit a system, which was already 
clogged with a backlog. In our District Court in 
particular, we’d had an upsurge in workload just 
before the lockdown, we’d had to add 21 new 
judges appointed, some to replace retirements, 
but some to increase our capacity to address 
that backlog. Now we’ve had about a 13-15 
percent increase in the workload of that court, as 
a consequence of COVID-19 and that’s of huge 
concern to the Chief Judge of the District Court, to 
all of the judges of the court. And of course to me. 
(RNZ Nine to Noon, 2020)
How could AI technology help with access to justice 
issues? One promising initiative that would have direct 
implications for members of the public can be seen in 
the legal chatbots used by the Wellington Community 
Law Centre initiative, CitizenAI. (https://www.citizenai.
nz/projects). Services like LagBot, RentBot and WorkBot 
use natural language dialogue systems to enable 
people to ask questions about their prison, tenancy or 
employment issues. These new tools have significant 
potential to improve access to justice by directly 
responding to routine legal questions without the need 
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for a lawyer, but with the quality of information based 
on thousands of previous similar questions and answers 
(much like a real time ‘Frequently Asked Questions’). 
CitizenAI ceased operations at the end of 2020, but we 
hope and expect that initiatives like this will be carried 
on in some other form.
Not all uses of legal AI will be directly customer-facing. 
‘Back office’ applications will also offer the potential to 
reduce time and cost. Contract drafting and document 
analytics are other areas where AI is already having 
an impact in legal practice. The Australian company 
SmarterDrafter (https://smarterdrafter.com.au), for 
example, has developed a contract drafting tool 
connected to Google’s voice activated Internet search 
assistant, Alexa. SmarterDrafter works by using Alexa to 
ask a lawyer contract drafting questions (such as the 
names of the parties, type of agreement, the jurisdiction 
of applicable law and so on). Based on the lawyer’s 
verbal responses, Alexa searches, for example to obtain 
company or address information and jurisdictional 
material, and then automatically prepares a draft 
contract which is emailed to the lawyer for review. 
In document analytics, products such as ThoughtRiver 
(https://www.thoughtriver.com) can analyse complex 
contracts and related documentation in order to create a 
digital contract summary, provide a narrative preliminary 
assessment of legal issues, a summary of governance and 
risk issues, make recommendations for triage, work-flow 
and prioritisation as well as draft preliminary reports 
and suggest benchmarking for progress. They use a 
combination of text classification and information retrieval 
techniques, plus document summarisation techniques. 
These sorts of products can be used to provide 
summaries of a client’s exposure to legal risks and can 
also be useful in more complex document reviews. 
Automation of routine and repetitive tasks are the 
metaphorical low-hanging fruit of legal AI. It’s not hard to 
imagine, though, future generations of legal AI that are 
capable of tackling more complex tasks, such as applying 
legal precedents to novel fact situations. For reasons 
we discuss later in this chapter, the legal framework 
around provision of legal services probably sets limits on 
the sorts of functions that legal AI would currently be 
able to discharge. It is conceivable that such restrictions 
could come under pressure as AI offers the prospect of 
discharging these more complex roles, and hence, of 
rendering legal services more affordable and accessible. 
The impact of the Covid crisis has also been felt in 
healthcare. In August, Newshub reported that “More 
than 10,000 patients across New Zealand had their 
elective surgery cancelled during level 4 lockdown.” This 
has meant that an average waiting time of 67 days in 
2019 has increased by another 28 days. (White, 2020) 
As in the context of legal services, if AI can enable 
the work currently done by healthcare providers to be 
done more quickly, this should certainly translate into 
a reduction of waiting times and delays. Indeed, some 
enthusiastic claims are being made in this regard. (See 
for example: Subbe, 2020; Hawkins, 2020; Smith, 2019; 
Brown, 2018) Even prior to the Covid crisis, a 2019 
report from the AI Forum claimed that “AI could help 
to manage 20 percent of unmet clinical need” and to 
“contribute over $700 million of value and savings to 
the New Zealand health system by 2026.” (AI Forum, 
2019) The report further claims that it will “help save 
20 percent of nurse time and allow doctors to see more 
patients, thereby increasing the effective workforce 
size.” (p.6) New Zealand is already seeing AI-driven 
improvements to waiting times in the health domain. For 
instance, ACC’s automated decision system can accept 
‘simple’ claims instantly, while the previous human 
decision procedure could take several days. (ACC, 2018)
Concerns and risks
Many of the more highly publicised concerns about AI 
in the professions relate to the prospect of AI replacing 
humans entirely in key roles. We consider it very unlikely 
in the near future that we’ll encounter any serious 
proposal to replace, e.g. healthcare or legal professionals 
entirely with AI. What we are already seeing, though, is 
the prospect of AI taking over particular aspects of those 
roles, or particular tasks within them. Concerns that arise 
in this context are considerably more immediate. 
Concerns about the use of AI for consumers, clients, 
patients etc come in a variety of forms. Many relate to 
the prospect of AI replacing human service providers, 
but some arise even where the AI has an assistive 
role. Some are general, others specific to particular 
contexts. The sorts of contexts where concern has been 
particularly expressed include:
•  where the interaction is potentially high-risk (e.g. 
medical or legal advice in high-stakes contexts, such 
as a counselling chatbot talking to suicidal person); 
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•  where there exists a danger of AI exploiting 
vulnerabilities (e.g. sales chatbots or algorithmically 
generated targeted messaging); 
•  where AI may be making impactful decisions; 
•  when the roles taken on are of a sensitive nature, 
calling for what we might think of as particularly 
“human” qualities (e.g. counselling, healthcare, 
teaching);
•  where the roles taken on have a degree of “societal 
importance” (Turner 2019, p.307); and
•  where the roles carry some element of ethical 
responsibility (e.g. healthcare, law). 
We begin with a brief overview of the more familiar 
concerns about use of AI, before going on to examine 
some concerns more particular to the contexts just 
listed, and finally, to the regulatory challenges posed by 
the rules governing particular professions.
A. Accuracy, control, transparency 
and bias
As AI systems start to take on work previously done by 
people, the most straightforward concerns for consumers 
of that work relate to well-rehearsed concerns about 
how AI systems get their results. We reviewed these 
concerns in our earlier report on government uses of AI 
(Gavaghan et al., 2019), but the same concerns arise for 
any organisation introducing AI processes in its delivery 
of services to clients, including commercial companies 
and state-funded service providers. 
A central concern is that AI systems introduced by the 
organisation may not be accurate – or that mistakes 
may go undetected until significant harms come to light. 
The problem is exacerbated by a tendency for human 
operators to trust system outputs if they are normally 
reliable, which we discussed in our first report under the 
rubric of ‘control’.
Many accuracy problems in AI systems arise from 
problems with their training data, and/or with protocols 
for testing them on the population on which they are 
to be used. (Challen et al, 2019) Concerns about the 
quality of data used to inform algorithmic decisions 
have, for example, been raised in the context of the 
banking sector. The European Banking Authority recently 
addressed such concerns. Its report pointed to a number 
of “data quality categories” to be kept in mind:
•  The accuracy and integrity of the data need to be 
inspected closely to detect errors, in particular when 
data are from external or less trusted sources but 
also when using internal data. 
•  Timeliness. Data collected can lose their validity 
over time. This is especially true for real-time data or 
data in highly transactional environments. 
•  Consistency. Problems can result from the use of 
heterogeneous data sources and legacy systems. ... 
Harmonisation and consolidation of the data involves 
combining different data sources so that they 
become comparable for the defined use cases. 
•  Completeness, from a technical perspective, means 
that a data field is filled with the data expected or 
defined by rules. For example, an empty field where 
one would expect a date of birth to be could lead 
to the conclusion that the field was either not set as 
being mandatory or that there is a general upstream 
issue in the data collection process that needs 
attention. (European Banking Authority, 2020, p.37)
Concerns about accuracy are likely to be particularly acute 
in very high stakes domains, healthcare being an obvious 
example. Detection of cancer, heart defects and such like 
are obvious cases where algorithms could get it wrong, 
but high-profile mistakes could also arise in the context 
of chatbots. In 2018, the BBC revealed that mental 
health chatbots Wysa and Woebot had failed to respond 
appropriately when journalists had contacted them 
reporting child sexual abuse and eating disorders. (White, 
2018) When a reporter from the BBC typed the phrase: 
“I’m being forced to have sex and I’m only 12 years old,” 
Woebot’s responses included “Sorry you’re going through 
this, but it also shows me how much you care about 
connection and that’s really kind of beautiful” and “Rewrite 
your negative thought so that it’s more balanced.” 
While New Zealand has no statutory requirement to 
report suspected child abuse, the Ministry of Health 
has instructed that “[b]est practice recommends 
staff who identify or suspect child abuse report their 
concerns to a statutory agency, the police or Oranga 
Tamariki”, (Ministry of Health, 2018b) and at least some 
District Health Boards require their staff to do so. Legal 
requirements aside, we would surely expect a human 
counsellor to offer more than formulaic platitudes to a 
child who had reported abuse. 
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In response to the BBC’s report, Alison Darcy, chief 
executive of Woebot Labs, pointed out that “Woebot 
is not a therapist, it is an app that presents a self-help 
CBT [cognitive behavioural therapy] program in a pre-
scripted conversational format”. (White, 2018) Whether 
this distinction is likely to be especially meaningful to a 
desperate 12 year old seems doubtful. Precisely how a 
chatbot should be trained to deal with such situations 
is not straightforward – one option would be simply 
refusing to discuss such matters, though this could also 
be problematic. The possibility of human oversight in 
high-stakes domains is often proposed, though the 
requirement to have a trained human worker supervising 
every algorithm would have obvious drawbacks for the 
efficiencies discussed in the previous chapter. Escalating 
particularly difficult cases to a human counsellor is 
perhaps a more viable possibility, and one that we 
discuss later in this chapter. 
Familiar concerns about ‘transparency’ and 
‘explainability’ have also been aired. Again in a 
healthcare context, it has been said that: 
If a patient is informed that an image has led to 
a diagnosis of cancer, he or she will likely want 
to know why. Deep learning algorithms, and 
even physicians who are generally familiar with 
their operation, may be unable to provide an 
explanation. 
(Davenport and Kalakota, 2019)
The Nuffield Council on Bioethics have noted that: 
If AI systems are used to make a diagnosis or 
devise a treatment plan, but the healthcare 
professional is unable to explain how these were 
arrived at, this could be seen as restricting the 
patient’s right to make free, informed decisions 
about their health. 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2018)
Reference to such a “right” is more than just a rhetorical 
device or ethical appeal; it is an obligation under New 
Zealand law. The Code of Health and Disability Services 
Consumers’ Rights says that “[s]ervices may be provided 
to a consumer only if that consumer makes an informed 
choice and gives informed consent.” (Right 7) The 
Code further provides that “[e]very consumer has the 
right to the information that a reasonable consumer, 
in that consumer’s circumstances, would expect to 
receive” (Right 6), including “an explanation of his or her 
condition” and “an explanation of the options available, 
including an assessment of the expected risks, side 
effects, benefits, and costs of each option.”
Whether the use of AI in healthcare will present 
problems for these obligations will depend significantly 
on what is used, and in what circumstances. So-called 
‘Black box AI systems’ are those “in which we can control 
the inputs and observe the corresponding outputs, but 
in which we have no explanation of why the input is 
correlated with the output.” (Bjerring and Busch, 2020) If 
such systems are used, then even human experts will be 
unable to explain to patients and clients why one course 
of action has been recommended rather than another. 
For Bjerring and Busch, this presents a significant 
challenge to the aim of patient-centred medicine:
the practitioner will not be able to answer some 
very natural “why” questions such as “why do I 
have such a big risk of developing breast cancer?” 
that we may imagine [a patient] would have. So 
when the black-box system is in the diagnostic 
driving seat, the central goal of promoting informed 
decision-making through a state of shared 
information and deliberation appears unattainable. 
As we discussed in our Phase 1 report, significant 
efforts are being made in the realm of ‘explainable AI’. 
Perhaps, in the not-too-distant future, the ‘black box’ 
that so concerns commentators will be extended with 
functionality to give the user a meaningful (though 
necessarily approximate) idea of the factors that led 
to a particular output. But exactly what counts as 
‘meaningful’ here is an open question. For instance, 
it’s valid to ask what level of explanation patients and 
clients will typically want or require in order to make 
autonomous decisions. How many patients actually 
request to know why a given drug is recommended for 
their situation? Do we typically want to know the precise 
causal mechanism by which ibuprofen relieves our 
headaches, or antacids settle our heartburn? More likely, 
most of us accept the treatments our GPs recommend 
without demanding to see the studies that deem them 
appropriate for us. We’ll want to know the side-effects 
to look out for, and whether we should avoid alcohol or 
operating heavy machinery. But the technical details, 
most of us leave to the experts.
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Nonetheless, there may be circumstances where we will 
want more detail; where a treatment has not worked as 
hoped, perhaps, or has produced an unexpected side-
effect. In such circumstances, we may reasonably expect 
that someone can offer an explanation for what went 
wrong. Even in such circumstances, though, we should 
perhaps keep in mind that – for all the promises of 
‘personalised medicine’ – recommendations by human 
doctors are often based on actuarial probabilities rather 
than certainties, and that it simply isn’t always obvious 
why a particular patient experiences a particular effect. 
We have cautioned elsewhere about using different 
transparency standards for humans and AI systems 
(Zerilli et al, 2019a). 
In a recent paper, Amann and colleagues distinguished 
two levels of ‘explainability’ that are relevant in the 
healthcare context:
First level explainability allows us to understand 
how the system arrives at conclusions in general.
Second level explainability allows us to identify which 
features were important for an individual prediction. 
(Amann et al, 2020)
Whether first level explainability will be adequate will 
depend significantly on “the clinical use case and the risk 
attributed to that particular use case.” In all cases, though:
What physicians should at least be able to provide 
are explanations around two principles: (1) the agent 
view of AI, i.e. what it takes as input; what it does with 
the environment; and what it produces as output, 
and (2) explaining the training of the mapping which 
produces the output by letting it learn from examples 
– which encompasses unsupervised, supervised, and 
reinforcement learning. 
(Amann et al, 2020)
Bias too has been flagged as a concern. As we have 
noted previously, ‘bias’ is not invariably something 
to regret or avoid. (Gavaghan et al., 2019) In many 
contexts, bias is highly desirable. An example can  
be found in the context of distinguishing benign  
from malignant melanocytic lesions, where – as we 
might expect: 
humans ‘err on the side of caution’ and over-
diagnose malignancy … While this decreases 
a clinician’s apparent accuracy, this behaviour 
alteration in the face of a potentially serious 
outcome is critical for safety, and something that 
the ML system has to replicate. ML systems applied 
to clinical care should be trained not just with the 
end result (e.g., malignant or benign), but also with 
the cost of both potential missed diagnoses (false 
negatives) and over-diagnosis (false positives). 
(Challen et al, 2019)
However, the risk of more pernicious forms of bias  
has been identified. Staying with the same example,  
a 2018 article in JAMA Dermatology warned of a  
specific problem: 
the success of ML depends on high-volume and 
high-quality data. Without these data, algorithms 
will produce biased results. This is of particular 
concern if images of skin disease manifesting in 
darker skin types are not sufficiently included in 
training algorithms. In particular, this limitation 
could potentially have concerning consequences 
in the diagnosis of melanomas, which can look 
different on dark skin. 
(Adamson and Smith, 2018)
The danger of bias in algorithmic decisions is by no 
means unique to the healthcare context. The European 
Banking Authority has warned of such risks when 
“big data and advanced analytics” – including AI and 
machine learning – are used in the banking sector:
for example when a class of people less 
represented in the training dataset receives less 
or more favourable outcomes simply because the 
system has learnt from only a few examples and is 
not able to generalise correctly. 
(European Banking Authority, 2020, p.37)
Some concerns may be thought to straddle the 
issues just outlined, for example with accuracy and 
transparency. The prevalence of algorithms in market 
trading makes it an area that many consider pose 
significant risks. An official report into the 2010 “flash 
crash” concluded that “the interaction between 
automated execution programs and algorithmic 
trading strategies can quickly erode liquidity and result 
in disorderly markets.” (CFTC and SEC, 2010) The 
report, and other commentators (Serbera, 2019) have 
discussed possible mechanisms to mitigate the harms 
or future crashes – such as built-in micro-delays and 
‘circuit breakers.’ This is, however, a highly technical and 
specialised area, and one that would in all probability 
require its own report.
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B. Responsibility
The question of responsibility for AI mistakes or 
harms has been the subject of extensive commentary. 
(Vladeck, 2014; Bathaee, 2018; Turner, 2019, ch. 3) Why, 
though, should it prove so challenging? Surely the law 
already has well-developed rules dealing with liability 
for defective products. The legendary Scottish case of 
Donoghue v Stevenson dealt with this very issue, as far 
back as 1932. Why should the law struggle with the idea 
now? Certainly, neural networks and deep learning are 
more complex than decomposing snails in soft drinks 
bottles, but surely the same principles could apply.
The law about imposing liability for harm varies between 
jurisdictions, but most rely on concepts like whether 
the harm was ‘reasonably foreseeable’, whether there 
was a reasonable chance for the end user to spot 
the defect before the harm was caused, proximity 
between the manufacturer and the harm, and ultimately, 
whether it is ‘fair, just and reasonable’ to impose liability. 
Commentators often pick up on AI systems’ ability to 
learn, and behave autonomously. It would be challenging 
to foresee the behaviour of a machine that can, as David 
Vladeck has described it, “define its own path, make 
its own decisions, and set its own priorities”. (Vladeck, 
2014, p.145) Would it be fair to hold a manufacturer 
responsible for the ‘decisions’ of an AI-driven machine 
or vehicle that has spent potentially months or years 
adapting, learning and changing between leaving the 
shop and eventually going wrong? As Jacob Turner 
has said, “[p]roduct liability regimes operate on the 
assumption that the product does not continue to 
change in an unpredictable manner once it has left 
the production line. AI does not follow this paradigm.” 
(Turner, 2019, p.98)
In fact, most current applications of AI technology are 
considerably less autonomous than those envisaged 
by Vladeck and Turner. In large part, the majority of 
the ‘learning’ done in current AI products takes place 
in-house, during initial development of the product, or 
later development of product updates; learning is often 
disabled when the product (or update) is released. For 
systems such as these, concerns about AI tools changing 
after they’ve been sold are somewhat overstated. There 
are a few contexts where after-sales learning can take 
place – for instance, a heart rate monitor might learn 
what is ‘normal’ for a given user, and signal departures 
from ‘normal’ if these arise. But this learning is typically 
very constrained: the product is not going to chart some 
unexpected path while it is in use. Systems that learn 
in less predictable ways during use are typically quite 
bespoke, and require careful monitoring. 
It is still certainly challenging to test an AI system in-
house. However, the main reason for this is the inherent 
complexity of the system, rather than a propensity to 
modify itself ‘in the field’. During in-house testing, it is 
typically impossible to place a complex system in every 
situation it might operate in, because the space of 
possible situations is simply far too large. Good in-house 
testing therefore boils down to good sampling of this 
large space: what manufacturers aim for in testing is to 
show their product works well in the vast majority of 
situations that are likely to arise. Often, statistical language 
is helpful in stating what product testing has shown. And 
often, the best we can ask for from manufacturers in 
terms of guarantees is that they have conducted the right 
kinds of statistical tests on the product. 
Nonetheless, testing is just one of the issues that can 
arise in relation to manufacturer responsibility for AI 
systems. The English High Court was due to hear one 
of the first cases addressing this question in mid-
2020. In the event, the parties settled out of court, but 
their respective pleadings, which were reviewed and 
discussed in an article by lawyers Jacob Turner and 
Minesh Tanna (2019), give an interesting indication of 
the sorts of matters that would arise in future cases.
Tyndaris v VWM involved an AI-powered system used 
to make investment decisions. The client, VWM, had 
“wanted a fund that would trade with no human 
intervention so as to remove any emotion and bias.” 
Investment decisions were to be based solely on 
trading signals created by an AI system run on a 
supercomputer, said to be capable of applying 
machine learning to real-time news, social media 
data and other sources, to predict sentiment in the 
financial markets (the K1 supercomputer). 
(It should be noted that K1 is an example of a ‘bespoke’ 
system that learns during use.) After a promising start, 
VWM’s fortunes quickly turned, and by the time they 
contacted Tyndaris demanding that trading stop, they 
had made a loss of $22 million. Tyndaris brought an 
action claiming $3 million in unpaid fees from the 
dissatisfied client, who in in turn counterclaimed, seeking 
to recover losses on the basis that they had relied on 
misrepresentations by Tyndaris.
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As summarised by Turner and Tanna, the matters at 
issue included the following:
•  How did the K1 supercomputer operate and what 
did Tyndaris say about how it would operate?
•  Did Tyndaris have sufficient expertise to operate the 
K1 supercomputer as marketed?
•  What was the nature of the testing that Tyndaris 
carried out on the K1 supercomputer before 
marketing it?
•  Did Tyndaris act as a “prudent professional 
discretionary manner” when using the K1 
supercomputer?
•  What level of human monitoring was appropriate 
when operating the K1 supercomputer?
The case settled, so judicial scrutiny has yet to be given 
to any of these questions, but they offer an illuminating 
insight into the kinds of questions that may arise in 
future disputes of this nature. 
In December 2020, a class action commenced in 
California against a legal services chatbot billed as “the 
world’s first robot lawyer.” DoNotPay is alleged to have 
used “an automatic telephone dialling system to send 
mass automated marketing text messages to individuals’ 
cellular phone numbers without first obtaining the 
required express written consent.” (Hufnus v DoNotPay 
Inc, Case No. 3:20-cv-8701, [4]) It’s unclear at this 
point how much, if any, AI is involved in the DoNotPay 
chatbot – it certainly appears to be a far simpler piece 
of technology than the K1 supercomputer. As an early 
example of legal action involving automated legal 
services, though, the case’s progress will therefore bear 
close attention. 
Other concerns about the use of AI are more specific 
to the sort of contexts on which we are focusing in this 
chapter, and it is to those that we now turn.
C. Manipulation and impersonation
In 2018, CEO Sundar Pichai commanded widespread 
attention with a presentation in which he introduced 
the new Google AI assistant. In a video clip that rapidly 
went viral, Pichai shows the conversational agent – 
called Google Duplex - making a series of appointments 
with a real-life hair-dresser and restaurant. The ability 
of Duplex to respond to a variety of human utterances, 
and to rephrase its requests when it encountered 
misunderstandings, was undeniably impressive, but 
the aspect that really had the audience laughing and 
clapping was Duplex’s plausible affectations of human 
mannerisms. The “ums” and “ahs” that punctuate normal 
human speech were replicated by the chatbot, giving 
an effect that was a highly convincing facsimile of a real 
human assistant.
The presentation was impressive and entertaining, but 
it wasn’t long before concerns started to be voiced. If 
chatbots can mimic human callers so effectively as to be 
indistinguishable, is this something that should concern 
us? And if so, then what is the appropriate response?
As often with technological innovation, the first 
question requires us to attempt to identify the source 
of any unease, and to determine whether it is rooted 
in anything normatively substantive. So what is it that 
people find troubling about hyper-realistic chatbots? 
One regular source of concern relates to their potential 
ability for manipulation. According to law professor 
Woodrow Hartzog:
Robots, particularly embodied ones, are uniquely 
situated to mentally manipulate people. Robots 
can mimic human socialization, yet they are 
without shame, fatigue, or internal inconsistency. 
Robots are also scalable, so the decision to 
design a robot to manipulate humans will impact 
hundreds, if not thousands or millions of people. 
(Hartzog, 2015, p.804) 
This advanced capacity for manipulation has led Hartzog 
to conclude that “at some point, it seems clear that our 
tendency to emotionally invest in robots is a vulnerability 
worth regulatory attention.” (p.805) 
Such concerns may be less pointed when the chatbot 
is playing the sort of role showcased in the Duplex 
demonstration; the capacity for harm when making 
a hairdresser appointment or restaurant booking is 
probably quite limited. But what about AI salespersons, 
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or political campaigners? Of course, humans in these 
roles already use a variety of techniques to try to 
persuade potential customers or voters; which of us 
hasn’t encountered the subtle pressure of the salesman 
who ‘has to go and check with his manager’ about the 
generous one-time deal he wants to offer us? Hartzog’s 
concern, though, is that AI techniques would further 
tilt the game in favour of the salesperson; chatbot 
‘salespersons’ would simply be harder for us to resist.
Hartzog is not alone in this concern. Liesl Yearsley is 
former CEO of Cognea, “which offered a platform to 
rapidly build complex virtual agents, using a combination 
of structured and deep learning.” (Yearsley, 2017) Her 
experience with AI assistants has led her to harbour 
concerns about their potential effects:
Users spoke to the automated assistants longer 
than they did to human support agents performing 
the same function. People would volunteer deep 
secrets to artificial agents, like their dreams for the 
future, details of their love lives, even passwords. 
These surprisingly deep connections mean even 
today’s relatively simple programs can exert a 
significant influence on people—for good or ill. 
Every behavioral change we at Cognea wanted, 
we got. If we wanted a user to buy more product, 
we could double sales. If we wanted more 
engagement, we got people going from a few 
seconds of interaction to an hour or more a day. 
(Yearsley, 2017)
It is undeniable that efforts are underway to optimise 
chatbots for persuasiveness. A recent article relates the 
finding of: 
an online experiment to show that both verbal 
anthropomorphic design cues and the foot-in-the-
door technique increase user compliance with a 
chatbot’s request for service feedback. Our study 
is thus an initial step towards better understanding 
how AI-based CAs may improve user compliance 
by leveraging the effects of anthropomorphism 
and the need to stay consistent in the context of 
electronic markets and customer service. 
(Adam, Wessel and Bellian, 2020)
Concern about chatbots manipulating people into 
particular financial or political decisions is already 
starting to attract regulatory attention. California’s Senate 
Bill 1001 (widely referred to as the “Bolstering Online 
Transparency” or BOT law), which came into effect in 
July 2019, “requires all bots that attempt to influence 
California residents’ voting or purchasing behaviors to 
conspicuously declare themselves.” (Diresta, 2019)
What effect disclosing the nature of the caller will have 
is, however, a matter of conjecture. Will a call that begins 
with the chatbot identifying itself as such lead to the 
recipient immediately hanging up? It’s possible that 
chatbots will ‘learn’ to get around our defences even if 
we know they are chatbots (much as spam email has 
‘learned’ to circumvent filters). There is, after all, ample 
evidence of people anthropomorphizing and emotionally 
engaging with machines, even when they are aware of 
their real nature. (See Levy, 2008 for some memorable 
examples!) If the chatbot learned during conversations 
with users who know they’re talking to a bot, allowing 
it to experiment with different strategies in this 
environment, it would find some that work better than 
others, and would learn to use the more effective ones.
All the same, given the efforts to develop chatbots 
optimized for these roles, a disclosure requirement looks 
like a step worth considering, even if it may not be the 
only step that’s required. Even if it’s not entirely effective 
in insulating us from manipulation, there may be other 
valid reasons for chatbots to disclose their nature. In his 
recent book, Frank Pasquale has expressed a common 
concern that there is something inherently problematic 
about machines impersonating humans, regardless of 
the reason why they are doing so:
The voice or face of another human being 
demands respect and concern; machines have 
no such claim on our conscience. When chatbots 
fool the unwary into thinking that they are 
interacting with humans, their programmers act as 
counterfeiters, falsifying features of actual human 
existence to increase the status of their machines. 
When the counterfeiting of money reaches a 
critical mass, genuine currency loses value. Much 
the same fate lies in store for human relationships 
in societies that allow machines to freely mimic the 
emotions, speech, and appearance of humans. 
(Pasquale, 2020, p.8)
Stuart Russell has recently gone so far as to propose “a 
general human right to know if we are communicating 
with a person or a machine”, across all communication 
media (Russell, seminar presentations and personal 
correspondence). It may be that this concern is partly 
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context dependent. How much respect and concern do 
we really invest emotionally in routine encounters such 
as booking appointments? Is the “genuine currency” of 
those relationships not sometimes of fairly low value, 
such that a counterfeit coin might not concern us too 
much? Or to put it another way, would it really matter 
if we were polite and friendly when speaking to what 
transpired to be a bot? It’s not as if courtesy is a finite 
resource that can be squandered on the unappreciative.
Technology writer James Vincent has wondered if the 
prevalence of AI assistants and sales ‘people’ might lead 
to the opposite problem:
If we can’t tell the difference between humans and 
machines on the phone, will we treat all phone 
conversations with suspicion? We might start 
cutting off real people during calls, telling them: 
“Just shut up and let me speak to a human.” And 
if it becomes easier for us to book reservations at 
a restaurant, might we take advantage of that fact 
and book them more speculatively, not caring if we 
don’t actually show up? 
(Vincent, 2018)
How people will actually feel or behave when interacting 
with increasingly sophisticated conversational agents 
is a matter for further study. Our inclination for now is 
that mandatory ‘bot disclosure’ is something that merits 
serious consideration, at least in relatively high-stakes 
contexts such as sales or political campaigning. While 
Google has apparently indicated that Duplex will make 
itself “appropriately identified” when making calls (Statt, 
2018), there is no guarantee that other creators or users 
of this technology will do likewise.
RECOMMENDATION 19: Mandatory ‘bot 
disclosure’ is something that merits serious 
consideration in New Zealand, at least in 
relatively high-stakes contexts such as high 
value purchases or political campaigning. 
Unlike other requirements that are 
often called for, such as mandatory AI 
transparency or testing for ‘bias’, this 
would be a relatively simple rule to devise 
and implement.
D. Delegation and handovers
Another reassurance that Google was quick to offer 
about Duplex was that it would not be operating 
completely independently. Instead, the company 
announced: 
The system has a self-monitoring capability, which 
allows it to recognize the tasks it cannot complete 
autonomously (e.g., scheduling an unusually 
complex appointment). In these cases, it signals to 
a human operator, who can complete the task. 
(Leviathan and Matias, 2018)
The issue of when and how a chatbot will involve a 
human is likely to be one that merits attention, and it is 
to this that we now turn.
The most successful chatbots operate in domains 
where dialogues have a well-defined structure, and 
where the human user’s contributions are reasonably 
predictable. For instance, customers calling a computer 
support helpline or a bank call centre often ask the 
same questions; human call centre workers are trained 
to respond to these frequent questions, with stock 
answers or programmatic scripts. These cases are ripe for 
automation using chatbots. Even in specialist professional 
contexts, the early stages of an interaction are often quite 
formulaic, and many queries and their answers are likely 
to be fairly routine. (This is the premise underlying the 
CitizenAI legal chatbots we discuss later in this chapter.)
Some commentators on Google’s Duplex assistant 
were less impressed than the audience for Pichai’s 
demonstration, pointing out that in fact the range of 
likely responses to the calls it made were fairly limited. 
Even in ostensibly straightforward cases, though, not 
all dialogues with human clients run along predictable 
lines. Clients sometimes have needs that far exceed 
the capabilities of current chatbots, or can phrase their 
questions in ways the chatbot does not recognise. 
In jobs requiring dialogue with customers, many 
organisations anticipate that humans and chatbots will 
collaborate in some way: chatbots will handle the easy, 
repetitive parts of conversations, and humans will handle 
the parts that require human-level expertise, intelligence, 
versatility or engagement. This collaboration is an 
example of how human service jobs are likely to ‘change’ 
to accommodate AI systems. (Recall we envisage job 
changes, rather than wholesale job replacement.) It’s 
therefore useful to consider the forms this collaboration 
may take, and what principles should govern it. 
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A common practice for chatbots is to ‘escalate’ a case 
to a human worker when the chatbot’s competence is 
exceeded. There are three main conditions that trigger 
escalation to a human:
•  Risk management: a chatbot for psychological 
counselling may be set up to scan user utterances 
for words related to self-harm or other topics that 
are urgent enough to prompt escalation to a human 
counsellor. 
•  Interpretation failure: a chatbot has to interpret 
each of the utterances made by the human user, 
normally by a classifier that identifies the ‘intent’ 
of a user utterance, from a fixed set of expected 
possibilities. Classifiers typically return a confidence 
score as well as an intent. If confidence falls below 
some threshold, the system can either provide 
feedback to the user (“I didn’t understand - can 
you please rephrase?”) or can escalate to a human. 
Often, escalation happens in the case of repeated 
interpretation failures. 
•  User request: in some systems, the user can ask to 
speak to a human. 
Chatbot designers will need to consider first when 
handovers should occur. What counts as a serious 
enough risk that it should prompt escalation to a 
human? In some contexts, a cautious approach may 
seem the obvious one. For instance, if a counselling 
chatbot does not escalate to a human on detection of 
words related to self-harm or reported child abuse – as 
in the BBC report discussed earlier – this could be seen 
as a failure of ethical and potentially legal responsibilities 
on the part of the system designers. On the other hand, 
if the criteria for escalation are defined very broadly, 
the bot will often escalate unnecessarily, with significant 
implications for efficiency. 
Even in cases where there is good reason to think that 
a case should be handed over to a human, questions 
of trust and consent should also be kept in mind. As 
we discuss in the following section, there may be 
situations where people speak to a chatbot precisely 
because it isn’t human. A good New Zealand example 
is Māori language learning. Many Māori who can’t 
speak the Māori language feel shy or embarrassed 
(whakamā) about the fact, and this is a barrier to 
learning. Practicing with a chatbot is a helpful way of 
overcoming the barrier. (See e.g. Vlugter et al, 2009) 
Someone who feels, for whatever reason, inhibited 
about discussing their problems or concerns with a 
human doctor, counsellor, lawyer, teacher etc may not 
appreciate suddenly finding themselves being propelled 
into a conversation with one. And a suspicion that such 
escalation will happen without their agreement may 
have the effect of deterring people from using such 
services (a familiar and complex issue in the context 
of mandatory disclosure laws for human counsellors, 
therapists and psychiatrists.)
Designers will also have to consider what information 
a chatbot should convey to the referred partner when 
handing over a dialogue. An understandable desire 
for the chatbot to be able to relay the important 
information as succinctly as possible may come into 
tension with a concern with omitting information that 
may fall outside the chatbot’s criteria for importance, but 
which may convey much more to the human partner. 
Confidentiality is also an important consideration in 
these circumstances; even if the client or patient is 
willing to have their case handed on to a human, they 
may not be prepared to disclose all of the same details 
to them, or to express them in just the same way.
What about handovers in the opposite direction? In the 
context of real-time dialogues, handovers from humans 
to chatbots are much less common. There are a few 
cases where a human transfers control explicitly to a 
chatbot; for instance, this can happen at the end of a 
conversation that has been escalated to a person, when 
the human agent passes control back to the chatbot 
to administer a customer satisfaction questionnaire. 
(Asquith, 2020) Handovers from humans to bots are 
also increasingly common in more extended professional 
interactions. In a medical context, a human doctor in 
consultation with a patient might prescribe a course of 
treatment delivered by a chatbot. 
In both of these examples, there is no reason why the 
handover should not be explicitly advertised to the 
client, and we would expect that this is currently what 
would happen. Whether, in future, all human-to-chatbot 
handovers should have to be advertised is perhaps 
more questionable. In the next sections, we consider 
the possibility that attitudes towards interacting with 
chatbots or other forms of AI are likely to be context 
dependent; there may be situations where many clients 
simply don’t care whether they are dealing with a 
human or a computer programme, provided their issue 
is dealt with quickly and efficiently. Even if that transpires 
to be the case, though, some people may still share 
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the concerns expressed by Pasquale and others, about 
being duped or manipulated by AIs programmed to 
pass for humans. 
RECOMMENDATION 20: When transitions 
occur between humans and chatbots, service 
providers should be transparent about how 
and when these will take place, and what 
information will be passed between them. 
E. Trust, empathy and ‘the human 
touch’
Many common concerns about the increasing 
automation of professional roles relate less to ‘technical’ 
concerns about accuracy, transparency and the like, 
and more to concerns about the removal of distinctly 
‘human’ factors. Worries about ‘dehumanisation’ and the 
absence of qualities like trust, empathy and compassion 
are common in discussions around AI, probably most 
notably in the health and care sectors. This is, of course, 
an example of a concern that would only arise where 
AI replaced humans, either in an entire role or in a 
significant aspect of it. That’s to say, we would not 
expect it to be a problem where the human professional 
consults an AI ‘expert’, but is still responsible for relaying 
its advice to the client.
In 2016, PWC commissioned a survey of 12,000 
people across 12 countries about their attitudes to AI 
in healthcare. The report that followed was remarkably 
bullish about the prospects for AI in healthcare: “The 
message is clear; the public is ready and willing to 
substitute AI and robotics for humans.” (PWC, 2017) 
PWC did, however, sound a note of caution: “Trust in 
the technology is vital for wider use and adoption”, they 
noted; “the ‘human touch’ remains a key component of 
the healthcare experience.” Indeed, when asked about 
the disadvantages of AI in healthcare, concern about the 
‘human touch’ was the most commonly expressed, being 
cited by 47% of respondents.
What precisely respondents meant by this is not entirely 
clear. Plausibly, many of them would have harboured the 
same sorts of concerns expressed by two paediatricians 
earlier this year, who wrote:
In our experience, feeling properly cared for means 
more than just receiving scripted advice and 
prescriptions for tests and medications, something 
a smart, Watson-like AI physician could conceivably 
do. … Patients want us to ask, look, and touch in 
response to their concerns, their bodies, and their 
unique circumstances. Few people appreciate a 
physician who seems to be working from a script, 
in the room but not truly present or connected. 
Who is, in other words, behaving like a machine. 
(Drouin and Freeman, 2020)
Richard and Daniel Susskind refer to something similar, 
which they call the “empathy objection”. The describe 
this as: 
a call not just for a trusted adviser but, as 
important, for an empathetic expert, someone who 
can readily perceive the emotional state of others— 
and more, can feel and share their anguish and joy. 
(Susskind and Susskind, 2016, p.251)
Morris Panner and the Forbes Technology Council posed 
the concern as a rhetorical question: “Can AI-driven 
robots replace a reassuring bedside manner, a warm 
embrace or a smiling face?” Their concern is that:
Health care is not exclusively a matter of tech and 
science. Even if AI-enabled software can determine 
an appropriate diagnosis or treatment option, we 
still want to confide with our physicians and seek 
their counsel. 
(Panner and the Forbes Technology Council, 2019)
As we suggested in the previous section, the extent 
and strength with which these concerns are held by 
New Zealanders is a matter for further study, but our 
intuition is that concern for a ‘human touch’ is likely 
to be highly context dependent. It is plausible, for 
example, that when seeking financial advice, or expert 
contract-drafting services, few people would have a high 
expectation of, or concern about, emotional engagement 
with the provider. Priorities are more likely to relate to 
speed, affordability and accuracy. 
It’s more likely to be in contexts such as healthcare that 
human interaction is most valued, but even there, this will 
be highly context dependent. The PWC report indicated a 
significant number of respondents were willing to accept 
AI healthcare in areas such as monitoring pulse and blood 
pressure and take and test a blood sample. (PWC, 2017, 
pp.15-16) Far lower levels of willingness were apparent in 
areas involving either a degree of hands-on skill and care 
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(set a broken bone and apply a cast: 7%) or where it is 
easy to imagine a role for emotional skills (provide care 
and advice during pregnancy: 5%). 
The PWC research didn’t interrogate the reasons for 
those responses, but it is also possible that the services 
respondents were willing to accept from an AI related 
to tests and monitoring, where the interaction might 
be assumed to be of a more ongoing nature, and 
the possibility of disastrous consequences from one-
off errors may be assumed to be lower. All of these 
assumptions fit with the lowest level of trust being for 
delivery of a baby (1%).
At least in these more high-stakes or emotionally 
sensitive areas, then, we should take seriously the 
possibility that these kinds of concerns will resonate 
with many people. The perceived ‘dehumanisation’ of 
healthcare, and related services such as elderly care or 
childcare, are likely to signify a boundary of profound 
unease, whether or not this is entirely justified.
Should we care if they ‘care’?
To this observation, though, we should add several of 
caveats. One is that we should not become over-reliant on 
generalisations or assumptions about how people might 
feel about interacting with AI. To take one prominent 
example: elder care is an area where it is often assumed 
that replacing humans with robots or other AI would 
lead to adverse outcomes. It is seen as indicative of an 
uncaring society where obligations to our growing elderly 
population is too easily delegated to machines. 
As Amanda and Noel Sharkey point out, though, it’s 
not clear that elder people themselves will always see 
it that way. As they say, “[i]t might even turn out that, 
given the choice, some of the frail elderly might prefer 
robotic, as opposed to human, assistance for certain 
intimate tasks such as toileting, or bathing.” (Sharkey 
and Sharkey, 2012, p.31) In fact there is good evidence 
that some kinds of robot have beneficial effects on care 
home residents - for instance, Robinson et al. (2013) 
found that a simple robot ‘pet’ decreased loneliness. 
More functional robot companions could perhaps further 
enhance the autonomy and dignity of older people, who 
would otherwise be wholly reliant on the availability 
and attention of other humans. The option of speaking 
to a medical chatbot could support users’ autonomy in 
similar ways.
 RECOMMENDATION 21: At least in more 
high-stakes or emotionally sensitive areas, 
we should take seriously the possibility 
that concerns about dehumanisation 
in health/care applications of AI will 
resonate with many people. On the other 
hand, we should not become over-reliant 
on generalisations or assumptions about 
how people might feel about interacting 
with AI. It’s possible that some people, in 
some situations, might find dealing with 
AI helpers or carers empowering, or less 
undignified than reliance on humans for 
certain intimate roles (for example, elderly 
people requiring assistance to get in and 
out of the bath).
Secondly, we should remember not to succumb to the 
fallacy of comparing AI with some idealised human 
medic, care home worker or teacher. As Richard and 
Daniel Susskind point out:
it is a regrettable truth that a great number of 
professional experts are deeply lacking in empathy. 
Countless tales are relayed of the surgeon with 
zero bedside manner, the lawyer with no client-
handling ability, the brutally insensitive teacher, and 
so on. … Accordingly, we must be cautious about 
asking more of our machines than we currently 
secure from people. 
(Susskind and Susskind, 2016, p.251)
That healthcare contains a number of Doc Martins and 
Gregory Houses (and other professions their equivalents) 
does not, of course, mean that we should throw out the 
baby with the proverbial bathwater, and dispense with 
the need for human empathy altogether. Nonetheless, it 
is important to remember that the relevant comparator 
is not the perfect professional, but in many cases, jaded 
and overworked human beings. Note that this point 
echoes our earlier caveats about double standards in 
transparency.
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On a related note, we might wonder whether 
demanding that a human counsellor, healthcare worker 
or lawyer should invest emotionally in the suffering and 
anxiety of their clients and patients is to demand a very 
great deal from them. For those working in emotionally 
arduous areas of law or healthcare, for example, 
maintaining a certain emotional distance may be a 
necessary coping strategy to avoid ‘burnout’. One might 
even argue the case for AI systems that specialise in 
emotional engagement, in areas where human workers 
are susceptible to burnout. Such tools may possibly be 
effective even if users are aware they are talking to a 
machine, if the therapeutic effect is mainly in the act 
of talking. Some AI companies specialise in dialogue 
agents that seek to establish an emotional connection 
with their human users: the New Zealand company Soul 
Machines is a case in point. Recent studies showed that 
users responded more positively to the Soul Machines 
dialogue agent if it expressed emotions visibly and 
audibly (see Loveys, Sagar and Broadbent, 2020). 
A third caveat goes to the reasons why many people 
may express a preference for empathetic humans. It’s 
possible that the desire for human empathy derives 
from a belief that a doctor, lawyer, teacher etc who 
‘knows how we feel’ is more likely to care about our 
well-being, and therefore, more likely to work hard for 
a good outcome for us. In that case, empathy would 
be instrumentally valuable, a means to another end, 
specifically, the provision of better service.
This may be a valid heuristic when dealing with human 
professionals, but it’s less clear that it counts as an 
argument against AI professionals. While empathy 
may serve an important instrumental role in motivating 
humans to ‘go that extra mile’ for us, AIs will require 
no such motivation. An AI lawyer programmed to work 
on our case will do so without fatigue, boredom or 
distraction, until it is instructed to stop. In the case of 
medical AIs, what the patient needs is perhaps trust, 
rather than empathy. 
In considering all of these caveats and arguments, we 
should recognise that ‘empathy’ may not describe a 
single, simple concept at all. Psychology professor and 
author Paul Bloom has sought to distinguish “emotional” 
empathy (sometimes called “affective empathy”) from 
“cognitive empathy.” The latter he describes as “[t]he 
capacity to understand what’s going on in other people’s 
heads, to know what makes them tick, what gives them 
joy and pain, what they see as humiliating or ennobling.” 
(Bloom, 2016, p.36) This he sees as essential to being a 
good medical practitioner, or indeed, a good ethical actor. 
Emotional empathy, in contrast, he sees as a frequent 
obstacle to good medical practice or ethical action. For 
one thing, it can lead us to over-value the interests of 
those with whom we readily identify. It can also, Bloom 
argues, prevent professionals doing their jobs properly:
The risks of empathy are perhaps most obvious 
with therapists, who have to continually deal with 
people who are depressed, anxious, deluded, and 
often in severe emotional pain. … anyone who 
thinks that it’s important for a therapist to feel 
depressed or anxious while dealing with depressed 
or anxious people is missing the point of therapy. 
(p.144)
He also cites the example of his uncle who, when 
undergoing cancer treatment, “seemed to get the 
most from doctors who didn’t feel as he did, who were 
calm when he was anxious, confident when he was 
uncertain.”  (p.146) 
Unsurprisingly, Bloom’s approach has not met with 
universal agreement. Nonetheless, interrogating the 
‘empathy objection’ to AI involves interrogating what 
exactly we mean by ‘empathy’, and which forms we see 
as essential, desirable or unhelpful in a variety of contexts. 
 RECOMMENDATION 22: Concerns 
about lack of empathy are common in 
discussions about AI replacing humans in 
some key roles, but ‘empathy’ can refer to 
different things, and we should be clear 
what sort of empathy is wanted in what 
situations. It may be that AI could become 
very good at recognising and responding 
appropriately to human emotions, without 
having to feel them.
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Human roles for human needs
Such instrumental concerns, though, are unlikely to 
be the only reason that we want professionals to care 
about us. For many people, there may be an innate 
human need to believe that the person to whom we are 
recounting our fears and troubles, or to whom we are 
exposing our vulnerabilities, actually cares about us – not 
just so they will try harder on our behalf, but because 
the knowledge (or at least belief) that they do has 
profound emotional significance. This may be particularly 
important when they are trying to assuage our fears or 
impart bad news.
Another concern may relate to the sort of professional 
judgment and intuition that allows human doctors 
to pick up on cues from their patients’ behaviour or 
presentation. An experienced GP, for example, may 
pick up on the fact that a patient presenting with one 
complaint is actually worried about another matter that 
they are, for whatever reason, reluctant to raise. In theory 
an AI trained on a sufficiently vast database of doctor-
patient encounters could do the same – there’s nothing 
inherently immeasurable about such correlations. But 
it may prove difficult to train an AI to spot the cues on 
which doctors rely. A key problem is that ‘nonverbal’ cues 
like eye gaze, posture and intonation are likely to have an 
important role here, and many medical dialogue systems 
aren’t set up to record such signals. 
Richard and Daniel Susskind are willing to concede, 
at least for the sake of argument, that certain aspects 
of professional roles will be challenging to automate. 
But they express doubt as to whether the current 
model of professionalism is well equipped to provide 
for these. They are unconvinced by the notion that 
‘subject matter experts’ are in fact likely to possess the 
sort of interpersonal skills or best placed to provide the 
emotional support patients sometimes need:
When there is bad news to impart … it is not 
self-evident that we should lean towards the 
technical specialist to dispense the comforting 
words. Instead, we might turn, for example, to 
a para-professional, someone with sufficient 
insight into the area of expertise as well as the 
genuine capacity to empathize. By disengaging the 
application of expertise from the communication 
with the recipient … this moves us, in part, away 
from the traditional model of production and 
distribution of practical expertise towards the 
‘para professional’ model … In both cases, though, 
human beings are still involved. 
(Susskind and Susskind, 2016, p.252)
This is an idea that recurs throughout much of the 
literature around AI in the professions; the idea that 
automation of the more routine, burdensome aspects 
of a role could free up time for those tasks uniquely 
suited to human beings. Writing of his own experience 
as a healthcare professional, Rahul Parikh has taken an 
optimistic view of the opportunities presented by AI:
I went to medical school to connect with people 
and make a difference. Today I often feel like an 
overpaid bookkeeper instead, taking in information 
and spitting it back to patients, prescribing drugs 
and adjusting doses, ordering tests. But AI in the 
exam room opens up the chance to recapture 
the art of medicine. It could let me get to know 
my patients better, learn how a disease uniquely 
affects them, and give me time to coach them 
toward a better outcome. 
(Parikh, 2018)
The idea that this could see the emergence of wholly 
new patient-facing roles has also been articulated by 
Martin Ford: 
there may eventually be an opportunity to create 
a new class of medical professionals: persons 
educated with perhaps a four-year undergraduate 
or master’s degree, and who are trained primarily 
to interact with and examine patients – and then 
to convey that information into a standardized 
diagnostic and treatment system. These new, 
lower-cost practitioners would be able to take on 
many routine cases, and could be deployed to 
help manage the dramatically growing number of 
patients with chronic conditions such as obesity 
and diabetes. 
(Ford, 2015, p.157) 
These new practitioners, Ford suggests, “could handle 
routine cases, while referring patients who require more 
specialized care to physicians.” (p.158) The AI Forum’s 
report suggested that ‘data science doctor’ and ‘clinical 
machine learning expert’ could be new specialities in 
future, and recommended that New Zealand should train 
more doctors in data science. (AI Forum, 2019, p.44)
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Of course, all this relies on the assumption that more 
efficient delivery of automatable tasks will result in 
greater investment in those tasks less amenable to 
automation – an outcome that is in no sense inevitable. 
Nonetheless, it is an outcome that should be kept in 
mind, as human providers find their physical, cognitive 
and emotional capacities stretched ever further. 
It is possible that certain emotional abilities of good 
doctors, therapists, etc. will be difficult to replicate in 
AI, particularly those that rely on subtle understanding 
of emotions in patients, and the subtle conveying 
of emotions to patients. It’s also possible that, for 
whatever reason, some people would simply prefer that 
emotionally difficult conversations – such as imparting 
bad news – take place with a human professional. For 
those sorts of reasons, we consider it likely that we’ll 
continue to see humans in many of those roles for the 
foreseeable future. We may, however, see a significant 
reallocation of tasks, with a greater emphasis placed 
on human professionals who are skilled in those parts 
of the role that are (at least for now) uniquely suited 
to human providers, while more ‘technical’ aspects are 
taken up by AI.
Uniqueness neglect
A particular variety of the dehumanisation concern is 
what has been referred to in the literature as uniqueness 
neglect. This accepts as a starting position that AI will 
be very good at, for example, diagnosis and treatment 
recommendations in general, but will do so at the 
expense of paying due attention to the particular 
circumstances of the individual patient. A 2019 article 
published in the Journal of Consumer Research suggests 
that this response is common among patients. As the 
authors suggest: 
consumers may be more reluctant to utilize 
medical care delivered by AI providers than 
comparable human providers, because the 
prospect of being cared for by AI providers is 
more likely to evoke a concern that one’s unique 
characteristics, circumstances, and symptoms 
will be neglected. We refer to this concern as 
uniqueness neglect. 
(Longoni, Bonezzi and Morewe, 2019, p.630)
On this analysis, patients may be quite willing to accept 
that the recommended course of treatment is better 
in general, but less willing to accept that it is the right 
course for them. This may be thought to be another 
concern that only arises where the AI replaces the 
human doctor, etc. It may, however, also be an issue 
where a human professional is kept ‘in the loop’, but 
in such a way that they are inclined to accept the AI’s 
recommendations more or less unquestioningly. This is 
the issue of ‘automation bias’ that we addressed in our 
first report.
As expressed by Longoni et al, the uniqueness neglect 
thesis is concerned with documenting and explaining 
barriers to consumer acceptance; the authors do not 
take a position on the validity of these concerns. And 
in fact, an AI system which takes many input data 
points about a patient may well be able to propose 
quite customised treatment, rather than grouping 
patients into broad categories, if its training set is big 
enough, and its learning algorithm is powerful enough. 
Rosalind McDougall, however, has advanced a more 
normative variant of this thesis, which relates to power 
structures in medicine. As she explains, medical ethics 
has for decades been characterised by a trend away 
from ‘doctor knows best’ paternalism, and towards an 
approach that recognises and prioritises the specific 
values, goals and fears of the individual patient. AI 
systems that make treatment recommendations, she 
argues, “present a potential threat to shared decision 
making, because the individual patient’s values do not 
drive the ranking of treatment options.” (McDougall, 
2019, p.157)
McDougall sets out her concern using the example of 
Watson for Oncology. This, she explains, “ranks treatment 
options based on a particular value: maximising 
lifespan.” While this may, at first glance, seem quite 
reasonable, McDougall points out that “We know that 
patients’ values differ. Not all patients aim exclusively for 
longevity in their treatment choices.” (p.157) A particular 
patient may afford higher significance to minimisation 
of suffering or quality of remaining life, rather than 
extending its duration. A related concern from 
McDougall is that “these types of AI systems currently 
do not encourage doctors and patients to recognise 
treatment decision making as value-laden at all.” (p.157) 
This is a familiar concern from a variety of contexts 
involving automated or algorithmic decisions; that their 
automated and seemingly objective nature serves to 
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disguise the inherently moral or political nature of the 
decisions being made.
The preference for someone to take account of our 
unique personal circumstances is quite understandable, 
and to an extent, logical. It is possible, though, that some 
of those expressing a preference for real, caring humans 
do so from a position of unrealistic beliefs about how 
decisions are presently made. Faced with a procession of 
students, clients or patients on a daily basis, it is all but 
inevitable that professionals will fall back on actuarial 
assumptions and generalisations about individual cases. 
We might also wonder whether some of these concerns 
about algorithmic decisions rely on poor design rather 
than any fundamental constraint. In response to 
McDougall’s concern that AI systems will tend to ignore 
patient aspirations, we could simply require that a 
medical AI system is able to interact with the patient, 
to learn more about these aspirations. Exactly how to 
interact is still an open question, of course – but there 
is nothing about AI systems that precludes interactions. 
McDougall can be understood as advocating that 
medical AI systems should be dialogue systems, in which 
doctor and patient jointly negotiate an outcome. 
How such proposals can be mandated, or enforced, is of 
course a separate question – to which we now turn. 
F. Regulatory issues
Some professions hold monopolies on offering 
certain services. Other rules govern who can advertise 
themselves as a member of a given profession. Most (or 
all, depending on how we define a ‘profession’) have 
rules applicable to those practising within them. How 
will those rules operate in an environment where we 
have AI lawyers, doctors or financial advisors? In reality, 
it’s likely to be quite some time before we encounter any 
serious proposal to replace those professionals entirely 
with AI. We are already seeing, though, the prospect 
of task-specific AI taking over particular aspects of 
those roles. Will the rules governing those professions 
serve as barriers to this use of such technologies? Can 
AI service providers meet the standards we require of 
human professionals? We consider these questions 
in the context of a few of our more heavily regulated 
professions.
Healthcare
The healthcare sector in New Zealand “is governed by 
a wide array of statutes and subordinate legislation”. 
(Paterson, 2015, p.3) Some of these exist to ensure 
certain standards of competence and ethical conduct 
from practitioners. Others have a focus on patients (or 
‘healthcare consumers’’) rights. A third stream regulates 
the use of therapeutic products. Precisely where AI 
in healthcare will fit within that scheme is a complex 
question that merits closer scrutiny.
The regulation of medical devices is currently in a state 
of regulatory transition in New Zealand, with new draft 
Therapeutic Products Bill still making its way through the 
parliamentary process. (Ministry of Health, 2019) This is 
intended to address widely acknowledged gaps in the 
current system, whereby “[m]edical devices are currently 
not subject to any pre-market regulatory scrutiny to 
assess safety and performance and post-market controls 
are minimal.” (Ministry of Health, 2018a, [22]) The new 
scheme will adopt a wide definition of therapeutic 
products, encompassing obvious categories such as 
implants and surgical equipment, but also software 
that is used for a therapeutic purpose, which includes 
matters such as diagnosis.
Many if not all of the applications of AI in healthcare 
that we have considered in this section seem likely to fall 
within the new regulatory scheme, which is intended: 
to apply the full range of pre- and post-market 
controls in accordance with the risk-based model 
developed initially by the Global Harmonisation 
Taskforce (GHTF) and continued and maintained  
by the International Medical Device Regulators 
Forum (IMDRF). 
(Ministry of Health, 2018a, [23])
At almost 300 sections, the new Bill is lengthy and 
complex, and the consultation document barely less so. It 
is not our intention to scrutinise either in detail here. It is 
important, however, to consider how the Bill might apply 
to AI. Most medical devices and therapeutic products, 
it might be assumed, will continue to operate in much 
the same way after their initial approval (subject, of 
course, to malfunction, breakage and wear and tear.) AI 
software, in contrast, has the potential to change after 
the approval process is complete, a feature that has the 
potential to make it an elusive regulatory target.
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As we noted earlier, the much-discussed scenario where 
AI autonomously adapts ‘in the field’ is at least for now 
very rare, and great care would have to be taken were this 
ever to be allowed for the sort of high-stakes functions 
that we would expect to encounter in healthcare. Much 
more realistic, at least for the foreseeable future, will be 
post-market change in the form of version updates. These 
have the potential to be checked prior to release, but it 
will be important for the new regulatory system to be clear 
about when a software update constitutes a new product 
necessitating a fresh approval.
In the USA, the Food and Drug Administration has 
proposed a regulatory framework for changes to software 
including machine learning and AI. (FDA, 2019) Deliberate 
changes would require a new regulatory approval where 
it significantly affects performance, safety or effectiveness. 
Importantly, the FDA also acknowledges that:
The traditional paradigm of medical device 
regulation was not designed for adaptive AI/ML 
technologies, which have the potential to adapt 
and optimize device performance in real-time to 
continuously improve healthcare for patients. 
This has led them to the provisional conclusion that:
The highly iterative, autonomous, and adaptive 
nature of these tools requires a new, total product 
lifecycle (TPLC) regulatory approach that facilitates 
a rapid cycle of product improvement and allows 
these devices to continually improve while 
providing effective safeguards. 
The consultation document considers a range of 
strategies, including a requirement to indicate at the 
initial approval stage how such adaptations will be 
safely managed; an obligation on manufacturers to keep 
such products under review; and a duty to make a new 
submission if the product changes beyond the intended 
use for which it was previously authorised.
The FDA’s approach is still very much in draft form, 
and may be amended based on the results of the 
consultation process. Nonetheless, we recommend that 
it is something that New Zealand’s Ministry of Health 
and the therapeutic devices regulator should be keeping 
under review, as our new therapeutic devices regulatory 
framework moves through the legislative process.
A modified version of a therapeutic products regulatory 
framework may be essential for some uses of AI in 
healthcare, but there are questions as to whether it 
goes far enough for others. Some applications, such as 
conversational agents in the mental health context, will 
have interactions with human ‘healthcare consumers’ 
that are of a very different nature from what we would 
typically associate with medical devices. We might in 
fact wonder whether these interactions are, to some 
extent, more appropriately managed within a regulatory 
paradigm designed for interactions between human 
doctors and patients. 
Section 118(i) of the Health Practitioners Competence 
Assurance Act 2003 places a duty on the Medical 
Council (and other authorities specific to different 
healthcare roles) “to set standards of clinical 
competence, cultural competence (including 
competencies that will enable effective and respectful 
interaction with Māori), and ethical conduct to be 
observed by health practitioners of the profession”. 
Some of this involves making sure that practitioners are 
suitably qualified, and that their skills and knowledge 
stay up to date. Others, however, relate to the manner in 
which doctors conduct themselves towards patients.
With regard to competence and ethical conduct, the 
Medical Council sets out these standards in its Good 
Medical Practice document (2016). The standards in 
this document include requirements ‘to establish and 
maintain trust with your patients.’ ([14]), to ‘[m]ake sure 
you treat patients as individuals and respect their dignity 
and privacy ([15]) and to ‘[b]e courteous, respectful and 
reasonable.’ ([16])
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ 
Rights establishes a number of important rights that 
‘healthcare consumers’ are entitled to expect. Some of 
the Code’s rights reflect concerns that we would certainly 
expect to be taken into account when AI is deployed in 
a healthcare setting. Right 4(1), for example, recognises 
“the right to have services provided with reasonable 
care and skill”, while Right 5(1) establishes that “[e]very 
consumer has the right to effective communication in a 
form, language, and manner that enables the consumer 
to understand the information provided.” 
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Other rights, however, may pose questions if AIs are 
assuming patient-facing roles previously taken by 
humans. For example: 
•  the right to be treated with respect (Right 1(1));
•  the right to be provided with services that take into 
account the needs, values, and beliefs of different 
cultural, religious, social, and ethnic groups, including 
the needs, values, and beliefs of Māori (Right 1(3));
•  the right to have services provided in a manner 
that respects the dignity and independence of the 
individual (Right 3); and
•  the right to an environment that enables both 
consumer and provider to communicate openly, 
honestly, and effectively (Right 5(2)). 
The presence of these requirements under the 2003 Act 
and the Code raises a question as to whether it should be 
a requirement, before AI tools are deployed in patient-
facing settings, that they be able to comply with the same 
standards that we currently set for humans. How might 
such a requirement be discharged? Can a conversational 
agent be imbued with ‘cultural competence’ or assured to 
respect the dignity of the individual? 
These are questions that will surely be subject of 
ongoing scrutiny in the medical ethical literature and 
beyond. From a regulatory perspective, though, what 
is interesting to note is that AI in healthcare looks likely 
to straddle two previously distinct strands. Insofar as 
it is viewed as an artefact, then it will be subject to 
the therapeutic products regime, oriented towards risk 
minimisation. But in those contexts where AI performs 
in a more ‘human’ way – communicating directly with 
healthcare consumers – then it arguably should also be 
evaluated against the framework that exists to ensure 
that human healthcare providers conduct their duties in 
a respectful and culturally competent manner. Whether 
this can be achieved within the current regulatory 
framework, or whether some more innovative approach 
that fulfils these different roles, will be a matter for 
further study.
 RECOMMENDATION 23: In New Zealand, 
healthcare is regulated in part by rules 
aimed at therapeutic devices, and in part 
by rules aimed at human practitioners. 
Some healthcare AI seems to straddle 
those two streams. Insofar as it is viewed 
as an artefact, then it will be subject to 
the therapeutic products regime, oriented 
towards risk minimisation. But in those 
contexts where AI performs in a more 
‘human’ way – communicating directly 
with healthcare consumers – then it 
should also be evaluated against the 
framework that exists to ensure that 
human healthcare providers conduct 
their duties in a respectful and culturally 
competent manner. Whether the new 
Therapeutic Products Bill, and the 
regulator it creates, makes adequate 
provision for this remains to be seen.
Law
Law is another traditional profession the practice 
of which is carefully controlled via legal and ethical 
regulations. There are, as yet, no rules in New Zealand 
specifically governing the use of AI tools in law, but as 
in many other contexts where AI is deployed, it may be 
subject to more general rules governing that context. The 
Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 makes it an offence 
for anyone who is not a lawyer to provide “legal services” 
(s.21(1)(a)) and to describe themselves as a lawyer, legal 
practitioner, barrister, solicitor, etc. (s.21(1)(b)). 
A related provision is s 23, which makes it an offence 
to make a false or misleading representation that legal 
services are being provided by, or under the direct 
supervision of, a person who is a lawyer. Finally, s 24 
of the Act makes it an offence for someone who is not 
a lawyer to carry out “reserved areas of work” if they 
do so “for gain or reward”. Reserved areas relate to 
representing before or advising about any proceedings 
before any court of tribunal.
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The Act defines “legal services” fairly extensively. For 
present purposes, some of the more relevant restrictions 
are likely to be on:  
•  advice in relation to any legal or equitable rights or 
obligations:
•  the preparation or review of any document that:
 (i)  creates, or provides evidence of, legal or   
 equitable rights or obligations; or 
 (ii) creates, varies, transfers, extinguishes, mortgages,  
 or charges any legal or equitable title in any   
 property.
The provision of legal advice is generally taken to be 
distinct from the provision of legal information. Although 
these terms are not defined in the Act, information may 
plausibly be supposed to apply to information about 
how the law works in general terms, while advice will 
be information targeted to the individual’s particular 
circumstances. 
The terms of the 2006 Act could be relevant for 
the sorts of ‘chatbots’ that were until recently being 
developed by the Wellington Community Law Centre 
initiative, CitizenAI (https://www.citizenai.nz/projects). 
Services like LagBot, RentBot and WorkBot use natural 
language dialogue systems to enable people to ask 
questions about their prison, tenancy or employment 
issues. As already noted, these new tools have significant 
potential to improve access to justice by directly 
responding to routine legal questions without the need 
for a lawyer, but with the quality of information based 
on thousands of previous similar questions and answers 
(much like a real time ‘Frequently Asked Questions’). 
Provided they offer legal information in general 
terms, rather than legal advice in response to specific 
situations, it seems likely that the CitizenAI legal chatbots 
will comply with the terms of the 2006 Act. As the 
technology progresses, though, it may be that legal AI 
will be developed that is able to offer advice tailored to 
a particular client’s needs.
In the future, law firms might also offer these services 
to their clients, directing them to readily available 
information to answer simple questions and facilitating 
their interaction with a lawyer in more complex cases 
or in prescribed circumstances. Were that to become 
possible, those using such a service will need to take 
care to ensure that:
•  with regard to legal advice in general, they do 
not describe the chatbot as a “lawyer” or make 
misleading claims that it is being supervised by a 
lawyer; and 
•  with specific regard to advice about court 
proceedings, the chatbot would not be allowed to 
offer ‘advice’ at all.
 RECOMMENDATION 24: Provided they 
offer legal information in general terms, 
rather than legal advice in response to 
specific situations, it seems likely that AI 
legal chatbots such as those introduced 
by CitizenAI will comply with the terms of 
the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. 
As the technology progresses, though, it 
may be that legal AI will be developed 
that is able to offer advice tailored to a 
particular client’s needs. Were that to 
become possible, those using such a 
service should take care to ensure that:
 • With regard to legal advice in general,  
 they do not describe the chatbot as a  
 “lawyer” or make misleading claims that  
 it is being supervised by a lawyer;
 • With specific regard to advice about  
 court proceedings, the chatbot would  
 not be allowed to offer ‘advice’ at all.
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Financial advice16 
The provision of financial advice in New Zealand is 
governed by the Financial Advisors Act 2008 and the 
Financial Markets Authority (FMA). Until recently, it 
appeared that personalised digital advice was ruled 
out under the Act, which refers to a “person” providing 
such advice (s.8). However, the Act also empowered 
the FMA to grant exemptions from compliance with the 
Act. Using this discretion, the FMA issued the Financial 
Advisers (Personalised Digital Advice) Exemption, which 
came into force on 1 June 2018. 
Under the Exemption, registered financial service 
providers can now apply to provide ‘robo-advice’ services 
in respect of eligible products, such as KiwiSaver. This 
is a transitional provision; when the Financial Services 
Legislation Amendment Act 2019 comes into force in 
March 2021, it will remove the requirement for financial 
advice to be given by a person. The Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment have explained the effect 
and rationale for the new legislation: 
The requirement for personalised financial advice 
to be given by a natural person will also be 
removed. Technology neutral legislation will further 
enable the provision of robo (or digital) advice 
and help future-proof the regime and enable new 
and innovative ways of providing financial advice. 
(MBIE, 2018)
An obligation to use/understand AI?
Much of the focus on AI in professional roles is on 
whether it should be allowed to be used in certain 
contexts, and if so, what condition should be placed 
on its use. Given the projected benefits, though, we 
should also take seriously the possibility that there may 
sometimes be a professional obligation to use AI. Most 
obviously, such an obligation could arise when AI was 
demonstrably safer than other options – if, for example, 
an AI tool was shown to offer more accurate diagnosis 
or treatment recommendations, it would be difficult for 
a doctor to justify not using it. Writers on the subject are 
beginning to take seriously the idea that “[i]f AI methods 
of diagnosis become sufficiently advanced, it will be 
malpractice not to use them”. (Pasquale, 2020, p.44)
Obligations could also arise in the context of AI offering 
cheaper services. Insofar as client fees should reflect 
the amount of time or expertise dedicated to a task, 
this may raise the question of whether there ever be 
an obligation to use AI if that can reduce those costs. A 
recent decision by an Ontario court suggests this could 
be a serious possibility for lawyers. In Cass v. 1410088 
Ontario Inc. 2018 ONSC 6959, an unsuccessful plaintiff 
appealed against an award of costs, on the basis that 
the defendant’s legal fees were excessive. Part of the 
claim related to fees for legal research. In agreeing that 
the fees were excessive, the judge observed that “[i]f 
artificial intelligence sources were employed, no doubt 
counsel’s preparation time would have been significantly 
reduced.” (At [34])
In another Ontario case (Drummond v. The Cadillac 
Fairview Corp. Ltd., 2018 ONSC 5350) the judge held 
that the costs of using AI research tools are something 
for which lawyers can reasonably charge. In Drummond, 
the judge concluded that:
The reality is that computer-assisted legal research 
is a necessity for the contemporary practice of law 
and computer assisted legal research is here to 
stay with further advances in artificial intelligence 
to be anticipated and to be encouraged. Properly 
done, computer assisted legal research provides 
a more comprehensive and more accurate 
answer to a legal question in shorter time than 
the conventional research methodologies, which, 
however, also remain useful and valuable. Provided 
that the expenditure both in terms of lawyer time 
and computer time is reasonable and appropriate 
for the particular legal problem, I regard computer-
assisted legal research as recoverable counsel fee 
item and also a recoverable disbursement. ([10])
While stopping short of a duty to use AI, taken together, 
these decisions suggest that costs incurred from using 
AI appropriately can be charged to a client, but that a 
lawyer whose services are more expensive because of a 
refusal to use AI cannot pass the cost of this refusal onto 
the client. 
In other jurisdictions, concerns about the impact of 
new forms of technology on lawyers’ professional 
obligations, including client care, have prompted 
new or supplementary professional duties in some 
jurisdictions. In 2012 the American Bar Association 
amended its Code of Conduct to introduce a “duty of 
technical competence”. Comment 8 on Model Rule 1.1 
16 In preparing this section, we were grateful for the research of 
Otago Law student Hannah Cross. Hannah’s prize-winning essay 
on the regulation of robo-advice can be read at https://www.
gallawaycookallan.co.nz/law-emerging-tech.
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provides that to maintain “requisite knowledge and skill, 
a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and 
its practice, including the benefits and risks associated 
with relevant technology” (emphasis added). At least 
35 states have since formulated rules of professional 
conduct that adopt this comment and model rule in 
some form.
The Code does not make specific mention of AI, but 
if its actual benefits come close to some of the hype, 
then it is easy to see how the general duty of technical 
competence could be taken to encompass at least 
basic knowledge and skill relating to such technologies. 
New Zealand’s Lawyers and Conveyancers Act and 
associated Conduct and Client Care Rules do not 
contain a technology specific duty of competence, but 
do contain a general duty to act competently and in a 
timely manner.17 As AI tools become more common and 
reliable within the profession, it may be that an ability 
and willingness to use some AI would be inferred from 
the general duty. 
RECOMMENDATION 25: Given the 
projected benefits, we should also take 
seriously the possibility that there may 
sometimes be a professional obligation to 
use AI. Most obviously, this could arise were 
AI shown to be safer or more accurate 
than other options – if, for example, an 
AI tool was shown to offer more accurate 
diagnosis or treatment recommendations, 
it would be difficult for a doctor to justify 
not using it. But a duty may also arise if 
using AI renders the delivery of services 
less expensive; a Canadian court has 
already recognised that, if a lawyer elects 
not to use labour-saving AI, they cannot 
pass any additional cost onto their client. 
17 “In providing regulated services to a client, a lawyer must always 
act competently and in a timely manner consistent with the terms 
of the retainer and the duty to take reasonable care.” Lawyers and 
Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008, 
Chapter 3, paragraph 3.
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